IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-03-00177-CR
Gary Don Wright,
Appellant
v.
The State of Texas,
Appellee
From the 54th District Court
McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court # 2002-790-C
MEMORANDUM Opinion
A jury convicted Gary Don Wright of aggravated sexual assault. Wright pleaded “true” to an enhancement allegation, and the jury sentenced him to life imprisonment.
Wright contends in his sole issue that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove that the complainant did not consent on the occasion in question. Because we disagree, we will affirm.
In reviewing a claim of legal insufficiency, we view all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Va., 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 753-54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). “The jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be given their testimony.” Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (quoting Barnes v. State, 876 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)).
Here, the jury had to decide whether it believed the complainant Toni Smith’s version of the events or Wright’s. Smith testified that Wright forced her at knifepoint to accompany him to a remote area where he sexually assaulted her multiple times. A rape examination corroborated Wright’s assertion that Smith was forcibly sexually assaulted. Smith’s cousin testified that Smith came to her house after the assault, that her clothing and hair were in a state of disarray, and that she was upset.
Conversely, Wright testified that he purchased a rock of crack cocaine and a marihuana cigar for Smith. According to Wright, Smith smoked the rock, and then the two of them smoked the cigar. Smith directed Wright to a secluded area and encouraged him to have sexual intercourse with her. Wright denied threatening Smith with a knife.
“[R]econciliation of conflicts in the evidence is within the exclusive province of the jury.” Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 30 (quoting Losada v. State, 721 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)). Here, the jury heard conflicting evidence about whether the encounter between Wright and Smith was consensual. The jury chose to accept Smith’s version of the events over Wright’s.
Accordingly, we conclude that the State presented legally sufficient evidence to prove that Smith did not consent. Thus, we overrule Wright’s sole issue and affirm the judgment.
FELIPE REYNA
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Vance, and
Justice Reyna
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed December 29, 2004
Do not publish
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parties’ presentation of their discovery dispute. I cannot. I will not. I do not.
The procedure set out in the rules and case law is there for a reason. The procedure allows the trial court to make timely rulings based upon objections made and evidence that has been presented. The rulings will either allow or limit discovery. By this procedure, all parties know what the ruling of the trial court is and the basis for it. An aggrieved party may pursue an adverse ruling by appeal or, in an appropriate case, by petition for writ of mandamus.
The entire process is, however, dependent upon compliance with the basic procedures. The parties in this instance have so far departed from procedures required by the rules and this Court’s prior opinions that I cannot determine, on this record, whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the requested discovery, nor whether there is an adequate remedy at law. Accordingly, I would deny the petition on this basis. I would further expressly note that the denial is without prejudice to either party’s pursuit of rulings on objections timely made and requiring proof of privileges timely asserted pursuant to the applicable rules of discovery, or to other relief as may be appropriate. I see nothing in the majority opinion that prevents the parties from revisiting these issues.
Finally, because the majority has addressed the merits of the offensive-use doctrine, I add that I do not agree that, on this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order the production of some of the documents sought to be protected; nor do I agree with the majority’s determination that LWCC’s remedy by appeal is adequate. To say more, at this juncture, would not be prudent, because it may have the effect of disclosing the contents of documents for which a privilege has been asserted but not proven.
TOM GRAY
Justice
Concurring opinion delivered and filed August 4, 2003
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