|
|
|
|
Opinion filed November 30, 2006
In The
Eleventh Court of Appeals
____________
No. 11-05-00383-CR
__________
CHARLES SNODGRASS, Appellant
V.
STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 238th District Court
Midland County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 30729
O P I N I O N
Charles Snodgrass was indicted for robbery enhanced as a repeat offender. The jury found appellant guilty and assessed his punishment at seven years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice after appellant pleaded true to two enhancement paragraphs. We affirm.
On the morning of March 29, 2005, appellant was in the cough and cold section of Albertson=s grocery store on North Midland Drive in Midland. Frank Edward McBride, a scan coordinator, noticed appellant in the cough and cold section and thought he Alooked lost.@ Appellant picked up several boxes of Sudafed, looked at McBride, and then put the boxes back on the shelf. Appellant Alooked around again@ and picked the six or seven boxes of Sudafed up again. Appellant headed for the exit and not toward the cash registers. McBride met appellant at the south entrance of the store, stood in front of appellant, and asked whether he was going to pay for the items in his hands. Appellant hit McBride in the chest and then pushed McBride through a set of double doors at the south entrance of the store. Other employees came to McBride=s aid, and they subdued appellant. The police were called. When the police arrived, several employees were holding appellant down as he punched and kicked. McBride was taken to the emergency room and a deep bruise was found on his chest. Although there was video surveillance, the tape was never recovered.
Appellant argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction. In a legal sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and then determine whether a rational trial of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). To determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, the appellate court reviews all of the evidence in a neutral light. Watson v. State, 2006 WL 2956272, at *8 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2006) (overruling in part Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 10-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407-08 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Then, the reviewing court determines whether the evidence supporting the verdict is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the conflicting evidence. Watson, 2006 WL 2956272, at *8; Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 10-11. The jury is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the witnesses= testimony, and due deference must be given to the jury=s determination. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.13 (Vernon 1981), art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979); Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 8-9. Appellant was convicted of robbery as a repeat offender. A person commits the offense of robbery if, in the course of committing theft as defined in Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ch. 31 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2006) and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 29.02(a)(1) (Vernon 2003), ' 31.03 (Vernon Supp. 2006). Appellant argues that the State did not meet its burden of proof on the intent element for two reasons: (1) appellant carried cash at the time of the incident and (2) one of the witnesses indicated that he thought appellant would pay for the Sudafed.
Appellant asserts that one of the four witnesses for the State B Jerry Salazar, the produce manager B testified that he thought appellant would pay for the items. Salazar testified that McBride pointed appellant out to Salazar and told him to watch appellant and make sure he was not going to take anything. Salazar testified that Awe thought he was going to pay for them.@ However, McBride and Scott Eldon Harris, the store director, both testified that appellant was going toward the store exit and not the cash registers. Salazar also testified that, after appellant was subdued by McBride and other employees, appellant said he would pay for the items. Harris and Midland Police Officer Christopher M. Earp testified that the scuffle between appellant and McBride started near the south exit and ended in the foyer, the area between the outer and inner doors of Albertson=s. Although appellant did have cash, it was up to the jury to resolve the fact question of intent. Robles v. State, 664 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Intent is an element that can be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the defendant. Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). The question of intent must be examined as of the time appellant took the items and not after he was accosted. See id.
Appellant took the Sudafed, walked toward an exit, and pushed McBride when confronted, causing McBride=s injury. The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support appellant=s conviction. Appellant=s sole issue is overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
JIM R. WRIGHT
CHIEF JUSTICE
November 30, 2006
Do not publish. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,
McCall, J., and Strange, J.