NO. 12-03-00274-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS
DANNY DALE WEISINGER, § APPEAL FROM THE 349TH
APPELLANT
V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE § HOUSTON COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Danny Dale Weisinger appeals his conviction of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years. Appellant, proceeding pro se, raises seven issues on appeal. We affirm.
Background
Appellant was charged by indictment with aggravated assault. Appellant pleaded “not guilty,” and the matter proceeded to trial by jury. During a recess following the presentation of evidence, but before jury argument, a juror approached the prosecuting attorney and attempted to speak with her concerning the case. The matter was raised to the trial court prior to jury argument as follows:
[Prosecuting Attorney]: Judge, one of the jurors – I don’t know his name, but one of the men jurors when I went into my office was coming out of the men’s room on the basement floor. He was trying to tell me something in regards to Lance Carr and his mother. He said, I know that I can’t talk to you. I was like, Well, you have to tell the Judge. So I don’t know. I just wanted to let the Court know.
[Appellant’s Counsel]: I don’t know. Apparently, she didn’t communicate with him.
THE COURT: All right.
[Prosecuting Attorney]: I recognize him if I see him, but I don’t know his name.
THE COURT: What will you propose that I do?
[Prosecuting Attorney]: I don’t believe –
[Appellant’s Counsel]: I don’t know. What are the options of the Court to do? Disable him if we feel he’s disabled and use the alternate or –
THE COURT: Well, he tried to talk to you so you didn’t talk to him. So he violated the Court’s instructions. If he tried to talk to one of the Court’s parties, but even then he knew that he was doing it because he said that he – that, I can’t talk to you.
[Prosecuting Attorney]: I don’t know. He went to say it, and he said, “Oh, I can’t talk to you.”
THE COURT: Maybe he started to and then realized what he was about to do.
[Appellant’s Counsel]: I had an experience about two weeks ago when one of the jurors wanted to approach us because – that’s because they recognized a person that they were scared of them, and if that is the case, we disabled that juror.
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
[Appellant’s Counsel]: You know, I’ll probably need to find out what he was trying to tell her.
THE COURT: That doesn’t sound like this. I don’t see anything to do right now except go forward. I am about to discharge the alternate because I don’t think that I keep the alternate after the jury start[s] deliberations. I think that I will let the alternate sit through the argument but then send the jury in and discharge the alternate.
Ultimately, the jury found Appellant guilty as charged and assessed his punishment at imprisonment for twenty years and a seven thousand dollar fine. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly, and this appeal followed.
Juror Misconduct
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to discharge the juror who attempted to converse with the prosecuting attorney. No person shall be permitted to converse with a juror about the case on trial except in the presence and by the permission of the court. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.22 (Vernon 1981). When a juror converses with an unauthorized person about the case, injury to the accused is presumed, and a new trial may be warranted. See Quinn v. State, 958 S.W.2d 395, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). However, the State may rebut this presumption of harm. Id. In determining whether the State appropriately rebutted the presumption of harm, appellate courts should defer to the trial court’s resolution of the historical facts and its determinations concerning credibility and demeanor. Id. If it is shown that the case was not discussed or that nothing prejudicial to the accused was said, then the appellant has not been injured and the verdict will be upheld. See Alba v. State, 905 S.W.2d 581, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
In the case at hand, the trial court, based on its exchange with the prosecuting attorney, determined that the juror tried to speak to the prosecuting attorney, but that the prosecuting attorney did not talk to the juror. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that it was reasonable for the trial court to find that the juror attempted to initiate a conversation with the prosecuting attorney, but, expressly realizing that such contact was forbidden, quickly and abruptly ended the communication. We defer to the trial court’s resolution of historical facts. Inasmuch as the record can be reasonably construed to reflect that nothing prejudicial to Appellant was said, we hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that the State appropriately rebutted the presumption of harm. Appellant’s first issue is overruled.
Indictment
In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it “introduced [the] indictment using the term ‘unknown object’ to describe [the] alleged ‘deadly weapon.’” We interpret Appellant’s second issue broadly to urge that the indictment was not sufficiently definite with regard to its allegation concerning the deadly weapon used. A defendant is entitled to notice if the State intends to seek a deadly weapon finding at trial, and the State’s failure to give such notice constitutes reversible error. See Mixon v. State, 781 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1989), aff’d, 804 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In Mixon, the court held that where the indictment specifically alleged that the appellant “used and exhibited a deadly weapon” to strangle the complainant and “did cause the death of the complainant” by strangling her, such allegations gave the appellant sufficient notice that use of a deadly weapon would be a fact question in his prosecution. Id. The court further held that a deadly weapon finding was not precluded simply by the fact that the weapon is not specifically known. Id.
