NO. 12-04-00350-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS
§APPEAL FROM THE
IN THE INTEREST
§COUNTY COURT AT LAW
OF M.B., A CHILD
§CHEROKEE COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ron and Christina Bird appeal the termination of their parental rights. In five issues, Ron and Christina each challenge the order of termination. We affirm.
Background
Ron and Christina are the parents of a son, M.B., born July 9, 2003. On December 17, 2003, the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services (the “Department”) received a report from the Jacksonville Police Department. The police reported that Ron was arrested and charged with possession of a prohibited weapon. Christina was arrested after being discovered with a crack cocaine pipe. M.B. was placed with the paternal grandparents. On December 19, the Department removed M.B. from his home.
On December 22, 2003, the Department filed an original petition for protection of M.B., for conservatorship, and for termination of Ron and Christina’s parental rights. Thereafter, on December 29, the trial court entered a temporary order following an adversary hearing. The Department was appointed temporary managing conservator of M.B., and both parents were appointed temporary possessory conservators. Further, the trial court ordered that the parents have limited access to and possession of the child.
The trial court found that “each of the actions required of [Ron and Christina] below are necessary to obtain the return of the child, and failure to fully comply with these orders may result in the restriction or termination of parental rights.” Both parents were ordered to comply with each requirement of the Department’s original, or any amended, service plan during the pendency of the suit. In addition to tasks ordered by the court, the January 13, 2004 family service plan required that both parents seek a support system to help provide care for M.B.; participate in random urinalyses and hair follicle testing; participate in a drug assessment; follow any and all recommendations of the drug assessment; demonstrate their ability to lead a drug/alcohol free lifestyle; participate in a parenting course; access and evaluate services offered by the community to assist in supporting the family; obtain/maintain employment; participate in family and individual counseling; maintain housing free of a Department history, criminal history, and drug/alcohol abuse; obtain/maintain appropriate and safe housing; participate in homemaker services; follow through with any pending criminal charges, probation, or parole terms; not be involved in any criminal activity; inform the Department of any address changes; cooperate with all court orders and service plans; and provide the Department with health, social, education, and genetic history.
According to the final permanency plan and permanency progress report from the Department filed with the court on August 24, 2004, Christina had not complied with her service plan at all nor was she participating in any other services. She also tested positive for cocaine in a February 2004 hair follicle test. Ron completed a psychological evaluation and attended counseling sessions sporadically. Although Ron met the criteria for inpatient treatment, he had not taken the necessary steps for such treatment. Moreover, Ron tested positive for cocaine in a February 2004 urinalysis and hair follicle test. Ron was not participating in any other services. Neither parent complied with any inpatient treatment programs even though the Department requested them to do so. Further, neither parent attended a scheduled hair follicle drug test on August 3.
A bench trial was conducted on October 21, 2004. At the conclusion, the trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Ron and Christina had engaged in one or more of the acts or omissions necessary to support termination of their parental rights. The trial court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the parent-child relationship between Ron, Christina, and M.B. was in the child’s best interest. Based on the above findings, the trial court ordered termination of Ron’s and Christina’s parental rights. This appeal followed.
Termination of Parental Rights
Involuntary termination of parental rights embodies fundamental constitutional rights. Vela v. Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750, 759 (Tex. App.–Austin 2000), pet. denied per curiam, 53 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. 2001); In re J.J., 911 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1995, writ denied). A termination decree is “complete, final, irrevocable [and] divests for all time the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers with respect to each other except for the child’s right to inherit.” Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976); In re Shaw, 966 S.W.2d 174, 179 (Tex. App.–El Paso 1998, no pet.). Because a termination action “permanently sunders” the bonds between a parent and child, the proceedings must be strictly scrutinized. Wiley, 543 S.W.2d at 352; In re Shaw, 966 S.W.2d at 179. However, parental rights are not absolute, and it is vital that the emotional and physical interests of the child not be sacrificed at the expense of preserving that right. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002).
