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NUMBER 13-02-328-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI
___________________________________________________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF C.K.L. AND T.A.L., MINOR CHILDREN
___________________________________________________________________
On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
of Calhoun County, Texas.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Dorsey and Rodriguez
Opinion by Justice Rodriguez
Appellant, the mother of C.K.L. and T.A.L., brings this accelerated appeal following the trial court=s order terminating her parental rights. By one issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting three exhibits as evidence. We affirm.
As this is a memorandum opinion not designated for publication, and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite them here. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
I. Standard
We review the trial court=s evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion standard. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 906 (Tex. 2000). Unless the trial court=s erroneous evidentiary ruling probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment, we will not reverse the ruling. Id.
II. Analysis
By her sole issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting three State=s exhibits over her objections.[1] Appellant first argues the medical records of C.K.L. and T.A.L. were admitted erroneously because they contained hearsay and went beyond the scope of Texas Rule of Evidence 803(4). See Tex. R. Evid. 803(4). Specifically, she objected that the records went beyond the scope of rule 803(4) because they got into Aessentially a who-done-it-type thing, identity issues.@
In Texas, it has been held that statements by a victim of child abuse as to the causation and source of the child=s injuries are admissible under rule 803(4). In re L.S., 748 S.W.2d 571, 576 (Tex. App.BAmarillo 1988, writ. denied); see Moore v. State, 82 S.W.3d 399, 403 (Tex. App.BAustin 2002, pet. ref=d). Moreover, in child sexual abuse cases, the injury is often as much psychological as it is physical in nature. Ware v. State, 62 S.W.3d 344, 351 (Tex. App.BFort Worth 2001, pet. ref=d). The nature and extent of the psychological harm may depend on the identity of the abuser. Id. Thus, the identity of an accused may be Areasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis and treatment.@ Id.; see Fleming v. State, 819 S.W.2d 237, 247 (Tex. App.BAustin 1991, pet. ref=d). Looking at the two exhibits, we are unclear as to where appellant believes the identity of the abuser is revealed. Regardless, we conclude that if an identification were made, the statement containing the identification would be pertinent to the diagnosis and treatment of both C.K.L. and T.A.L. See Ware, 62 S.W.3d at 351; Fleming, 819 S.W.2d at 247; see also Tex. R. Evid. 803(4). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant=s hearsay objection to the two exhibits. See Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 34 S.W.3d at 906.
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in admitting exhibit 5, which contained a time line of events relating to the history of the case. However, in accordance with rule 38.1(h) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, we will only consider contentions that are supported by clear and concise arguments with appropriate citations to authorities. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h). Thus, we will not address appellant=s argument concerning this exhibit. Appellant=s sole issue is overruled.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ
Justice
Do not publish.
Tex. R. App. P. 47.3.
Opinion delivered and filed
this 12th day of December, 2002.
[1]Appellant objected to: Exhibit 1 and 1A, which were the medical records of C.K.L. and T.A.L.; and Exhibit 5, which was a time line of events leading up to the State=s filing of the petition to terminate.