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NUMBER 13-04-00267-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI B EDINBURG
ANNA KRAMER, Appellant,
v.
IRIS KRAMER, Appellee.
On appeal from the 267th District Court of Jackson County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Hinojosa and Rodriguez
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
This is an appeal from the trial court=s order granting sanctions against appellant, Anna Kramer. By a single issue, appellant complains the trial court abused its discretion in granting sanctions against her. We affirm.
Appellant filed an Original Petition for Divorce as next friend of her son, Nicky Kramer.[1] Appellant later non-suited the divorce. A hearing was subsequently held on a motion for sanctions filed by appellee, Iris Kramer.[2] In the motion for sanctions, appellee stated:
Neither Anna Kramer nor her attorneys can show this court any authority for their alleged representation of Nicky Kramer in this action. As both parties have pled and presumably agree, Nicky Kramer is incompetent to make decisions for himself and is in a full-time care facility. His guardian and wife is Iris Kramer, the Respondent in this case.
* * * * * * *
Petitioner Anna Kramer and her attorneys have no basis in law or fact and there is not one warranted by a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law as to why the Petitioner should be able to bring this cause of action for divorce on behalf of Nicky Kramer. Further Respondent would argue that this groundless pleading was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment. There can be no other reason for bringing this cause of action other than bad faith and harassment. The Petitioner can cite the court no case law or statutory authority for his [sic] representation of Nicky Kramer when a legal guardian currently exists for Nicky Kramer.
The trial court granted the motion, finding that appellant=s divorce petition was brought without any basis in fact and law, in bad faith, and for the sole purpose of harassment. Appellee was granted sanctions under rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and section 10.001(1) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 10.001 (Vernon 2002). Appellant was ordered to pay sanctions in the amount of $5,000 for appellee=s attorney=s fees.
Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code authorizes a trial court to impose sanctions upon a person, a party represented by the person, or both, for advancing frivolous pleadings or motions. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. '' 10.001(1), 10.004(a) (Vernon 2002). Section 10.001(1) provides as follows:
The signing of a pleading or motion as required by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure constitutes a certificate by the signatory that to the signatory's best knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry:
(1) the pleading or motion is not being presented for any improper purpose, including to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) each claim, defense, or other legal contention in the pleading or motion is warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) each allegation or other factual contention in the pleading or motion has evidentiary support, or, for a specifically identified allegation or factual contention, is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) each denial in the pleading or motion of a factual contention is warranted on the evidence or, for a specifically identified denial, is reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 10.001 (Vernon 2002). In the order awarding sanctions, the trial court made the following findings:
1. Petitioner Anna Kramer knew that Iris Kramer was the Court appointed legal guardian of the person and estate of Nicky Kramer and that the Guardian and Ward were represented by counsel. . . .
2. Without any basis in fact or law, in bad faith, and for the sole purpose of harassment, Anna Kramer, by and through Anna Kramer=s attorney Matthew Diamond, filed a divorce petition naming Nicky Kramer as the petitioner through his purported next friend Anna Kramer in the District Court of Jackson County.
Imposing an available sanction is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Koslow=s v. Mackie, 796 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex. 1990). We review the trial court=s actions under an abuse of discretion standard. Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Scheppler, 815 S.W.2d 884, 889 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1991, no writ). The test for determining whether the trial court abused its discretion is whether it acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles; in other words, whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985).
The probate code establishes that a guardian has the right Ato bring and defend suits by or against the ward.@ See Tex. Prob. Code Ann. ' 768 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). Because appellee is the named guardian of the person and estate of Nicky Kramer, appellant had no basis in law to bring a suit on behalf of Nicky Kramer. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions against appellant.
Because we have concluded that sanctions were properly granted under chapter 10 of the civil practice and remedies code, it is unnecessary to address the appropriateness of the trial court=s sanctions under rule 13 of the rules of civil procedure. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. Appellant=s sole issue is overruled.
We affirm the trial court=s order granting sanctions against appellant.
FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA
Justice
Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed this
the 30th day of August, 2005.
[1] Nicky Kramer was deemed mentally incompetent as a result of injuries sustained in an automobile accident, and appellee, his wife, Iris Kramer, was appointed guardian of his person and estate.
[2] Appellant is appellee=s mother-in-law.