Section 161.001 of the Family Code permits a court to order termination of parental rights if two elements are established. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (Vernon 2002); In re J.M.T., 39 S.W.3d 234, 237 (Tex. App.–Waco 1999, no pet.). First, the parent must have engaged in any one of the acts or omissions itemized in the first subsection of the statute. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1) (Vernon 2002); Green v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 25 S.W.3d 213, 219 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2000, no pet.); In re J.M.T., 39 S.W.3d at 237. Second, termination must be in the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(2) (Vernon 2002); In re J.M.T., 39 S.W.3d at 237. Additionally, both elements must be established by clear and convincing evidence, and proof of one element does not alleviate the petitioner’s burden of proving the other. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001; Wiley, 543 S.W.2d at 351; In re J.M.T., 39 S.W.3d at 237.
Due process requires a petitioner to justify termination by clear and convincing evidence because termination is such a drastic remedy. In re J.M.T., 39 S.W.3d at 237. The clear and convincing standard for termination of parental rights is both constitutionally and statutorily mandated. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001; In re J.J., 911 S.W.2d at 439. Clear and convincing evidence means “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007 (Vernon 2002). There is a strong presumption that the best interest of the child is served by preserving the parent-child relationship. Wiley, 543 S.W.2d at 352; In re J.M.T., 39 S.W.3d at 240. Thus, the burden of proof is upon the person seeking to deprive the parent of their parental rights. In re J.M.T., 39 S.W.3d at 240.
Standard of Review
When confronted by both a legal and factual sufficiency challenge, an appellate court must first review the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Glover v. Texas Gen. Indem. Co., 619 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Tex. 1981); In re M.D.S., 1 S.W.3d 190, 197 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 1999, no pet.). Because termination findings must be based on clear and convincing evidence, the standard of review is not the same on appeal as a finding based upon a preponderance of the evidence. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002). Therefore, in conducting a legal sufficiency review, we must look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its findings were true. Id. at 266. We must assume that the fact finder settled disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable fact finder could do so and disregard all evidence that a reasonable fact finder could have disbelieved or found incredible. Id. This does not mean that we are required to ignore all evidence not supporting the finding because that might bias a clear and convincing analysis. Id.
The appropriate standard for reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge to the termination findings is whether the evidence is such that a fact finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the petitioner’s allegations. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25. In determining whether the fact finder has met this standard, an appellate court considers all the evidence in the record, both that in support of and contrary to the trial court’s findings. Id. at 27-29. Further, an appellate court should consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could not have reconciled that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.
This standard retains the deference an appellate court must have for the fact finder’s role. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26. Additionally, the trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Nordstrom v. Nordstrom, 965 S.W.2d 575, 580 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied). Thus, our review must not be so rigorous that only fact findings established beyond a reasonable doubt could withstand review. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26.
Termination Under Section 161.001(1)(O)
In their fourth issue, Ron and Christina contend that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that they failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for them to obtain the return of M.B. Both argue that they were not allowed enough time to complete all of the service plan requirements.
Applicable Law and Analysis
A court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of a child who had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(O) (Vernon 2002).
It is undisputed that the Department had temporary managing conservatorship of M.B. since December 19, 2003. Additionally, when the trial court granted the Department’s original petition, it did so, at least in part, on the basis of the affidavit of Charity Williamson, a Department employee. According to Williamson, the Department concluded that Ron and Christina engaged in ongoing drug possession and use in violation of a previous service plan. Additionally, Williamson noted that the original case was initiated because M.B. tested positive for cocaine and methadone at birth. This evidence establishes that M.B. was removed as a result of Ron and Christina’s neglect.
