In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
____________________
NO. 09-06-209 CR
____________________
SHALANDRA DENISE WASHINGTON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 250179
A jury convicted appellant Shalandra Denise Washington (1) of the misdemeanor offense of hindering apprehension or prosecution and assessed punishment at ninety days of confinement, but recommended that Washington receive community supervision. The trial court entered a judgment that convicted Washington and sentenced her to ninety days of confinement, but suspended imposition of the sentence and placed Washington on community supervision for one year. Washington then filed this appeal, in which she raises two issues for our consideration: that the trial court failed to sufficiently admonish her concerning the dangers of self-representation, and that she was denied her right to counsel. The State filed a brief in which it concedes error as to both of Washington's issues. We reverse and remand.
The Sixth Amendment, which provides that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to counsel, also implies the right to self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 818-21, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975). "The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted and punished by imprisonment." Id. at 807; see also Collier v. State, 959 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). A waiver of counsel must be made (1) competently, (2) knowingly and intelligently, and (3) voluntarily. Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 625-26. "The decision to waive counsel and proceed pro se is made 'knowingly and intelligently' if it is made with a full understanding of the right to counsel, which is being abandoned, as well as the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation." Id. at 626 (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834-36). The trial court must make a defendant "aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.'" Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S. Ct. 236, 87 L. Ed. 268 (1942)); see also Goffney v. State, 843 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The record must reflect that the trial court thoroughly admonished the defendant. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834-36; Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 626 n.8. "[T]he record must be sufficient for the reviewing court to make an assessment that the defendant was made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of the self-representation." Goffney, 843 S.W.2d at 585.
In the case sub judice, the trial court stated at several points during voir dire that Washington chose to represent herself, and the prosecutor also mentioned Washington's self-representation to the jury and inquired of the members of the venire whether any of them felt that Washington's self-representation placed her at a disadvantage. The record also contains a document entitled "Misdemeanor Plea Admonishments," signed by appellant, which recites as follows, in pertinent part:
I have the right to have an attorney represent me, and if I cannot afford one the court will appoint one for me. I specifically waive my right to be represented by an attorney, to consult with an attorney before I give up these enumerated rights. [sic] It is my decision to represent myself, and I do so knowing the dangers and disadvantages of self[-]representation.
Voir dire in Washington's trial began on April 17, 2006. The document containing the purported waiver of counsel was not signed and filed until April 18, 2006, the day after the trial began. Neither the clerk's record nor the reporter's record reflects that before Washington's trial began, the trial court admonished her of the dangers of self-representation and that Washington knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834-36; Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 625-26, 626 n.8; Goffney, 843 S.W.2d at 585. Accordingly, we sustain issues one and two, and we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this cause for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
STEVE McKEITHEN
Chief Justice
Submitted on July 21, 2008
Opinion Delivered July 30, 2008
Do Not Publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
1. On her notice of appeal and various other documents in the record, appellant spells
her first name as "Shalanda." However, on the information and the trial court's judgment,
appellant's first name is spelled "Shalandra."