IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-03-00341-CR
Debbie McRAE Barton,
Appellant
v.
The State of Texas,
Appellee
From the 380th District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court # 380-81112-02
MEMORANDUM Opinion
This is an appeal of a conviction for forgery by check. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.21(b) (Vernon 2003). We will affirm.
1. Factual Sufficiency of the Evidence. In Appellant’s first issue, she contends that the evidence was factually insufficient. Appellant points out that neither the forged check nor a carbon copy were introduced, that there was no handwriting expert testimony, and that she did not forge any other checks made to her by the victim. The victim testified as to the amount of the check as made, and the altered amount on the check as passed. Appellant admitted to passing the check. Even though the altered amount of the check would have paid the victim’s debt for legal fees to Appellant in full, Appellant accepted and cashed another check from the victim for legal fees the next month. Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, and giving due deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations, the court was rationally justified in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed forgery. See Zuniga v. State, No. 539-02, 2004 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 668, at *20 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2004); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
2. Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence. In Appellant’s second issue, she contends that the evidence was legally insufficient. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed forgery. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Herrin v. State, 125 S.W.3d 436, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We overrule Appellant’s second issue.
3. Specific Intent. In her third issue, Appellant contends that she could not have had the specific intent to defraud the victim, since the victim owed her child support arrearages. Appellant need not have had the specific intent to defraud the maker of the check, but only that passing the check was, in its nature, calculated to injure or defraud, for example, the financial institution to which she passed the check. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.19 (Vernon 1979). We overrule Appellant’s third issue.
Having overruled Appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment.
TOM GRAY
Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Vance, and
Justice Reyna
Opinion delivered and filed September 15, 2004
Affirmed
Do not publish
[CR25]