Ron’s failure to comply with court order
Amanda Prewitt, a Department employee, testified that Ron was ordered to comply with each requirement in the Department’s original or any amended family service plan during the pendency of this suit. The Department prepared a family service plan on January 13, 2004. Ron provided the Department with the name of a relative with whom it could place M.B. Ron participated in random urinalysis and hair follicle testing, a drug assessment, and a psychological evaluation. Ron was employed off and on and attended two individual counseling sessions. Ron was required to attend more counseling sessions, but the Department lost contact with him and the counseling service was cancelled. In fact, the Department’s contact with Ron throughout the case was sporadic, and Prewitt was frequently unable to reach Ron by telephone, letter, or personal visits. Moreover, Ron did not remain drug free. According to Prewitt, Ron did not attend parenting classes, missed scheduled drug tests, and did not seek treatment for drug issues.
By August 23, the Department’s goal changed from family reunification to an unrelated adoption due to Ron’s noncompliance with the family service plan. According to Prewitt, at the sixty day status hearing, the trial court ordered that Ron was not allowed visitation until he passed a urinalysis. If he failed a urinalysis, Ron was not allowed visitation with M.B. until a hair follicle test was clean. In 2004, Ron had a hair follicle test and urinalysis on February 19, an oral fluids test on April 29, and a hair follicle test on September 14. All tests were positive for cocaine. As of September 14, Ron did not have a clean hair follicle test. According to Prewitt, Ron denied continued drug use, but admitted using cocaine. In April, Ron stated that he was not using drugs when he tested positive for cocaine. According to Prewitt, Ron knew that his drug issues were the main problem.
During the case, Prewitt testified that she sent at least three letters to Ron or his attorney informing them of Ron’s failure to attend scheduled court ordered drug tests, failure to comply with the service plan, and failure to remain drug free. In Prewitt’s opinion, Ron failed to comply with the provisions of the court order establishing the actions necessary for him to obtain the return of child. In her opinion, it is in M.B.’s best interest for Ron’s parental rights to be terminated.
Jerald Shore, a psychologist, testified that he performed a psychological evaluation of Ron on February 26, 2004. Shore recommended that Ron be free of drugs before the Department considered reunification with M.B. He recommended Ron be evaluated for drug treatment. Additionally, Shore recommended that as long as Ron was not in treatment or not following a monitoring regime, visits between Ron and M.B. should be withheld. Shore recommended supervised visitations if Ron produced a certified clean drug test and had good hygiene. However, Shore recommended the Department sever Ron’s parental rights with M.B. if Ron refused treatment or could not produce a clean drug test for six months. After being informed that Ron had tested positive for cocaine in February, April, and September 2004, Shore concluded that termination of Ron’s parental rights was in M.B.’s best interest.
Ron acknowledged that he understood the family service plan. Ron stated that he would do whatever the Department asked to get his son back, including treatment. He testified that he appeared at parenting classes, but was told to come back or that he arrived too late to participate. Ron stated that he could find employment and that he saw the psychologist. He admitted not following through with pending criminal charges, although he “started to.” Ron went to counseling twice, but explained that “things got so dysfunctional” he was unable to handle it. He admitted that the service plan required him to be free of drugs and acknowledged that he tested positive for cocaine in February, April, and September 2004. He stated that he complied with the service plan, but, admittedly, not as much as he could. Ron testified that, given a little more time, he could handle the obstacles in his way. He stated that, at first, the situation was confusing, overwhelming, and rushed. Ron testified that he did not know how to deal with his family within the time allotted. However, Ron testified that, given his allotted time and the extraordinary circumstances, it took him some time to properly assess and deal with his problems.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, a reasonable fact finder could have concluded that Ron failed to demonstrate his ability to lead a drug free lifestyle because he tested positive for cocaine on three separate occasions in 2004, failed to follow the recommendation of the drug assessment, failed to attend all counseling sessions, failed to attend parenting classes, and failed to submit to all requested drug testing. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the finding, was sufficiently clear and convincing that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Ron failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for him to obtain the return of a child who had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(O).
