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Opinion filed October 26, 2006
In The
Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________
No. 11-06-00116-CR
__________
CARRIE ANN RAHAT, Appellant
V.
STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 118th District Court
Howard County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 11556
O P I N I O N
The jury convicted Carrie Ann Rahat, upon her plea of guilty, of the offense of possession of cocaine. The jury assessed her punishment at confinement for fifteen years. We affirm.
Appellant=s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw. The motion is supported by a brief in which counsel professionally and conscientiously examines the record and applicable law and states that he has concluded that the appeal is frivolous.
Counsel presents five potential points of error suggesting that evidence of the delivery of cocaine and of firearms found in appellant=s home was improperly admitted, that appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel, that the trial court erred in failing to reduce appellant=s sentence or failing to grant Ashock@ probation,[1] and that the jury pool was tainted by the presence of a relative of an employee of the office of the Howard County District Attorney. We agree with counsel that neither the record before this court nor the law support these potential points.
Big Spring Police Detective Brian Gordon testified that he arranged for a reliable, Acooperating individual@ to make a Acontrolled@ buy of cocaine from appellant. After the controlled buy, a search warrant was secured. Ten individual baggies of crack cocaine, a large amount of crack cocaine in 2-inch cube form, a Colt .22-caliber semi-automatic pistol, a FIE standard .38-caliber revolver, live ammunition, a set of Royal digital scales, a palm digital scale, the $40 used in the controlled buy, and over $1,000 in cash was recovered from appellant=s home. Over twenty-three grams of cocaine was recovered.
We agree with counsel that evidence of the controlled buy and evidence of the firearms was properly admitted under Tex. R. Evid. 402. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
The record does not support the potential point of error that appellant received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In fact, the record reflects that trial counsel provided reasonably effective assistance. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Further, the record does not reflect that counsel=s representation was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel=s error, appellant would have not pleaded guilty. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); Kober v. State, 988 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
We note that the jury assessed punishment at confinement for fifteen years, a sentence well within the range of punishment for a second degree felony.[2] A penalty assessed within the range of punishment established by the legislature will not be disturbed on appeal. Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Bradfield v. State, 42 S.W.3d 350 (Tex. App.CEastland 2001, pet. ref=d). We also note that appellant=s punishment was assessed at confinement and that, therefore, she was not eligible for either community supervision or shock probation. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, ' 4(d)(1), 6 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
Nothing in the record before this court supports the claim that the jury pool was tainted. We agree with counsel=s conclusion that there is no merit to this claim.
Counsel has provided appellant with a copy of the brief and advised appellant of her right to review the record and file a response to counsel=s brief. A response has not been filed. Court-appointed counsel has complied with the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); Eaden v. State, 161 S.W.3d 173 (Tex. App.CEastland 2005, no pet.).
The motion to withdraw is granted. We note that counsel has the responsibility to advise appellant that he may file a petition for discretionary review by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Ex parte Owens, 2006 WL 2619989 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2006). Likewise, this court advises appellant that she may file a petition for discretionary review pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 66.
The judgment is affirmed.
PER CURIAM
October 26, 2006
Do not publish. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., and
McCall, J., and Strange, J.
[1]Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, ' 6 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
[2]Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 12.33 (Vernon 2003) provides that a person convicted of a second degree felony shall be confined for a term of not less than two years and not more than twenty years. An optional fine not to exceed $10,000 is also authorized.