11th Court of Appeals
Eastland, Texas
Opinion
Charlie Roy Williams
Appellant
Vs. No. 11-01-00222-CR -- Appeal from Dallas County
State of Texas
Appellee
The jury convicted appellant of the offense of unlawful possession of cocaine. The trial court assessed his punishment at confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a term of 27 years. We affirm.
Appellant attacks the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction in his first point of error. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). The inquiry is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Turner v. State, supra at 427. The fact finder is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex.Cr.App.1992). The fact finder may choose to believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness's testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), cert. den’d, 488 U.S. 872 (1988).
Detective Larry Wayne Littlefield of the Dallas Police Department=s narcotic division testified that he participated in a Adynamic entry@ raid of a private residence suspected to be a drug house. Detective Littlefield was the first officer to enter the residence after its front door was Aslammed@ open. Immediately upon entering the house, he observed appellant standing over a table where others were sitting. The distance between Detective Littlefield and appellant was approximately 15 feet when this observation was made. Detective Littlefield noticed that appellant had his hands down on the table. Appellant then threw something down on the table and attempted to flee the room. Detective Littlefield testified that the object which appellant threw on the table was a cellophane wrapper containing a rock of cocaine. Upon apprehending appellant in a hallway, Detective Littlefield retrieved the cellophane wrapper from the table for collection as evidence. The State=s chemist testified that the cocaine rock recovered by Detective Littlefield weighed .92 grams.
Custody of appellant was ultimately transferred to Officer Jaime T. Castro outside of the house. Officer Castro performed a search incident to an arrest on appellant. Officer Castro testified that he recovered two baggies containing cocaine from appellant=s person. The State=s chemist testified that the cocaine recovered by Officer Castro weighed .75 grams.
The indictment alleged that appellant:
[U]nlawfully, intentionally and knowingly, possess[ed] a controlled substance, to-wit: COCAINE, in an amount by aggregate weight including any adulterants or dilutants, of 1 gram or more but less than 4 grams.
Appellant admits that the evidence established that he possessed the .75 grams of cocaine which Officer Castro found on his person at the time of arrest. However, he attacks the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the State=s contention that he possessed the additional .92 grams of cocaine which Detective Littlefield recovered. Appellant argues that the other persons in the room could have placed the cocaine on the table during the melee which ensued after the police stormed the house.
To prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove: (1) that the accused exercised control, management, and care over the substance; and (2) that the accused knew the matter possessed was contraband. Joseph v. State, 897 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex.Cr.App.1995). Whether direct or circumstantial evidence is used, the State must establish that the accused=s connection with the drug is more than just fortuitous. Brown v. State 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex.Cr.App.1995). Detective Littlefield specifically testified that he observed appellant drop the cellophane wrapper containing a rock of cocaine weighing .92 grams on the table in question. This testimony directly addressed appellant’s exercise of control and management of the controlled substance and was such that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant’s first point of error is overruled.
Appellant attacks the trial court’s jurisdiction in his second point of error. The record reflects that appellant was indicted by a grand jury empaneled by the 363rd Judicial District Court. He was convicted by the 194th Judicial District Court. He argues that the 194th Judicial District Court lacked jurisdiction because a written order of transfer is not contained in the record. The fact that a written transfer order is not contained in the record is a procedural matter, not a jurisdictional one. It does not render the actions of the transferee court void but merely makes them subject to a valid and timely plea to the court’s jurisdiction. If he does not file a timely plea to the jurisdiction, a defendant waives any right to complain that a transfer order does not appear in the record. See Evans v. State, 61 S.W.3d 688, 690 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth 2001, no pet’n); Sharkey v. State, 994 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex.App. - Texarkana 1999, no pet’n); Garcia v. State, 901 S.W.2d 731, 732-33 (Tex.App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet’n ref’d). Appellant did not file a plea to the jurisdiction; therefore, he has waived his complaint. Appellant’s second point of error is overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
W. G. ARNOT, III
CHIEF JUSTICE
June 27, 2002
Do not publish. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.3(b).
Panel consists of: Arnot, C.J., and
Wright, J., and McCall, J.