In the case at hand, the indictment alleged that Appellant “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to [the victim] by hitting her in the head with an unknown object” and further that Appellant “did then and there use or exhibit a deadly weapon, to-wit: said unknown object during the commission of said assault.” We hold that the indictment in the instant case gave sufficient notice that the State intended to seek a deadly weapon finding at trial.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Appellant further argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in that he did not attempt to quash the indictment on these grounds. Yet even assuming arguendo that the indictment did not provide sufficient notice, Appellant cannot overcome the presumption that his trial counsel provided reasonably effective assistance because the record does not contain evidence as to why his counsel did not seek to quash the indictment. See, e.g., Matthews v. State, Nos. 12-03-00435–440-CR, 2004 WL 2721718, at *6 (Tex. App.–Tyler November 30, 2004, no pet. h.) (the appellant failed to meet the first prong of Strickland because the record did not contain evidence concerning the appellant's trial counsel's reasons for choosing the course he did). Appellant’s second issue is overruled.
Evidentiary Sufficiency
In his third and fourth issues, Appellant argues that the evidence was neither legally nor factually sufficient to support his conviction.
Legal Sufficiency
Legal sufficiency is the constitutional minimum required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to sustain a criminal conviction. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2786-787, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); see also Escobedo v. State, 6 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1999, no pet.). The standard for reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; see also Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Johnson, 871 S.W.2d at 186. A successful legal sufficiency challenge will result in rendition of an acquittal by the reviewing court. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41-42, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2217-218, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1982).
The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Such a charge would include one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant is tried.” Id.
A person commits the offense of aggravated assault if he (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another and (2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon while engaging in such conduct. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 22.02(a)(2), 22.01(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004–05). A “deadly weapon” includes anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2004–05). In an aggravated assault case, even absent a description of the weapon used, the deadly character of the weapon used may be shown by the character of the wound inflicted. See Cloudy v. State, 142 Tex. Crim. 211, 212, 152 S.W.2d 363 (1941); Mixon, 781 S.W.2d at 347 (the fact that the specific type of object, which a medical examiner testified was used to put pressure on the neck resulting in victim’s death, was unknown, did not preclude a finding that such an object was a deadly weapon).
In the case at hand, the victim, Eunice Gullick, testified that she lived with Appellant for three years. At some point in time after the relationship between Gullick and Appellant had ended, Appellant met Gullick in South Carolina, seeking to reconcile with her. Gullick informed Appellant that she did not want to reconcile, and Appellant offered to drive Gullick to Texas.
Gullick testified that on January 19, 2003, she and Appellant arrived in Livingston, Texas. After meeting with Appellant’s friend, Lance Carr, and some other people, Appellant and Gullick went to Carr’s mother’s house where they were to spend the night. Gullick testified that after arriving at Carr’s mother’s house, she and Appellant began arguing. At some point, according to Gullick, the argument escalated, and Appellant began cursing at her. Gullick testified that Appellant then stood over her and began hitting her on her head, her stomach, and wherever else he could. To protect herself, Gullick took out a pocket knife and cut Appellant’s neck.
Carr told Gullick and Appellant to leave. Gullick stated that when the two walked outside, Appellant again attempted to hit her. When Carr threatened to call the police, Appellant and Gullick agreed to leave in the car together. Gullick testified that once the two left Carr’s mother’s house, Appellant began hitting her again, cursing at her, threatening her, and knocking her head against the car window. Gullick further stated that Appellant continuously demanded that she give him the knife, but that she told him she had dropped the knife while still at Carr’s mother’s house. Appellant stated, according to Gullick, that when he found the knife he was going to kill her with it.
Gullick testified that Appellant stopped the car and, with Gullick pinned between the car’s front bucket seats, positioned himself on top of Gullick and began beating her again. Gullick stated that, at some point, Appellant grabbed a hammer and told her that he would beat her brains out with it. Gullick further stated that Appellant began hitting her on her head, chest, and stomach with some object. Although she was not certain what the object was, Gullick testified that it had a hard texture and was not Appellant’s fist. Gullick speculated that it was the handle of the hammer and stated that she had been hit with Appellant’s fist enough to know the difference. Gullick stated that while Appellant beat her, he told her that he was going to kill her. Thereafter, a police officer arrived and the beating ceased. Gullick was later admitted to the hospital where she stayed for approximately three to four days.
