IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-02-00239-CV
Yamaha Suzuki of Texas, Inc.
and W.L.E. Enterprises, Inc.,
Appellants
v.
Troy Martinez,
Appellee
From the 249th District Court
Johnson County, Texas
Trial Court # C-2001-00153
MEMORANDUM Opinion
We determine that a trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied motions to impose sanctions against a litigant and his attorneys.
Troy Martinez filed a class action petition against Yamaha Motor Corporation USA and Yamaha Suzuki of Texas (YST) concerning allegedly defective personal watercraft (PWC) manufactured and sold by them. Martinez alleged that he owned a 1997 Yamaha personal watercraft which had the alleged defect. Martinez later added W.L.E. Enterprises, Inc. (WLE) and Yamaha Motor Manufacturing Corporation of America as defendants. He also added an allegation that he owned a 1996 Yamaha personal watercraft which had the same alleged defect. A year after the first petition was filed, Martinez non-suited defendants Yamaha Motor Corporation USA and Yamaha Motor Manufacturing Corporation of America. Two months later, Martinez non-suited YST and WLE. Prior to the two requests for non-suit, YST and WLE filed several motions for sanctions against Martinez and his attorneys. These motions requested sanctions under Rule 13 and Rule 215 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Chapters 9 and 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge denied all motions for sanctions.
We agree with YST and WLE that the standard by which we review a sanctions order is for abuse of discretion. Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 852 (Tex. 1992). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). When reviewing matters committed to the trial court's discretion, a court of appeals may not substitute its own judgment for the trial court's judgment. See Flores v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 777 S.W.2d 38, 41-42 (Tex. 1989).
YST and WLE point to Rules of Civil Procedure 13, 191.3, and 215 and to sections 9.011 through 9.014 and 10.001 through 10.006 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code as the legal bases for sanctions. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 9.011-.014, 10.001-.006 (Vernon 2002); Tex. R. Civ. P. 13, 191.3, 215. They also point to seven factual bases, which they contend required the trial court to impose sanctions: (1) filing of the original class action petition, which contained material allegations that were untrue; (2) filing a false affidavit; (3) filing an amended class action petition, which added a groundless claim and a claim on which limitations had expired; (4) filing false assertions in response to a request for disclosure; (5) failing to produce documents at a deposition after the court directed him to do so; (6) discovery requests made to YST and WLE after Martinez and his attorneys knew their claims had no merit; and (7) false corrections to a deposition concerning ownership of the personal watercraft. Martinez points to: (1) publication of a “Safety Study” by the National Safety Transportation Board (NTSB) concerning the characteristics of personal watercraft based on their involvement in boating accidents; the study resulted in nine conclusions and recommended that PWC manufacturers evaluate the design of and make changes in personal watercraft; (2) title documents related to two Yamaha PWCs, a 1996 and a 1997, showing the details of transfers of title and registration of the two PWCs; (3) evidence that Martinez’ attorneys had authority to investigate and did investigate the ownership of the personal watercraft registered to Martinez and his wife; (4) evidence that Martinez and his wife were married throughout the course of the legal proceedings, Martinez’ wife did not own a personal watercraft as her separate property, and Martinez’ wife transferred title to a personal watercraft to her father without Martinez’ knowledge; (5) evidence that Martinez did not understand, know of, or appreciate the risks and dangers alleged to be inherent in the design and operation of personal watercraft; (6) evidence that Martinez believed that the information about ownership contained in an affidavit was true when he signed it; (7) evidence that Martinez’ attorneys took reasonable steps to have Martinez produce the documents the court ordered; and (8) evidence showing that YST and WLE’s attorneys knew before Martinez and his attorneys that the personal watercraft had been transferred by Martinez’ wife to her father.
To apply an abuse-of-discretion standard, we defer to the trial court's factual determinations but review questions of law de novo. Castellano v. Garza, 110 S.W.3d 70, 73 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.). Our review of the record convinces us that no abuse of discretion occurred in the denial of the motions for sanctions. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d at 852; see also Elkins v. Stotts-Brown, 103 S.W.3d 664, 668-70 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). To hold otherwise would be to substitute our view of disputed evidence for that of the trial judge. Flores, 777 S.W.2d at 41-42.
The order denying sanctions is affirmed.
BILL VANCE
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Vance, and
Justice Reyna[1]
(Chief Justice Gray dissenting)
Order affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed July 14, 2004
[CV06]
[1] This case was submitted with former Chief Justice Davis on the panel, but he resigned effective August 4, 2003. Justice Reyna, who took office on January 5, 2004, participated in the decision.