IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-01-409-CR
No. 10-01-410-CR
No. 10-01-411-CR
No. 10-01-412-CR
No. 10-01-413-CR
No. 10-01-414-CR
No. 10-01-415-CR
No. 10-01-416-CR
No. 10-01-417-CR
No. 10-01-418-CR
     WILLIAM A. McINTOSH,
                                                                              Appellant
     v.
     THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                                                              Appellee
From the 40th District Court
Ellis County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 20084CR, 20085CR, 20086CR, 20087CR
20379CR, 20380CR, 20381CR, 20382CR, 20383CR and 20384CR
                                                                                                               Â
MEMORANDUM OPINION
                                                                                                               Â
      William A. McIntosh appeals from the trial courtâs denial of his motions for appointment of trial counsel in a series of DNA proceedings under chapter 64 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We notified McIntosh in a published order dated December 11, 2002 that these are not appealable orders and that these appeals would be dismissed for want of jurisdiction if supplemental clerkâs records containing orders adjudicating the merits of his motions for DNA testing were ânot filed with the Clerk of this Court on or before 5:00 p.m. on December 27, 2002.â McIntosh v. State, No. 01-409-CR, slip op. at 3-4, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 8879, at *4 (Tex. App.âWaco Dec. 11, 2002, order).
      We have not received a supplemental record containing an order on the merits in any of these appeals. Accordingly, we dismiss these appeals for want of jurisdiction.
                                                                   PER CURIAM
Before Chief Justice Davis,
      Justice Vance, and
      Justice Gray
Appeals dismissed for want of jurisdiction
Opinion delivered and filed March 5, 2003
Do not publish
[CR25]
rs, administrators, successors or assigns, an undivided one-half (½) interest of the oil, gas and other minerals produced with the oil and gas now owned by Charlsie Northcutt Morrison that are in and under the property and that may be produced from it[.]
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Under the Robinsons interpretation, the express wording of the reservation operated to reserve unto Morrison an undivided one-quarter interest in the mineral estate. The reservation, as quoted above, states that Morrison reserved an undivided one-half of the minerals produced with the oil and gas now owned by her. The words Ânow owned are underlined in the deed. We find that it is reasonable to read the reservation with an emphasis on the words Ânow owned and conclude that Morrison intended to convey one-half of her mineral interest (i.e. one-quarter of the total mineral interest).
     Morrison argues, however, that her reservation must be harmonized with the Evans Reservation which contains the following language:
SAVE AND EXCEPT and there is hereby reserved for Grantor, Barbara Morrison Evans and her heirs, administrators, successors or assigns, for a period until June 11, 2000, an undivided one-half (½) interest of the oil and gas and other minerals produced with the oil and gas now owned by Barbara Morrison Evans, that are in and under the property and that may be produced from it[.]
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On June 11, 2000, an undivided one-fourth (¼) interest of the total mineral estate shall pass to and be owned by Grantees, their heirs and assigns. It is the intent of the Grantor Barbara Morrison Evans and the Grantee [sic] James E. Robinson and Charles Owen Robinson, that as of June 11, 2000 that Barbara Morrison Evans, her heirs and assigns shall own an undivided one-fourth (¼) of the oil, gas and other minerals and James E. Robinson and Charles Owen Robinson and their heirs and assigns shall own an undivided one-fourth (¼) of the total oil, gas and mineral estate.
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Morrison claims that the meaning of the Ânow owned by language in her reservation is revealed in the additional language. She argues that the last sentence of the Evans Reservation indicates that both reservations intended for the grantors to initially retain their undivided one-half interests in the minerals. She argues that because the language in the Evans Reservation makes clear that the parties intended for Evans to retain her undivided one-half interest in the mineral estate until June 11, 2000, the only reasonable construction for the language in the Morrison Reservation is that she would likewise retain her undivided one-half interest in the mineral estate.
     Whether an instrument is ambiguous is a question of law that must be decided by examining it as a whole in light of the circumstances present when it was executed. See Enter. Leasing Co. of Houston v. Barrios, 156 S.W.3d 547, 549 (Tex. 2004). We must examine and consider the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all provisions so that none will be rendered meaningless. See Forbau v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex. 1994). No single provision will control; rather, all provisions must be considered with reference to the whole instrument. Id.
Finding that the wording of the Morrison Reservation is substantially identical to the Evans Reservation, and considering the additional language, we find that both interpretations are reasonable. Because the deed is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, it is ambiguous. This ambiguity creates a fact issue as to the parties intent and, therefore, summary judgment was not proper.
Conclusion
     Having sustained MorrisonÂs first issue, we reverse the summary judgment and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
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BILL VANCE
Justice
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Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Vance, and
Justice Reyna
           (Chief Justice Gray dissenting)
Reversed and remanded
Opinion delivered and filed August 30, 2006
[CV06]
   [1]  Barbara Evans is not a party.