11th Court of Appeals
Eastland, Texas
Opinion
Stevan Ray Warren
Appellant
Vs. No. 11-01-00229-CR B Appeal from Dallas County
State of Texas
Appellee
The jury convicted Stevan Ray Warren of aggravated robbery. The trial court found the enhancement paragraphs to be true and sentenced appellant to 35 years confinement. We affirm.
There is no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. The record showed that on June 20, 2000, Steven and Sandra Bell returned to their home around 9:15 p.m. and that Steven backed the car into the garage. As Steven was getting out of the car, a man approached him and put a pistol under Steven’s chin. The man demanded that Steven give him his jewelry and money. A second individual, identified at trial as appellant, approached the Bells and took Sandra’s purse which contained her cellular phone, pager, and $1,100 in cash. Appellant began yelling to the first man that he was “taking too much time” and that “we have enough.” The men left the scene.
In his first issue on appeal, appellant complains that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his written statement. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, appellate courts must give great deference to the trial court’s findings of historical facts as long as the record supports the findings. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Cr.App.1997). We must afford the same amount of deference to the trial court’s rulings on “mixed questions of law and fact” if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman v. State, supra at 89. Appellate courts, however, review de novo “mixed questions of law and fact” not falling within the previous category. Guzman v. State, supra. When faced with a mixed question of law and fact, the critical question under Guzman is whether the ruling “turns” on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Loserth v. State, 963 S.W.2d 770, 773 (Tex.Cr.App.1998). A question “turns” on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor when the testimony of one or more witnesses, if believed, is always enough to add up to what is needed to decide the substantive issue. Loserth v. State, supra. We must view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court=s ruling and sustain the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Guzman v. State, supra. Because the trial court’s ruling is a “mixed question of law and fact” that turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, we will afford great deference to the trial court’s ruling.
At the hearing on appellant=s motion to suppress, Detective Kevin Lingo with the Richardson Police Department testified that he first talked to a suspect named Raymond Cunningham. As a result of that conversation, Detective Lingo became aware of two additional suspects. Cunningham told Detective Lingo where the two other suspects lived in Dallas. Richardson Police Officer Phillip Casavant testified at the hearing that he assisted in preparing a search warrant and in attempting to locate the additional two suspects. Officer Casavant contacted the Dallas Police Department and gave them a description of the two suspects and the address where the suspects were staying. Officer Casavant informed the Dallas Police Department that a search warrant and arrest warrants were in the process of being completed.
David Durica with the Dallas Police Department testified that he was contacted by Officer Casavant about the two suspects and their possible location. Officer Durica had a plain clothes officer go to the location. The officer went to the apartment, and he found the vehicle matching the description given by the Richardson Police Department. Two men matching the description of the suspects left the apartment in that vehicle. Officer Durica stopped the vehicle which was being driven by appellant. Officer Durica arrested appellant, and appellant was taken to the Richardson Police Department.
Detective Lingo testified that appellant was arrested on July 28, 2000. Detective Lingo interviewed appellant on July 29, 2000, after appellant had been in custody for 14 to 15 hours. Detective Lingo stated that he gave appellant the Miranda[1] warnings and that appellant indicated that he understood these warnings. Appellant then gave a written statement. Detective Lingo testified that he did not make any promises to appellant in exchange for appellant’s statement. However, on cross-examination, Detective Lingo recalled telling appellant that he wanted to be able to help appellant “go back to see his pregnant wife.” Detective Lingo testified that a magistrate comes to the jail twice a day and that he did not do anything to prevent appellant from going before a magistrate.
Appellant testified at the hearing on his motion to suppress that he was arrested on July 27, 2000, and that he was told he did not have a bond “because the detectives wanted to talk to [him].” Appellant stated that he was held four or five days before anyone came to talk to him. Appellant said that he had not been to a magistrate when Detective Lingo interviewed him and that he did not recall Detective Lingo reading him his rights. Appellant acknowledged that, on the written statement, he initialed the paragraph containing his rights and the paragraph indicating he voluntarily waived those rights. Appellant said that he just put his initials where he was told because that was the only way he felt he could “get a bond or...some type of leniency.” Appellant further stated that, if he had been taken to a magistrate and if he had known a bond was available to him, he would not have given the statement.
The trial court found that there was an unreasonable delay in taking appellant before a magistrate. The trial court found, however, that appellant did not prove a causal connection between the delay and his written statement. Appellant specifically argues on appeal that the trial court erred in finding that he did not prove a causal connection between the delay and his giving a written statement.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. arts. 14.06(a) & 15.17(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003) require that a person under arrest be taken to a magistrate without unnecessary delay. The failure to take an arrestee before a magistrate in a timely manner will not invalidate a confession unless the arrestee can show a causal connection between the confession and the delay. Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 679 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), cert. den’d, 509 U.S. 926 (1993). An unreasonable delay will not vitiate an otherwise voluntary confession if the arrestee was properly advised of his Miranda rights. Cantu v. State, supra.
Detective Lingo testified that he gave appellant the Miranda warnings before taking his statement and that appellant understood his rights. Cantu v. State, supra. Appellant acknowledged that, on his written statement, he initialed the Miranda warnings and his waiver of those rights. Appellant indicated that he only gave the written statement to cooperate so that he could return to his wife and that he would not have given the statement had he been taken before a magistrate. In a motion to suppress hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Cr.App.2000). Accordingly, the trial court may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony. State v. Ross, supra. We find that the trial court did not err in its finding that appellant failed to show a causal connection between the delay in taking him before a magistrate and his giving the written statement. Appellant’s first issue on appeal is overruled.
In his second issue on appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting his statement because the record does not show that it was given freely and voluntarily as required by TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 38.22, ' 2 (Vernon 1979). The record shows that, prior to giving his written statement, appellant was given the statutory warnings set out in Article 38.22, section 2(a). The record also shows that appellant waived those rights and gave a written statement. Appellant has not shown that his statement was not given freely and voluntarily. Appellant’s second issue on appeal is overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
JIM R. WRIGHT
JUSTICE
October 23, 2003
Do not publish. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Arnot, C.J., and
Wright, J., and McCall, J.