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NUMBER 13-01-451-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI
___________________________________________________________________
JAIME GUERRA, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
___________________________________________________________________
On appeal from the 94th District Court
of Nueces County, Texas.
__________________________________________________________________
O P I N I O N
Before Justices Dorsey, Hinojosa, and Rodriguez
Opinion by Justice Rodriguez
Appellant, Jaime Guerra, was charged with the felony offense of aggravated kidnapping. After Gallegos pled not guilty and waived a jury trial, the trial court found Gallegos guilty, and sentenced him to life in prison. By one point of error, Guerra contends the trial court erred in holding the evidence legally sufficient to prove the offense of aggravated kidnapping as alleged in the indictment. We affirm.
I. FACTS
While A.C., a thirteen year old girl, walked to school, Guerra approached her holding a baby rabbit. Guerra spoke to A.C. about the rabbit and asked if she would like to come into his house to see the Amother@ rabbit. A.C. agreed and followed Guerra into the house. Guerra led A.C. into his bedroom, but she became frightened and said she had to leave. Guerra told A.C. that she did not have to leave and pushed her onto the bed. A.C. kicked Guerra, but he held her feet and looked under her skirt. A.C. continued to struggle with Guerra until he finally backed away and apologized. A.C. then retreated from the room and left the house.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Young v. State, 14 S.W.3d 748, 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
III. ANALYSIS
By his sole point of error, Guerra contends the trial court erred in sustaining a conviction because the evidence was legally insufficient to prove all essential elements of the offense. Guerra was indicted under section 20.04 of the Texas Penal Code, which provides: a person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly abducts another person with the intent to violate or abuse sexually. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 20.04 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2002); Holmes v State, 873 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Tex. App.BFort Worth 1994, no pet.). According to section 20.01, Aabduct@ means to restrain a person with intent to prevent her liberation by secreting or holding her in a place where she is not likely to be found. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 20.01(2)(A) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2002); Holmes, 873 S.W.2d at 125. ARestrain@ means to restrict a persons movement so as to interfere substantially with her liberty, by moving her from one place to another, or by confining her. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 20.01(1) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2002).
Although there is no time requirement for Arestraint,@ the interference with the person=s liberty must be substantial. See Rogers v. State, 687 S.W.2d 337, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Therefore, temporary restraint, if substantial, is sufficient to constitute Arestraint@ for an aggravated kidnapping offense. See id.; see also Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Cortez v. State, 738 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1987, no pet.); Rodriguez v. State, 646 S.W.2d 524, 526 (Tex. App.BHouston [1st Dist. ] 1982, no pet.). In this case, Guerra confined A.C. to the bedroom by holding her feet. Even though Guerra held A.C. for less than two minutes, this substantial restriction of her liberty satisfies the restraint element of the offense. See Rodriguez, 646 S.W.2d at 527. Moreover, Guerra held A.C. in a place where she was not likely to be found. See Price v. State, 35 S.W.3d 136, 140 (Tex. App.BWaco 2000, pet. ref=d).
Guerra contends that his temporary detention of A.C. did not result in substantial interference with her liberty. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. '' 20.01(1), (2). However, this contention is invalid based on a recent court of criminal appeals=s case which held that confinement, even if temporary or part of another crime, constitutes substantial interference with a person=s liberty, an element of an aggravated kidnapping offense. See Hines v. State, No. 1026-01, 2002 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 106, *7-*10 (May 22, 2002); see also Megas v. State, 68 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. App.BHouston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). In this case, Guerra led A.C. into his bedroom and held her legs in a position where she could not escape. The evidence sufficiently supports the conclusion that Guerra substantially interfered with her liberty. See Hines, 2002 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 106, at *7-*9.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction, a reasonable jury could have found the elements of aggravated kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19. Therefore, Guerra=s sole point of error is overruled.
Accordingly, the trial court=s judgment is affirmed.
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ
Justice
Do not publish.
Tex. R. App. P. 47.3.
Opinion delivered and filed
this 27th day of June, 2002.