NUMBER 13-99-698-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI
___________________________________________________________________
RICHARD LEE GODDAR
D, Appellant,v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
___________________________________________________________________
On appeal from the 36th District Court
of Aransas County, Texas.___________________________________________________________________
Before Justices Hinojosa, Yañez, and Chavez
Opinion by Justice Chavez
Appellant, Richard Lee Goddard, was convicted in a trial before the court of failure to appear(1) for not showing up for trial in an aggravated sexual assault case pending against him. On appeal he challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.
In his first and second points of error, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. In a factual sufficiency review, a reviewing court sets aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). In a legal sufficiency review, the reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
If a person lawfully released from custody, with or without bail, on condition that he subsequently appear, intentionally or knowingly fails to appear in accordance with the terms of his release he has committed the offense of failure to appear. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 38.10. Evidence against appellant included the testimony of the bail bondsman who was a surety on the bail bond, testimony by the special prosecutor pro tem who prosecuted appellant's aggravated sexual assault case, testimony by the bailiff who was present for the prosecution of appellant's aggravated sexual assault case, and documentation that the bail bondsman had to pay to have appellant returned from Nogales, Arizona to stand trial.
Appellant argues that he did not have to appear for trial because he could only be proven guilty of a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual assault, but provides us with no case law to support this argument. We find no authority to support the argument that the potential inability of the State to prove the crime charged in the indictment provides an exception to the failure to appear section of the penal code and permits a defendant not to show up at trial and to leave the state. Appellant could more properly have filed a motion to quash(2) or simply appeared and defended himself against the crime charged. We overrule appellant's challenges to the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence.
We AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.
MELCHOR CHAVEZ
Justice
Do not publish.
Tex. R. App. P. 47.3.
Opinion delivered and filed this
the 2nd day of November, 2000.
1. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 38.10 (Vernon 1994).
2. See Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 28.05.