Although there is conflicting evidence that Ron complied with the service plan in some ways and that he could, given some more time, handle the obstacles, the trial court could have found that Ron was given sufficient time to comply with the family service plan. Moreover, this evidence is not so significant that a reasonable trier of fact could not have reconciled this evidence in favor of its finding and formed a firm belief or conviction that Ron failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for him to obtain the return of a child who had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(O). Accordingly, Ron’s fourth issue is overruled.
Christina’s failure to comply with court order
Prewitt testified that Christina was ordered to comply with each requirement in the Department’s original or any amended family service plan during the pendency of this suit. The Department prepared a family service plan on January 13, 2004. Christina provided the Department with the name of a relative with whom it could place M.B. and participated in urinalysis and hair follicle testing and a drug assessment. However, Christina did not complete a court ordered psychological evaluation and failed to comply with any of the other items on the family service plan, including parenting classes. The Department’s contact with Christina throughout the case was sporadic, and Prewitt was frequently unable to reach her by telephone, letter, or personal visits. Prewitt stated that Christina was not present at the sixty day status hearing on February 2. Ron reported that Christina was in drug rehabilitation in Longview, Texas. However, when Prewitt contacted the drug rehabilitation facility on February 11, the facility had no record of Christina’s being admitted into the program. According to Prewitt, Christina did not attend parenting classes, missed scheduled drug tests, and did not seek treatment for drug issues.
By August 23, the Department’s goal changed from family reunification to an unrelated adoption due to Christina’s noncompliance with the family service plan. According to Prewitt, at the sixty day status hearing, the trial court ordered that Christina was not allowed visitation until she passed a urinalysis. If she failed a urinalysis, Christina was not allowed visitation with M.B. until a hair follicle test was clean. According to Prewitt, Christina’s hair follicle tests were positive for cocaine on February 19 and September 3, 2004. Although Christina denied using drugs since the beginning of the case, records from Mother Frances Hospital in Tyler, Texas, revealed that M.B.’s body fluids were positive for cocaine and methadone when he was born. In fact, both M.B. and Christina were life-flighted to Methodist Hospital in Dallas the day after M.B. was born. M.B.’s final diagnosis was drug withdrawal syndrome. Further, Methodist Hospital records showed that Christina tested positive for opiates, i.e., methadone, cocaine, and hepatitis C antibody. Although Prewitt and Christina discussed the fact that M.B. was born with cocaine in his system, Christina denied using cocaine. According to Prewitt, Christina’s activities and lifestyle would intentionally harm M.B. if he were returned to her. However, Prewitt admitted that she had no evidence that Christina had physically abused M.B.
During the case, Prewitt testified that she sent at least three letters to Christina or her attorney informing them of Christina’s failure to comply with the service plan and failure to remain drug-free. In one letter, Prewitt related a conversation during which she explained to Christina that she was not seeing any progress. Instead, Christina had many excuses for her noncompliance with the court orders. According to Prewitt, Christina understood the importance of the conversation because she made a large scene in the Department’s office, “crying out and hollering that we were not going to take her son away from her, that she was going to do what she needed to do to get him returned to her.” In Prewitt’s opinion, Christina failed to comply with the provisions of the court order establishing the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of child. In her opinion, it is in M.B.’s best interest for Christina’s parental rights to be terminated.
Andretta White, a probation officer with the Cherokee County Community Corrections and Supervision department, testified that she was Christina’s probation officer. She stated that Christina failed to report for the months of February and March 2004. Additionally, Christina had not reported since March 2004. According to White, Christina also failed to perform any community service.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, a reasonable fact finder could have concluded that Christina failed to demonstrate her ability to lead a drug free lifestyle because she tested positive for cocaine on two separate occasions in 2004, failed to follow through with any pending criminal charges, probation, and parole terms, failed to attend parenting classes, failed to complete a psychological evaluation, and failed to submit to all requested drug testing. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the finding, was sufficiently clear and convincing that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Christina failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of a child who had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(O).