Kathryn Ann Cundieff, a paramedic with EMS, testified that on January 19, 2003, she was dispatched to a roadside park on Highway 19, south of Crockett, Texas. Once at the scene, Cundieff provided emergency medical services to Gullick. Cundieff stated that they immobilized Gullick’s spine as she was complaining of pain in her neck. Cundieff testified that Gullick had suffered hematomas, which are bruising and swelling, on her face and chest.
Dr. Gary Candelaria treated Gullick upon her arrival at the hospital in Crockett, Texas. Dr. Candelaria noted that Gullick had evidence of contusions to various places throughout her face, as well as some abrasions. Dr. Candelaria further testified that upon examination, Gullick had significant tenderness and pain in her left anterior chest wall in the lateral part of her chest wall as well. Dr. Candelaria stated that a contusion is usually a blunt force injury that can cause subcutaneous swelling and bleeding and that such injuries could be caused by blunt force objects. Dr. Candelaria further stated that the wooden end of a hammer could cause blunt force injuries such as he observed in Gullick’s case. Dr. Candelaria testified that it was doubtful to him that Gullick suffered her injuries as a result of a fall, but rather, that it was more likely that she was struck with something. Dr. Candelaria further stated that it was not necessary that there be a fracture for a blunt force injury to be present.
From our review of the record, considering it in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to Gullick by hitting her in the head with an unknown object and that Appellant further either used or exhibited a deadly weapon during his commission of the assault. Therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
Factual Sufficiency
In conducting a factual sufficiency review, we must first assume that the evidence is legally sufficient under the Jackson standard. See Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). We then consider all of the evidence weighed by the jury that tends to prove the existence of the elemental fact in dispute and compare it to the evidence that tends to disprove that fact. See Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Although we are authorized to disagree with the jury’s determination, even if probative evidence exists that supports the verdict, see Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 133, our evaluation should not substantially intrude upon the jury’s role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of witness testimony. Santellan, 939 S.W.2d at 164. Where there is conflicting evidence, the jury’s verdict on such matters is generally regarded as conclusive. See Van Zandt v. State, 932 S.W.2d 88, 96 (Tex. App.–El Paso 1996, pet. ref’d). Ultimately, we must ask whether a neutral review of all the evidence, both for and against the finding, demonstrates that the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine our confidence in the jury's determination, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
A verdict will be set aside “only if the evidence supporting guilt is so obviously weak, or the contrary evidence so overwhelmingly outweighs the supporting evidence, as to render the conviction clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.” Ortiz v. State, 93 S.W.3d 79, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A clearly wrong and manifestly unjust verdict occurs where the jury's finding “shocks the conscience,” or “clearly demonstrates bias.” Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 481.
As the court of criminal appeals explained in Zuniga, "There is only one question to be answered in a factual-sufficiency review: Considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, was a jury rationally justified in its finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?” See id. at 484.
Here, there is, as Appellant notes in his brief, conflicting testimony concerning whether Appellant struck Gullick with some sort of object. Indeed, although Appellant admitted on the record to hitting Gullick multiple times with his hand, he denied striking her with anything else. Specifically, Appellant stated, “I don’t need anything to whoop that little woman.” Moreover, as Appellant notes, there is evidence that Gullick was intoxicated on the night in question.
We iterate that our evaluation should not substantially intrude upon the jury’s role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of witness testimony, see Santellan, 939 S.W.2d at 164, and where there is conflicting evidence, the jury’s verdict on such matters is generally regarded as conclusive. See Van Zandt, 932 S.W.2d at 96. It follows that the jury was entitled to believe Gullick’s testimony that Appellant was hitting her with something other than his fist, and that she had been hit enough times by his fist to know the difference, and Dr. Candelaria’s testimony that the wooden end of a hammer could cause blunt force injuries such as he observed in Gullick’s case. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 54 S.W.3d 88, 97 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2001, pet. ref’d). Moreover, the jury was entitled to disbelieve Appellant’s testimony that he did not beat Gullick with anything other than his fists. Id.
Our review of the record as a whole, with consideration given to all of the evidence, both for and against the trial court’s finding, has not revealed to us any evidence that causes us to conclude that the proof of guilt is so obviously weak or is otherwise so greatly outweighed by contrary proof as to render Appellant’s conviction clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. We conclude that the jury was rationally justified in finding Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s verdict.
