11th Court of Appeals
Eastland, Texas
Memorandum Opinion
In the Interest of M.D.M., K.M.M., and L.N.M.
No. 11-03-00379-CV -- Appeal from Ector County
In this case, we must determine whether the trial court erred when it required the payment of child support beyond the age of 18. Robert Wayne Massey and Deanna Kay Massey divorced in February 1991. Deanna was named sole managing conservator of their 3 minor children: M.D.M., K.M.M., and L.N.M. Robert was ordered to pay child support. Deanna filed a motion for clarification of the child support order in June 2003; and, in August 2003, she filed a motion for enforcement of the child support order. After a hearing on the motions, the trial court entered an order clarifying the child support order. We reverse and render.
In 5 issues on appeal, Robert argues that the trial court erred when it clarified the divorce decree and required him to pay child support under certain circumstances for each child after the child had reached the age of 18. In the original divorce decree, the trial court provided:
IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that ROBERT WAYNE MASSEY is obligated to pay, and subject to the provisions for withholding from earnings for child support specified below, shall pay to DEANNA KAY MASSEY child support of $1,300 per month...payable on the same day of each month thereafter until the date of the earliest occurrence of one of the following events:
(1) any child reaches the age of 18 years, provided that, if the child is fully enrolled in an accredited education program leading toward a high school or college diploma, the periodic child-support payments hsall (sic) continue to be due and paid until the end of the school year in which the child graduates;
(2) any child marries;
(3) any child dies;
(4) any child=s disabilities are otherwise removed for general purposes;
(5) any child is otherwise emancipated; or
(6) further order modifying this child support.
Thereafter, ROBERT WAYNE MASSEY is ORDERED AND DECREED to pay to DEANNA KAY MASSEY child support of $1,083.34 per month...until the date of the next occurrence of one of the events specified above.
M.D.M. turned 18 on October 16, 2002, and graduated from high school in May 2003. On June 1, 2003, Robert began paying Deanna $1,083.34 in child support. It was then that Deanna filed first the motion for clarification of the child support order and later a motion to enforce the child support order.
After the hearing on Deanna=s motions, the trial court entered an order in which it clarified the divorce decree as follows:
IT IS ORDERED that the child support required to be paid under Section XII, beginning at the top of page 10 of the Decree, continues for the benefit of each child, beyond the child=s age of majority, while that child is fully enrolled in an accredited college. In this respect, Afully enrolled@ shall mean that the child is taking not less than 12 hours per full semester while maintaining substantial progress toward a specific college degree; provided, however, that child support for the benefit of any child shall, in no instance, extend beyond the date which is four years after that child=s graduation from high school, and further provided that [Deanna] shall provide proof, upon reasonable request of [Robert], that a child is fully enrolled as defined above.
In his first issue on appeal, Robert contends that the trial court erred in extending his child support obligation for a child over the age of 18 who has graduated from high school. Absent certain exceptions not applicable in this case, the Texas Family Code authorizes court-ordered child support only until a child is 18 years old or graduates from high school, whichever occurs later. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ' 154.001 (Vernon 2002)[1]; Bruni v. Bruni, 924 S.W.2d 366 (Tex.1996); Elfeldt v. Elfeldt, 730 S.W.2d 657 (Tex.1987). To be enforceable as a contract, an agreement to provide support for a child over the age of 18 must satisfy former TEX. FAM. CODE ' 14.06(d) (1991).[2] Elfeldt v. Elfeldt, supra. Section 14.06(d) provided that A[t]erms of the agreement set forth in the decree may be enforced by all remedies available for enforcement of a judgment, including contempt, but are not enforceable as contract terms unless the agreement so provides.@
There was no separate agreement concerning payment of child support beyond a child reaching the age of 18. Cf. Bruni v. Bruni, supra. The divorce decree is the only expression of the parties= agreement on support. Because there was no agreement concerning child support entered into between Robert and Deanna after September 1, 2003, we must apply Section 14.06(d), which was the law in effect at the time of the original divorce decree. Section 14.06(d) required that the parties expressly provide in an agreement that the terms of the agreement provide support for a non-disabled child over the age of 18 are enforceable as a contract. There is no such agreement. If there is no such agreement, then the divorce decree must provide for enforceability; it does not. Elfeldt v. Elfeldt, supra. The trial court erred in requiring Robert to pay child support after the children had reached the age of 18 and had graduated from high school. Robert=s first issue on appeal is sustained. Because of our disposition of Robert=s first issue on appeal, we need not address his remaining issues. TEX.R.APP.P. 47.1.
We reverse the trial court=s order. We render judgment that Robert is not required to pay child support after a child has reached 18 years of age or until graduation from high school, whichever occurs later.
JIM R. WRIGHT
JUSTICE
June 23, 2005
Not designated for publication. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.2(a).
Panel consists of: Arnot, C.J., and
Wright, J., and McCall, J.
[1]At the time the divorce decree was entered, this provision was codified at TEX. FAM. CODE ' 14.05 (1991).
[2]At the time of the divorce decree, TEX. FAM. CODE ' 14.06(d) (1991) was in effect. Section 14.06(d) has been recodified as TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ' 154.124(c) (Vernon Supp. 2004 - 2005) and provides that A[t]erms of the agreement pertaining to child support in the order may be enforced by all remedies available for enforcement of a judgment, including contempt, but are not enforceable as a contract.@ Section 154.124(c) took effect September 1, 2003, and is only applicable to an agreement concerning child support entered into after that date.