Although there is conflicting evidence that Christina participated in two drug tests and a drug assessment, the trial court could have found that Christina was given sufficient time to comply with the family service plan. Moreover, this evidence is not so significant that a reasonable trier of fact could not have reconciled this evidence in favor of its finding and formed a firm belief or conviction that Christina failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of a child who had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(O). Accordingly, Christina’s fourth issue is overruled.
Best Interest of the Child
In their fifth issue, Ron and Christina each argue that there is not clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest.
Applicable Law
In determining the best interest of the child, a number of factors have been considered, including (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals; (7) the stability of the home; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976).
This list is not exhaustive, but simply indicates considerations that have been or could be pertinent. Id. However, the best interest of the child does not require proof of any unique set of factors nor limit proof to any specific factors. In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 814 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). The Holley test focuses on the best interest of the child, not the parent’s best interest. Dupree v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1995, no writ).
Analysis
In addition to the evidence previously described, shortly after the first witness began testifying at trial, Christina had to be removed from the courtroom because she was unable to remain quiet. In fact, Christina asked to be taken home, for her husband to take care of her, and for her medication. She stated that she spent five years in a mental hospital, was schizophrenic, was unaware of what she was doing, wanted her counselor, and was not able to testify. Regarding Christina’s behavior, Shore opined that she was faking her behavior because, at brief moments, she “pull[ed] it together.” He did not believe her behavior was psychotic.
Prewitt testified that on a couple of home visits, she observed Christina bend in half, rock back and forth, and clench her chest. Prewitt stated that when Christina exhibited this behavior, she had been informing Christina of the things she needed to do in order to get her child back. At that point, Christina questioned why the Department removed M.B., began to rock, and declared that the Department did not have the right to do so.
Officer Eric Dawes, a patrolman with the Jacksonville Police Department, testified that, on the night of December 17, 2003, he was on duty near a residence known for heavy drug sales. After midnight, a vehicle stopped by the house and turned its lights off. A passenger left the vehicle, went into the house, and returned approximately two minutes later. Then the car drove down the street. Dawes followed and observed that the vehicle failed to stop at a designated stopping point. Dawes stopped the vehicle. A female was driving the vehicle. Ron was in the front seat holding M.B. in a car seat, but the car seat was not properly fastened. Dawes identified Ron as the passenger who exited and returned to the vehicle earlier at the known drug residence. Christina was in the rear passenger seat along with two other children. After the driver denied Dawes permission to search the vehicle, a canine officer performed a free air search. The canine officer immediately alerted to the front and passenger side doors of the vehicle where Ron and Christina were sitting. Dawes searched the vehicle and found a crack pipe in the front passenger seat where Ron was sitting. He discovered a small piece of what he believed was crack cocaine in the rear middle passenger seat. Further, Dawes found a prohibited weapon in a cloth bag identified as Ron’s. According to Dawes, he found a crack cocaine pipe on Christina’s person. As a result, Dawes arrested Ron and Christina. Dawes admitted that he did not find marijuana or anything similar in the vehicle. Dawes testified that he arrested Ron and Christina on the day of the trial for outstanding warrants.
Phyllis Kidwell, the CASA advocate for M.B., testified that, in January 2004, M.B. was approximately six months old and had respiratory difficulties, possibly chronic, that required several series of antibiotics. According to Kidwell, M.B. was developmentally on target, and, at the time of trial, he was on target or above. She also observed visits between both parents and M.B. at the Department’s Jacksonville office. When both parents visited, Ron read books to M.B. and did most of the caretaking duties, i.e., changing diapers. Kidwell admitted that Ron never acted inappropriately with M.B. and, in fact, expressed love to and for the child. M.B. also interacted with Ron by smiling and cooing at him. According to Kidwell, Christina ceased visiting M.B. at some point and stated that she was going to drug treatment. However, Kidwell later discovered that she did not go. In March 2004, Ron also ceased visiting M.B. Kidwell testified that M.B. was doing well in his foster home, appeared developmentally on target or above, spoke some words with a lot of vocalization, walked, ran, and looked very healthy. Although Kidwell discovered from the case record that M.B. was born addicted to cocaine, he appeared free of any symptoms. However, Kidwell admitted that she had no documentation to support the case record. Kidwell believed that it was in M.B.’s best interest that Ron’s and Christina’s parental rights be terminated. She also believed that M.B. was adoptable.