Due Process Violation
As part of his third issue, Appellant argues that the failure to test the hammer for his fingerprints and DNA was a violation of his due process rights in that it permitted the prosecution to mislead the jury. While Appellant claims that he moved for such testing in a February 13, 2004 pretrial hearing, there is no record of that hearing before us on appeal. Furthermore, the clerk’s record contains no such motion. As such, Appellant has presented for us nothing to review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Appellant again argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Appellant argues that his counsel was ineffective in his failure to object to the admission of the hammer into evidence on the grounds that it had not been tested for fingerprints, fibers, blood, or DNA. Appellant also complains that his counsel was ineffective for his failure to object to certain photographs, which Appellant contends were offered by the State to inflame the minds of the jurors. For the reasons cited in our discussion of Appellant’s issue two, we hold that Appellant failed to meet the first prong of Strickland because the record does not contain evidence concerning his trial counsel's reasons for choosing the course he did. See, e.g., Matthews, 2004 WL 2721718, at *6. Appellant’s third and fourth issues are overruled.
Fatal Variance
In his fifth issue, Appellant argues that there was a fatal variance between the allegations in the indictment and the proof offered at trial. Specifically, Appellant contends that the indictment alleged that he committed the offense using an “unknown object,” but that the evidence presented at trial was that Appellant struck Gullick with a wooden-handled hammer. We disagree.
A "variance" occurs when there is a discrepancy between the allegations in the charging instrument and the proof at trial. Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). In a variance situation, the State has proven the defendant guilty of a crime, but has proven its commission in a manner that varies from the allegations in the charging instrument. Id. A variance claim is to be treated as an insufficiency of the evidence problem. See id. at 247. A variance that is not prejudicial to a defendant's “substantial rights” is immaterial. Id. at 248. In determining whether a defendant's substantial rights have been prejudiced in this context, two questions are generally asked: (1) whether the indictment, as written, informed the defendant of the charge against him sufficiently to allow him to prepare an adequate defense at trial and (2) whether prosecution under the deficiently drafted indictment would subject the defendant to the risk of being prosecuted later for the same crime. Id.
Here, we need not address the question as to materiality because the evidence does not reflect that there existed any discrepancy between the allegations in the charging instrument and the proof at trial. The indictment charged that Appellant caused bodily injury to Gullick “by hitting her in the head with an unknown object.”
At trial, Gullick testified that Appellant grabbed a hammer and told her that he would beat her brains out with it. Gullick further testified that Appellant began hitting her on her head, chest, and stomach with some object. Although she was not certain what the object was, Gullick testified that it had a hard texture and was not Appellant’s fist. Gullick speculated that it was the handle of the hammer and stated that she had been hit with Appellant’s fist enough to know the difference. From our review of the record, we conclude that the evidence reflects that Appellant beat Gullick with an unknown object. The record does not reflect definitively with what specific object Appellant beat Gullick. As such, we hold that there was no variance between the allegations in the indictment and the proof offered at trial. Appellant’s fifth issue is overruled.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In his sixth issue, Appellant argues that he was denied ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Appellant contends that his trial counsel’s failure to properly object to plain errors and failure to adequately communicate with Appellant concerning his case demonstrates either a lack of interest in Appellant’s case or a lack of professional knowledge in criminal defense. Appellant further argues that his replacement counsel refused to consider his prior counsel’s deficiencies for purposes of appeal. For the reasons cited in our discussion of Appellant’s issues two, three, and four, we hold that Appellant failed to meet the first prong of Strickland because the record does not contain evidence concerning why his counsel, either trial or appellate, chose their respective courses. See, e.g., Matthews, 2004 WL 2721718, at *6. Appellant’s sixth issue is overruled.
Witness Credibility
In his seventh issue, Appellant urges us to consider whether “the statements and testimonies of the alleged victim to be considered as the gospel as in truthfulness.” Appellant argues that Gullick’s testimony should have been impeached. We interpret Appellant’s seventh issue as reurging the questions of factual sufficiency of the evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. We have previously overruled Appellant’s third and fourth issues, determining that the evidence was factually sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Furthermore, for the reasons cited in our discussion of Appellant’s issues two, three, and four, we hold that Appellant failed to meet the first prong of Strickland because the record does not contain evidence concerning his trial counsel’s reasons for choosing the respective courses he did. See, e.g., id. Appellant’s seventh issue is overruled.
Disposition
Having overruled Appellant’s issues one, two, three, four, five, six, and seven, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
SAM GRIFFITH
Justice
Opinion delivered January 12, 2004.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and DeVasto, J.
(DO NOT PUBLISH)