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Opinion filed September 6, 2007
In The
Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-06-00142-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF R.N.R.R., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 326th District Court
Taylor County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 6155-CX
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
This appeal arises from an adoption proceeding. Appellant is the biological father of R.N.R.R. His parental rights were terminated in 1998 in a termination proceeding instituted by appellee, appellant=s mother. R.N.R.R.=s biological mother=s parental rights were terminated in the same proceeding. It appears that both appellant and R.N.R.R.=s biological mother executed affidavits relinquishing their parental rights in the earlier termination proceeding. Appellant subsequently filed the underlying suit seeking to adopt R.N.R.R. The trial court dismissed appellant=s suit on the ground that he did not have standing to adopt R.N.R.R. We affirm.
Issues
In his first issue, appellant challenges the finality of the order terminating his parental rights in the earlier proceeding. Appellant=s second issue concerns the statutory requirements for standing to file an adoption proceeding.
Standing to File Adoption Suit
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. ' 162.001(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006) provides that an adoption proceeding is subject to the standing requirements set out in Chapter 102 of the Family Code. The limitations set out in Tex. Fam. Code Ann. ' 102.006 (Vernon 2002) apply to appellant=s suit because the parent/child relationships between R.N.R.R. and her parents were terminated in the earlier proceeding. Section 102.006(a) provides that a former parent whose parent/child relationship with the child has been terminated by court order does not have standing to file a suit unless one of the two exceptions contained in Section 102.006(b) applies. This appeal concerns the exception set out in Section 102.006(b)(2) that the limitations set out in Section 102.006(a) do not apply to a person who has the consent of the child=s managing conservator, guardian, or legal custodian to bring the suit.
In his second issue, appellant contends that he should be able to file the adoption action without obtaining appellee=s consent in her role as R.N.R.R.=s legal custodian. He bases his contention on the assertion that it is not in the best interest of R.N.R.R. for him to ask appellee=s consent for his adoption action. Appellant is essentially asking us to create an additional exception to the statute=s prohibition against an adoption action being filed by a former parent whose parent/child relationship with the child has been terminated by court order. We decline to do so. There are important policy considerations for protecting the finality of termination proceedings. As noted by the Texas Supreme Court in Brown v. McLennan County Children=s Protective Services, 627 S.W.2d 390, 394 (Tex. 1982): AChildren voluntarily given up in compliance with the Family Code . . . cannot be snapped back at the whim of the parent.@ See In the Interest of Hughes, 770 S.W.2d 635, 637-38 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 1989, no pet.). Appellant=s second issue is overruled.
Finality of Previous Termination Order
In his first issue, appellant attempts to challenge the finality of the previous court order that terminated his parental rights. He argues that the order terminating his parental rights was interlocutory because the order failed to appoint a managing conservator of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. ' 161.207 (Vernon 2002).[1] It appears that appellant is advancing this argument in an effort to avoid the standing problem in this adoption proceeding by asserting that the order terminating his parental rights is not a final judgment. The trial court rejected this contention.
Appellant has attached a copy of the termination order to the appendix of his brief. However, the order terminating his parental rights is not included in either the clerk=s record or the reporter=s record. Documents attached to briefs that are not part of the clerk=s or reporter=s records are not part of the appellate record and may not be considered by the reviewing court. See Cantu v. Horany, 195 S.W.3d 867, 870 (Tex. App.CDallas 2006, no pet.) Accordingly, we are unable to evaluate the termination order because it is not part of the appellate record in this cause. Moreover, appellant=s challenge to the finality of the previous termination order would appear to be untimely. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. ' 161.211(a) (Vernon 2002) (the validity of an order terminating parental rights is not subject to collateral or direct attack after the sixth month after the date the order was signed). Appellant=s first issue is overruled.
This Court=s Ruling
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
TERRY McCALL
JUSTICE
September 6, 2007
Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,
McCall, J., and Strange, J.
[1]We do not address the merits of appellant=s construction of Section 161.207, and we express no opinion with regard to its validity.