IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-60504
Summary Calendar
TROY T. REDMOND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; JAMES ANDERSON; WOOD
BROWN; FRED CHILDS; DAVID FONDREN; JOHN HALTOM,
Defendants-Appellees.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:00-CV-176-WS
--------------------
October 29, 2002
Before JONES, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Troy T. Redmond (“Redmond”) appeals the summary judgment for
the defendants on Redmond’s complaint asserting race discrimination
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, § 1983, and § 1985, in connection with his
termination from employment with the Mississippi Department of
Corrections (“MDOC”). Redmond argues that the district court erred
in limiting discovery to issues of the defendants’ qualified
immunity and in denying his discovery requests and that the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 01-60504
-2-
district court erred in determining that the defendants’ asserted
reason for terminating Redmond was not a pretext for race
discrimination.
The district court did not plainly err in limiting discovery.
See United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th Cir.
1994)(en banc). Although the doctrine of qualified immunity does
not apply to Redmond’s Title VII discrimination claims, see Harvey
v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227 (5th Cir. 1990), Redmond has not shown
that any discovery would have uncovered substantial fact issues
with which he could have opposed the summary judgment motion. See
Willamson v. United States Dep't of Agric., 815 F.2d 368, 373 (5th
Cir. 1987).
Redmond’s summary-judgment evidence did not counter the
defendants’ evidence that Redmond’s termination was motivated by
his assault on a MDOC hearing officer and other misconduct, not by
discriminatory animus. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, 507-508 (1993). The defendants thus were entitled to
judgment on Redmond’s Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 discrimination claims. Further, to the extent that Redmond
sued the defendants in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, the absence of an underlying constitutional or statutory
violation is fatal to such claims. See Johnston v. Harris County
Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1573 (5th Cir. 1989).
AFFIRMED.