IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-04-00263-CR
Mark Burton,
Appellant
v.
The State of Texas,
Appellee
From the Criminal District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Court # 82750
MEMORANDUM Opinion
Appellant has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal under Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1). See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1). Appellee has not filed a response. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
PER CURIAM
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Vance, and
Justice Reyna
(Chief Justice Gray concurs in the result only.)
Appeal dismissed
Opinion delivered and filed October 27, 2004
Do not publish
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Aggravated assault increases the penalty for simple “bodily injury” assault if the victim suffers a significantly greater degree of bodily harm—serious bodily injury, rather than mere bodily injury.
Landrian, 268 S.W.3d at 537 (footnotes and citations omitted).
The State’s version of a hypothetically correct charge is correct. The State is also correct that serious bodily injury is an aggravating factor and does not require a culpable mental state. See id. The indictment’s heightened intended level of injury should not be applied in a hypothetically correct jury charge on aggravated assault—causing serious bodily injury, a result-oriented offense. See id. Furthermore, a person is nevertheless criminally responsible for causing a result if the only difference between what actually occurred and what he desired, contemplated, or risked is that a different offense was committed. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.04(b)(1) (Vernon 2003); cf. Ferrel, 55 S.W.3d at 590-91.
Returning to the evidence and its sufficiency as to Fancher’s culpable mental state (mens rea), Fancher admitted that he hit Daniels on the side of the head. (Fancher does not dispute on appeal that his punch caused Daniels to fall to the floor and that the result of Daniels’s fall was serious bodily injury.) Intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as acts, words, and the conduct of the defendant. Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Intent to cause bodily injury can be reasonably inferred from Fancher’s act of striking Daniels in the head. See, e.g., Dobbins v. State, 228 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d, untimely filed) (jury may infer existence of culpable mental state from any facts tending to prove its existence, including acts, words, and conduct of accused) (citing Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). It is also consistent with his defensive theory of self-defense, which the jury rejected. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find a rational jury could have found that Fancher intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury by striking Daniels, which caused serious bodily injury. We overrule issue two.
Charge Error
Fancher’s first issue complains about error in the charge’s application paragraph. In analyzing a jury-charge issue, we first decide whether error exists. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The application paragraph provided:
Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 5th day of June, 2005, the defendant, Louis Sherley Fancher, did then and there intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly strike the said Billy Daniels, and caused serious bodily injury to Billy Daniels, as alleged in the indictment, then you will find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault as charged in the indictment.
[Emphasis added.]
Fancher contends:
The jury charge question in fact does not allege any crime, because it is not illegal to intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly strike someone. Furthermore, the charge question doesn’t come close to tracking the Indictment. Thus Appellant was convicted of an unindicted non-crime.
Fancher also asserts that the application paragraph failed to track the indictment, which alleged a heightened culpable mental state, and lessened the State’s burden of proof because it is “conduct-oriented” while the offense and the indictment are “result-oriented.”
Fancher did not object to the charge. The State concedes that the application paragraph is erroneous. Based on the language of the above-discussed assault statutes and case law, we agree that the application paragraph is erroneous. Because Fancher did not object, we analyze this error under the familiar Almanza standard. Allen v. State, 253 S.W.3d 260, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d 137, 143-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). Unobjected-to jury charge error will not result in reversal of a conviction in the absence of “egregious harm.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. In examining the record for egregious harm, we consider: (1) the entire jury charge; (2) the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and the weight of the probative evidence; (3) the final arguments of the parties; and (4) any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole. Olivas, 202 S.W.3d at 144. Charge error is egregiously harmful if it affects the very basis of the case, deprives the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affects a defensive theory. Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 706, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Sanchez v. State, 209 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
The Entire Jury Charge
Other than the erroneous application paragraph, the jury charge correctly states the law. Assault, aggravated assault, and the three applicable result-oriented culpable mental states are correctly defined in the charge’s abstract portion. But as Fancher points out, the application paragraph asked the wrong question, and it did so in a way that was the easiest for the State to get a conviction because Fancher testified and admitted striking Daniels. We cannot say that the jury charge, taken as a whole, ameliorates the error in the application paragraph. See Samaripas v. State, No. 10-09-00044-CR, 2010 WL 376949, at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 3, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
The State of the Evidence
As we have noted, Fancher admitted striking Daniels, and we agree with him that the erroneous application paragraph thus lessened the State’s burden of proof. Otherwise, a good part of the evidence concerned Daniels’s preexisting condition and medical testimony about Daniels’s injury. Fancher highlights that there was no evidence that he knew of Daniels’s preexisting spinal cord injury. While we found above that the evidence is sufficient under a hypothetically correct charge, we conclude that the application paragraph’s lessening of the State’s burden of proof nevertheless affects the very basis of the case by calling into question the jury’s verdict on the erroneous application paragraph.
Final Arguments
Fancher contends that the prosecutor exacerbated the charge error by emphasizing several times that the State had proved a culpable mental state by Fancher’s admission that he intentionally hit Daniels. Particularly troubling is the following excerpt made while arguing that the State had proved all five elements of the offense:
And three and four, I’m going to talk about together, that he intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caused bodily injury to Billy. Um, the defendant admits this, too. Think about what the defendant said when he testified yesterday. He admitted to punching Billy. Now, that’s intentional. He admitted to intentionally punching him. And, uh, I think his exact words were, “That’s when I hooked him with a left.” So you have all that. They having agreed to one, two, three, and four. Those are not in question. That it was June 5th, ’05. It was this defendant, Louis Fancher, that he intentionally hit Billy Daniels. [Emphases added.]
In this one excerpt, the prosecutor, after having correctly stated the law, twice conflates the correct result-oriented elements of assault with the application paragraph’s erroneous conduct-oriented statement. Furthermore, the prosecutor used an analogy that was also conduct-oriented; it involved a person who had just had knee surgery (a preexisting condition), was wearing pants that hid the preexisting condition, and was kicked in the knee. The prosecutor again conflated the correct (result-oriented) with the incorrect (conduct-oriented):
Remember, we talked about the person doesn’t have to intend to cause a serious bodily injury. If he intended to kick him in the knee and serious bodily injury is what happened, he’s guilty of aggravated assault.
The State agrees that this was done but also notes various correct statements of the law by the prosecutor in final argument.
Relevant Information from the Entire Trial
Neither party points to any other relevant information from the entire trial.
Conclusion
Based on the record as a whole, we find that the erroneous application paragraph deprived Fancher of a valuable right, which was a jury finding on the correct elements of the offense for which he was ultimately convicted. See Samaripas, 2010 WL 376949, at *6 (citing Sanchez, 209 S.W.3d at 125). We also conclude that the error affected the very basis of the case because it transformed a result-oriented offense into a conduct-oriented offense. We sustain issue one.
We find that Fancher was egregiously harmed by the erroneous application paragraph. We therefore reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case for a new trial. See Samaripas, 2010 WL 376949, at *7.
REX D. DAVIS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray
and Justice Davis[3]
Reversed and remanded
Opinion delivered and filed March 30, 2011
Do not publish
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[1] The Court of Criminal Appeals recently overruled Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) and factual-sufficiency review. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The court held that the Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency standard is the only standard a reviewing court should apply in determining the sufficiency of the evidence. Id.
[2] As we discuss below, Fancher asserts, and the State concedes, that the charge’s application paragraph is erroneous.
[3] The Honorable Felipe Reyna, a former justice on this court, was on the panel and present for argument, but having left office on December 31, 2010, he did not participate in this decision. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.1(c).