Regarding the night of December 17, 2003, Ron denied leaving the vehicle and was under the impression that they were borrowing someone’s car. Ron stated that he never saw the prohibited weapon. Ron admitted that he had problems in the past with drugs and that, currently, he “infrequently” had a problem with drugs. He denied using drugs when M.B. was removed from him. In fact, Ron denied ever using cocaine in the past, but admitting using opiates that necessitated treatment with methadone.
Ron stated that when M.B. was removed, his family became extremely dysfunctional. Ron testified that Christina has “issues.” She began to break down and he had to take care of her. According to Ron, working, taking care of Christina, and dealing with the Department became trying. In his opinion, Christina could have learned how to deal with the situation if given time. Ron admitted that he could not take care of Christina and go to drug rehabilitation at the same time. In his opinion, Christina needed counseling because she became overwhelmed easily and had a hard time “processing emotions and dealing” with these types of situations. Ron denied knowing that Christina was using drugs when she was pregnant with M.B. until two or three days before M.B. was born. Thus, he was not surprised when he discovered that M.B. was born with cocaine in his system.
Ron admitted not attending the first hearing on M.B.’s removal because he did not know he was supposed to be there until too late. He acknowledged not staying in contact with his attorney because “when . . . things are not going right,” he tended not to keep in touch with people. Ron admitted that he missed a court date resulting in a warrant and that his house had fallen into “disarray.” Ron testified that he could take care of his criminal problems. He stated that, if he was given some time, he could take care of M.B. even if Christina was unable to do so. He stated that he loved his son and that he was a good father. Ron also stated that he did not want his son around drugs.
Christina testified that she did not understand why she was at trial that day. She stated that she wanted to go home and that she loved her son. She would rather “die” than be without M.B. Christina testified that she believed Ron could provide a stable home for their child. However, she stated that she needed to be in the hospital because she could not control herself. Both the attorney ad litem and CASA recommended termination of Ron’s and Christina’s parental rights.
Although there is conflicting testimony regarding Ron’s parenting ability and his insistence that he could provide a stable home for M.B., even without Christina, the trial court could have disregarded his testimony. The trial court could have found that Ron tested positive for cocaine on three occasions from February to September 2004, that he admitted not being able to handle the demands of his wife and the Department, and that he knew Christina was using drugs while pregnant with M.B. Moreover, this evidence was not so significant that a reasonable trier of fact could not have reconciled this evidence in favor of its finding and formed a firm belief or conviction that terminating Ron’s parental rights was in the best interest of M.B. Accordingly, Ron’s fifth issue is overruled.
Although there is conflicting testimony regarding Christina’s ability to adequately deal with her family life at some point in time, the trial court could have disregarded this testimony. The trial court could have found that Christina tested positive for cocaine on two occasions from February to September 2004, that she admitted needing to be hospitalized, that M.B. tested positive for cocaine at birth, and that Christina was unable to deal with her family life. Moreover, this evidence was not so significant that a reasonable trier of fact could not have reconciled this evidence in favor of its finding and formed a firm belief or conviction that terminating Christina’s parental rights was in the best interest of M.B. Accordingly, Christina’s fifth issue is overruled.
Conclusion
Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Ron and Christina failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for them to obtain the return of a child who had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child. Because we concluded that the trial court found one ground of termination under subsection 161.001(1), we need not address Ron’s or Christina’s first, second, and third issues. Further, the trial court did not err by finding that terminating Ron’s and Christina’s parental rights is in the best
interest of M.B. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
SAM GRIFFITH
Justice
Opinion delivered November 30, 2005.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and DeVasto, J.
(PUBLISH)