IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-05-00418-CV
Dennis Powell,
Appellant
v.
Leon Clements, John Allen,
Glenda Adams and Ernestine Julye,
Appellees
From the 278th District Court
Walker County, Texas
Trial Court No. 23107
ORDER ASSIGNING MEDIATOR
On July 19, 2006, this case was abated and referred to mediation.
The Court has not been advised that the parties have agreed upon a mediator. Therefore, the Court assigns R.D. “Spike” Pattillo, III as mediator for this case. The telephone number for Mr. Pattillo is (254) 741-6410. Mediation must occur within thirty days after the date of the order assigning a mediator.
Before the first scheduled mediation session, each party must provide the mediator and all other parties with an information sheet setting forth the party’s positions about the issues that need to be resolved. At or before the first session, all parties must produce all information necessary for the mediator to understand the issues presented. The mediator may require any party to supplement the information required by this Order.
Named parties must be present during the entire mediation process, and each corporate party must be represented by a corporate employee, officer, or agent with authority to bind the corporate party to settlement.
Immediately after mediation, the mediator must advise this Court, in writing, only that the cases did or did not settle and the amount of the mediator’s fee. The mediator’s fees will be taxed as costs. As previously required by the Order abating this case and referring it to mediation, unless the mediator agrees to mediate without fee, the mediator must negotiate a reasonable fee with Appellees, and Appellees must pay the agreed-upon fee directly to the mediator.
Failure or refusal to attend the mediation as scheduled may result in the imposition of sanctions, as permitted by law.
PER CURIAM
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Vance, and
Justice Reyna
Mediator assigned
Order issued and filed November 22, 2006
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ered and Bonner made no additional objection.
Limiting the purposes for which the response could be considered brought the response outside the definition of hearsay—an out of court statement offered in court to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Under these circumstances the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence. The next question in the record—Did she later make a conflicting statement?—appears to reveal the State’s purpose for asking the question. It appears the State intended to impeach the credibility of Dee Anna by evidence that she had made inconsistent statements to CPS about the extent of her knowledge of the sexual abuse of the victims by Bonner.
Finally, the bold statement made by the majority that Dee Anna’s statements would be inadmissible under any of the hearsay exceptions in Rules 803 and 804 is not only inaccurate, but more importantly is beyond the scope of the issues presented to us. Tex. R. Evid. 803, 804. Rule 803(24) is an example of an exception that would be applicable. Tex. R. Evid. 803 (24). If Dee Anna’s statement on the day of Bonner’s arrest indicated that she had cause to believe either child had been abused, she could have been prosecuted for a Class B misdemeanor for the failure to report the abuse. Tex. Fam. Code. 261.101, 261.109. Thus, the statement would have been admissible as a statement against interest. Tex. R. Evid. 803 (24).
With these comments regarding this narrow issue, I concur in the majority opinion.
TOM GRAY
Justice
Concurring opinion delivered and filed on August 15, 2001
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