Buckley v. Nabors Drilling USA

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _______________ m 02-40477 Summary Calendar _______________ TERRY L. BUCKLEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, VERSUS NABORS DRILLING USA, INC., AND NABORS OFFSHORE CORPORATION, Defendants-Appellants. ******************************* _______________ m 02-40478 Summary Calendar _______________ PHILLIP COX, Plaintiff-Appellee, VERSUS NABORS DRILLING USA, INC., Defendant-Appellant, NABORS OFFSHORE CORPORATON, Appellant. _____________________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas m G-01-CV-623 _____________________________ October 8, 2002 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and its arguments on that point. CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. Nabors mentions the issue only in its reply * PER CURIAM: brief. Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived, and we will not address Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., and Nabors Off- them. Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. shore Corporation (together referred to as Co., 44 F.3d 256, 260 n.9 (5th Cir. 1995). “Nabors”) appeal the denial of a motion to Therefore, the judgment is AFFIRMED on the compel arbitration and to stay proceedings ground that Nabors failed to establish the ex- pending arbitration under §§ 3 and 4 of the istence of a binding agreement between the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The district parties. court denied the motion on the ground that the arbitration provisions in question are exempted by § 1 of the FAA as contracts of employment involving seamen. In the alternative, the court held that even assuming the FAA is applicable, Nabors failed to establish the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. We pretermit comment on the district court’s decision concerning the proper scope of § 1, because resolution of that complicated issue is unnecessary in this case. Even if the district court is right to say that the arbitration provisions are exempted, Nabors failed to raise or argue the district court’s alternative holding as an issue in its opening brief and thus waived * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be pub- lished and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. 2