11th Court of Appeals
Eastland, Texas
Memorandum Opinion
In the Interest of S.L.W. and C.R.W., children
No. 11-03-00390-CV -- Appeal from Taylor County
The trial court entered an order terminating the parental rights of Sabrina Maddox and Ray Wells to their children, three-year-old S.L.W. and two-year-old C.R.W. Maddox appeals from the trial court=s order terminating her parental rights to her children.[1] We affirm.
The trial court found that Maddox (1) failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of the children;[2] (2) used a con-trolled substance in a manner that endangered the health or safety of the children and failed to complete a court-ordered substance abuse program or, after completion of a court-ordered substance abuse program, continued to abuse a controlled substance;[3] and (3) engaged in conduct or placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the children.[4] Maddox brings three issues on appeal in which she argues that the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court=s findings.[5]
A court may order involuntary termination of parental rights only if the court finds that (1) a parent has committed a predicate act or omission harmful to the child and (2) termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ' 161.001 (Vernon 2002); In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 353-54 (Tex.2003). The court must ensure that these findings are made by clear and convincing evidence. In re B.L.D., supra. Any complaint that the evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support the findings necessary for termination is analyzed by a heightened standard of appellate review. In re B.L.D., supra.
In a legal sufficiency review, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.2002). A reviewing court must assume that the fact finder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding. In re J.F.C., supra. In a factual sufficiency review, we must give due consideration to evidence that the fact finder could rea-sonably have found to be clear and convincing. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex.2002). In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether the evidence is such that a fact finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State=s allegations. In re C.H., supra. We consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. In re J.F.C., supra at 266.
S.L.W. was removed from Maddox in January 2001, and C.R.W. was removed in September 2001. The children were returned to Maddox in February 2002. In November 2002, the children were once again removed from Maddox after Maddox was arrested for having violated a condition of her community supervision by having a positive drug test. Shanna Lenamon, with Child Protective Services (CPS), testified at the termination hearing that, after a hearing, the children were again returned to Maddox with the stipulation that Maddox would participate in drug testing. Lenamon stated that, if Maddox tested positive for drugs, CPS would consider placing the children back in foster care. In January 2003, Maddox again tested positive for drugs, and the children were removed and placed in foster care. Maddox was incarcerated at the time of the hearing for violations of her community supervision. Wells was also incarcerated at the time of the hearing for manufacturing drugs.
Section 161.001(1)(E) allows for termination of parental rights if the parent Aengaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.@ Under subsection (E), the cause of the danger to the child must be the parent=s conduct alone and includes the parent=s actions or omissions or failures to act. In the Interest of S.H.A., 728 S.W.2d 73, 83‑84 (Tex.App. - Dallas 1987, writ ref=d n.r.e.). Endanger means Ato expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize.@ Texas Department of Human Services v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex.1987). It is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury. Texas Department of Human Services v. Boyd, supra. The specific danger to the child=s well‑being need not be established as an independent proposition but may instead be inferred from parental misconduct. In the Interest of J.J., 911 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tex.App. - Texarkana 1995, writ den=d).
The record shows that Maddox has a pattern of drug abuse. Maddox had a positive drug test in November 2002. At that time, the court ordered Maddox to submit to further drug testing which would be used in determining her suitability for permanent placement of the children. Maddox again had a positive drug test in January 2003. Maddox admitted to Lenamon that she was using drugs. Maddox was incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing because her community supervision was revoked for having a positive drug test. Evidence of imprisonment shows a course of conduct which has the effect of endangering the physical or emotional well-being of the child. Texas Depart-ment of Human Services v. Boyd, supra. If the imprisonment displays a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct, it qualifies as conduct that endangers the emotional well-being of the child. In the interest of Guillory, 618 S.W2d 948 (Tex.Civ.App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ). Maddox=s pattern of drug abuse not only resulted in her incarceration but also shows a voluntary course of conduct which endangered her children. Moreover, the record shows that Maddox also left the children in the care of an individual who was known to abuse drugs.
We find that there is probative evidence to support the trial court=s finding that Maddox engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children. We additionally find that the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State=s allegation that Maddox engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children. Maddox=s third issue on appeal is overruled. Because we have concluded that there is both legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court=s finding under Section 161.001(1)(E), we need not address Maddox=s first and second issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court=s findings under Section 161.001(1)(O) & (P). Only one finding alleged under Section 161.001(1) is necessary for a judgment of termination. In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth 2001, no pet=n); In re S.F., 32 S.W.3d 318, 320 (Tex.App. - San Antonio 2000, no pet=n); see also TEX.R.APP. P. 47.1.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
JIM R. WRIGHT
JUSTICE
September 30, 2004
Not designated for publication. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.2(a).
Panel consists of: Arnot, C.J., and
Wright, J., and McCall, J.
[1]Wells is not a party to this appeal.
[2]TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ' 161.001(1)(O) (Vernon 2002).
[3]TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ' 161.001(1)(P) (Vernon 2002).
[4]TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ' 161.001(1)(E) (Vernon 2002). The trial court=s order stated: A[E]ngaged in conduct that placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.@ The misstatement of Section 161.001(1)(E) appears to be a typographical error.
[5]Maddox does not challenge the trial court=s finding that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the best interest of the children. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ' 161.001(2) (Vernon 2002).