IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-99-168-CV
IN RE CURTIS WAYNE HARTFIELD
Original Proceeding
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Curtis Wayne Hartfield seeks a writ of mandamus compelling Johnson County Justice of the Peace Betty Stiles to proceed to trial on a matter filed in her court on June 4, 1999. We dismiss the petition for mandamus for want of jurisdiction.
Section 22.221 of the Government Code prescribes the original jurisdiction of the courts of appeals. That section states:
(b)Each court of appeals for a court of appeals district may issue all writs of mandamus, agreeable to the principles of law regulating those writs, against a:
judge of a district or county court in the court of appeals district; or
(2) judge of a district court who is acting as a magistrate at a court of inquiry under Chapter 52, Code of Criminal Procedure, in the court of appeals district.
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998). The Government Code does not confer mandamus jurisdiction over justice courts upon the courts of appeals. Id.; see Casner v. Rosas, 943 S.W.2d 937, 938 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no writ). Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction.
PER CURIAM
Before Justice Vance,
Justice Gray, and
Justice Campbell (sitting by assignment)
Opinion delivered and filed July 21, 1999
Petition dismissed
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she had known of the suppressed evidence, it may have affected her decision on punishment—demonstrates that withholding the testimony contributed to his punishment.
When considering newly discovered evidence, the court has "broad discretion to determine the issues, the credibility of the witnesses and whether a different result would occur in the event of a retrial." Ochoa v. State, 653 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983, no pet.). Furthermore, the denial of a motion for a new trial will not be disturbed unless there was an abuse of discretion. Eddlemon v. State, 591 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979).
The Jacksons never mentioned Appellant in their testimony or in the written transcript of the interview, which concerned a conversation they had with Richard and Tiffany Epps. Nor did their testimony corroborate Appellant's contention that he helped dispose of the body after the murder under duress. Under the circumstances, the court could have reasonably found that the evidence was irrelevant and would not have mitigated Appellant's punishment. This finding was reasonable, especially in the light of juror Williams' affidavit in which she merely stated that the evidence may have affected her decision on punishment.
Moreover, the court could have reasonably concluded that the Jacksons' testimony did not constitute newly discovered evidence. For the purpose of obtaining a new trial, evidence is not "newly discovered" if it is known to the defense at the time of the trial. Huffman v. State, 479 S.W.2d 62, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). Appellant's trial counsel first became aware of the evidence the Jacksons possessed and the written transcript when Dan Jackson approached him while the jury was still deliberating on punishment. The record does not reflect, however, that he ever asked the court to allow Appellant to reopen the evidence on punishment, to present the testimony of the Jacksons, and then to either reargue punishment or allow the jury to resume its deliberations without additional argument.
Based on the record as a whole, we cannot hold that the court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant's motion for a new trial. We affirm the judgment.
BOB L. THOMAS
Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Thomas,
Justice Cummings, and
Justice Vance
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed February 19, 1992
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