IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-05-00247-CR
Deeshawn Dismuke,
Appellant
v.
The State of Texas,
Appellee
From the 40th District Court
Ellis County, Texas
Trial Court No. 28250CR
MEMORANDUM Opinion
Dismuke appeals his conviction for intentionally or knowingly causing serious bodily injury to a child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(a)(1), (e) (Vernon 2003). We affirm.
We understand Dismuke’s two issues to challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence. In his first issue, he generally contends that “the trial court erred in allowing the conviction to stand.” In his second issue, Dismuke contends that the trial court erred in overruling Dismuke’s motion for instructed verdict. “We treat a point of error complaining about a trial court’s failure to grant a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence.” Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). “In deciding whether evidence is legally sufficient, ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Hampton v. State, 165 S.W.3d 691, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981)); accord Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
Dismuke argues that there is “almost no evidence” that he caused the victim’s injuries. Buried within Dismuke’s argument is a suggestion that before we can consider the testimony of an accomplice we must determine whether there is nonaccomplice evidence sufficient to connect Dismuke to the crime as required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.14. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.14 (Vernon 2005). The State points to Dismuke’s admission that he caused the injuries. This same evidence, Dismuke’s admissions, is sufficient corroboration of his connection to the crime as required by Article 38.14. We hold that the jury, viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could reasonably have found that Dismuke caused the victim’s injuries. We overrule Dismuke’s issues.
Having overruled Dismuke’s issues, we affirm.
TOM GRAY
Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Vance, and
Justice Reyna
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed January 25, 2006
Do not publish
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