WITHDRAWN 12-20-90
AFFIRMED
NOVEMBER 29, 1990
NO. 10-89-252-CV
Trial Court
# B-139-88
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
TENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT WACO
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
GERARD DEAN,
Appellant
v.
NADINE FREEDMAN,
Appellee
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
From 220th Judicial District Court
Bosque County, Texas
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
O P I N I O N
* * * * * * *
This is a bailment case growing out of the rental of a tractor. Defendant-Appellant Gerard Dean rented a tractor from Plaintiff-Appellee Nadine Freedman on or about April 2, 1988. Ms. Freedman filed this suit to recover the tractor she had rented to Mr. Dean, for unpaid rentals, and compensation for damages to the tractor.
Mr. Dean filed a counterclaim for labor and materials used to repair the tractor and asserted a mechanic's lien on the tractor.
Trial was before the court without a jury. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Freedman for damages to the tractor in the amount of $1700.00, for rental fees in the amount of $250.00 and $2277.70 attorneys fees. The $250.00 rental fees abovementioned were offset to the extent of $225.09 awarded to Defendant-Appellant for parts installed in the tractor.
Appellant comes to this court on three points of error as follows:
(1) The trial court erred as a matter of law because it failed to apply the correct test to determine how Appellant may have rebutted the presumption of negligence of a bailee.
(2) The trial court erred in finding Appellant negligent in that the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence adduced at trial clearly established that Appellant rebutted any presumption of negligence, both factually and as a matter of law.
(3) The trial court erred in refusing to award Appellant attorneys fees because the finding of sufficient evidence to establish appellant's claim, together with proof of presentment and reasonableness of fees, entitled Appellant to reasonable attorneys fees as a matter of law.
We have carefully considered all of Appellant's points and contentions, and respectfully overrule same and affirm the trial court's judgment.
At the outset, we should point out that after trial and prior to entry of judgment, the trial court wrote a letter addressed to the attorney for each side setting out in effect his analysis of the facts, as well as his view on the law as it applied to the various aspects of the case. This letter was filed in the District Clerk's office and included in the transcript. The Appellant takes the position that this letter has the legal effect of "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law' under the provisions of Rule 296, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. We do not agree. Neither side had filed a request for such findings of fact and conclusions of law. This letter had never been offered in evidence. Appellant complains of errors in legal reasoning and fact finding that he says appear in this letter. Appellant cannot use this letter to demonstrate error. Comments by the trial judge, written or oral, are not considered as substitutes for findings of fact or conclusions of law. Where findings of fact and conclusions of law are not properly requested and none are filed, as here, the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed if it can be upheld on any legal theory that finds support in the evidence. In the Interest of W.E.R., (Tex. 1984) 669 S.W.2d 716; also see Tejas Trail Property Owners Assn. v. Holt (Fort Worth CA 1974) 516 S.W.2d 441 and the cases cited at pages 444 and 445, no writ.
Roberson v. Robinson (Tex. 1989) 768 S.W.2d 280 at page 281 has this to say:
"In a nonjury trial, where no findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed or requested, it is implied that the trial court made all the necessary findings to support its judgment. (citations). When a statement of facts is brought forward, these implied findings may be challenged by factual sufficiency and legal sufficiency points the same as jury findings or a trial court's findings of fact."
(Citations).
Bearing in mind the foregoing authorities, we now proceed to deal with Appellant's points of error.
In Appellant's first point he complains that the trial court failed to apply the correct test to determine whether the Appellant rebutted the presumption of negligence by a bailee. Without findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is implied that Appellant failed under any test to rebut the presumption of negligence. Appellant's first point of error is overruled.
This brings us to Appellant's second point of error wherein he asserts the trial court erred in finding the Appellant negligent because such finding is legally and factually insufficient.
On April 2, 1988, Appellant Dean entered into an agreement with Appellee Freedman to rent her tractor to load manure into a manure spreader. They agreed that he would pay her ten dollars a day rental for the use of the tractor. Shortly after Appellant began using the tractor, it started "heating up." This was followed by a series of conversations between the parties and efforts to get the tractor repaired, much of the evidence concerning which was disputed. All of this culminated on April 25, 1988, when Ms. Freedman's brother, M.L. Meinkowski, pulled the tractor to Mr. Meinkowski's farm which was about four miles from Appellant's place. A fair summary of the evidence is as follows:
(1)The injury to the tractor was bent rods in the engine.
(2)After being used at Appellant's farm, the tractor engine never started again.
(3)Of the possible ways to bend the rods in an engine, one likely way is to try to start a "flooded" tractor by pulling it and engaging the transmission.
(4)Fuel can "flood" a tractor engine when the ignition switch is left on after the tractor is stopped.
(5)A prudent tractor operator will turn the ignition switch off when the tractor is stopped.
(6)Although Appellant denied pulling the tractor to start it again after the tractor engine quit running, the tractor somehow was moved from the field where it was used to Appellant's barn.
(7)The most contested evidence concerned the pulling or towing of the tractor. Appellant denied pulling the tractor "in gear" in an attempt to start it. Mr. Meinkowsky, Appellee's agent, denied towing the tractor "in gear" when the tractor was removed from Appellant's farm.
(8) Appellant's maintenance of the tractor eliminated the possibility that the bent rods were caused by anything other than the operator's negligence.
(9)Except to contest the person responsible for the damage, Appellant offered no other explanation for the physical cause of the damage to the tractor's engine.
After reviewing the evidence and taking into account that the trial court was the judge of the credibility of the witnesses, we are of the opinion and hold that the trial court's finding that Appellant failed to overcome his presumption of negligence was legally and factually sufficient. We therefore respectfully overrule Appellant's second point of error.
By Appellant's third and final point of error he contends that he was entitled to attorney's fees as a matter of law. The trial court awarded Appellant $225.09 for parts installed in the tractor without awarding him attorney's fees.
Appellant claimed a lien against the tractor under Section 70.001 of the Texas Property Code. Until this appeal, Appellant's only claim to his attorney's fees was under this section which allows the trial court in its discretion to award attorney's fees to the "prevailing party." See Seureau v. Mudd (Houston 14th CA 1974) 515 S.W.2d 746, NRE. In any event, in the absence of formal findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court impliedly made the findings to support his decision. Roberson v. Robinson (Tex.1989) 768 S.W.2d 280. Appellant's third and final point of error is overruled.
Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
JOHN A JAMES, JR.
DO NOT PUBLISH Justice (Retired)
[Participating: Chief Justice Thomas, Justice Means, and Justice James (Retired)]
(WITHDRAWN 12-20-90)