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NUMBER 13-03-754-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
___________________________________________________________________
DEBORA LYNN STANTON, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
___________________________________________________________________
On appeal from the 130th District Court
of Matagorda County, Texas.
__________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Hinojosa and Rodriguez
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez
This is a capital-murder case. The jury found appellant, Debora Lynn Stanton, guilty of murder. The State did not seek the death penalty, and Stanton was sentenced to life imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Corrections. The trial court has certified that this case "is not a plea bargain case, and the defendant has the right of appeal." See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). By one issue, Stanton complains of the voluntariness of her confessions.[1] We affirm.
I. Facts
All issues of law presented by this case are well settled, and the parties are familiar with the facts. Therefore, we will not recite the law or the facts in this memorandum opinion, except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court's decision and the basic reasons for it. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
II. Analysis
Stanton contends the trial court erred when it admitted her February 10 and 11 statements into evidence because the statements were involuntarily given following coercion by police during custodial interrogations. She argues that the error violated her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, resulted in reversible error.
A. Standard of Review
Appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress a confession gives great deference to the trial court's determinations of fact, then assesses de novo the trial court's application of the law to those facts. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
B. First Confession
Voluntariness is not an issue unless the confession was obtained when the individual was in custody at the time of the questioning. Melton v. State, 790 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); see Garza v. State, 915 S.W.2d 204, 211 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1996, pet. ref'd). A person is not considered to be in custody unless a reasonable person would believe that her freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322-24 (1994)). The following are four general situations that may constitute custody: (1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way; (2) when a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he cannot leave; (3) when law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted; and (4) when there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he is free to leave. Id. "The determination of custody must be made on an ad hoc basis, after considering all of the (objective) circumstances." Id. at 255 (parentheses in original).
In accordance with Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 380 (1964), the trial court conducted a pre-trial hearing to determine the voluntariness of Stanton's statements. See Jackson, 378 U.S. at 380; Lopez v. State, 384 S.W.2d 345, 347-48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22 (Vernon 2005). At the hearing, Stanton and Detective Wayne Frieda testified that Stanton called Officer Fred Wesselski and told him she wanted to speak with one of the officers. Officer Wesselski and Detective Frieda provided Stanton transportation to the police station. Detective Frieda and Officer Wesselski further testified that before her first confession they told Stanton she could leave at any time, but she chose not to do so.[2] Additionally, Stanton testified that, before she gave her February 10 statement, no one told her that she was a suspect or that she might be accused of causing the death of the victim. Detective Frieda also testified that Stanton was not in custody at the time she gave her first confession on February 10, 1992. However, at the hearing, Stanton testified that she thought she was not free to leave at the time she gave her February 10 statement.
As the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the witnesses, see State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), and considering all of the objective circumstances, see Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255, the trial court could have found that Stanton was not in custody at the time of her first confession. Giving deference to the trial court's determinations of fact, see Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89, we conclude Stanton's first confession does not involve the issue of voluntariness because it was not obtained while Stanton was in custody. See Melton, 790 S.W.2d at 326. Thus, we find no error in the trial court's refusal to grant Stanton's motion to suppress her first confession. Appellant's issue, to the extent it addresses the voluntariness of Stanton's first confession, is overruled.
C. Second Confession
At the suppression hearing, Detective Frieda and Officer Wesselski testified that Stanton was arrested after her first confession but before her second confession. It is, therefore, undisputed that Stanton was in custody at the time she gave her February 11 statement. Detective Frieda and Officer Wesselski also testified that Stanton received and waived her Miranda rights before she confessed on February 11, 1992. Nonetheless, Stanton claims that her second confession was not voluntary because she was promised leniency in return for this second confession.
At the suppression hearing, Stanton testified as follows regarding the alleged promise made by Detective Frieda and Officer Wesselski before she gave her February 11 statement: (1) they "told me by doing what they asked, . . . answering their questions and doing the things, . . . helping them with what they needed that it would make things easier on me;" (2) "[t]hey told me that they would make things easier on me;" (3) "I was told B with the [February 11] statement, I was told that my cooperation with helping them out in this case would make things a lot easier on me;" and (4) "other than telling me that they would make things easier on me if I worked with them on this," no other promises were made. At the hearing, the officers denied that they made any promises to Stanton. At trial, however, Detective Frieda testified that he might have said things would "go easier on her" if she cooperated.
For a promise to render a confession invalid under article 38.21, it must be (1) positive; (2) made or sanctioned by someone in authority; and (3) of such an influential nature that it would cause a defendant to speak untruthfully. Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.21 (Vernon 2005) (providing statement of accused may be used in evidence against her if it appears that same was freely and voluntarily made without compulsion or persuasion). To determine if the alleged promise of a benefit was likely to influence a person to speak untruthfully, an appellate court considers whether the circumstances of the promise made the defendant "inclined to admit a crime he didn't commit." Sossamon v. State, 816 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc). Moreover, a general statement regarding how a confession can sometimes result in leniency does not render a confession involuntary. See Muniz, 851 S.W.2d at 254.
The trial court was entitled to disbelieve Stanton's testimony. The trial court was also entitled to believe the officers' testimony denying that they made any promises to her or Detective Frieda's testimony acknowledging that he may have told Stanton things would "go easier on her" if she cooperated. See Ballard, 987 S.W.2d at 891. Nonetheless, even accepting as true Stanton's allegations as to what the officers told her, we cannot conclude that a general statement about how helping out with the case would make things a lot easier on Stanton renders her second confession invalid or involuntary. See Muniz, 851 S.W.2d at 254. The alleged promise of leniency is not sufficient to induce an innocent person to falsely confess to the crime. Compare Janecka, 937 S.W.2d at 466, with Sossamon, 816 S.W.2d at 345. Nor is it positive enough to render the confession invalid under article 38.21. See Janecka, 937 S.W.2d at 466; Muniz, 851 S.W.2d at 254. Therefore, we conclude the promise, if any, did not render Stanton's second confession invalid or involuntary as Stanton contends. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. The trial court did not err in denying Stanton's motion to suppress her second confession. We overrule Stanton's sole issue as it relates to her second confession.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ
Justice
Do not publish.
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Memorandum Opinion delivered and
filed this 14th day of July, 2005.
[1]The February 10, 1992 and February 11, 1992 statements about which Stanton complains will also be referred to as her first and second confessions respectively. The State read both statements to the jury, and they were admitted into evidence. A third statement dated February 7, 1992 was not offered as evidence.
[2] At trial, Officer Wesselski also testified that on February 10, 1992, Stanton contacted him at the police department and told him she needed to talk with him, that there were some things she had forgotten to tell him earlier or had lied about and wanted to straighten out with him, and that there were some things about her and her brother, Jay Stanton, he needed to know. When Stanton was transported to the police station she rode in the front seat of the car and was not handcuffed. Officer Wesselski also testified that he explained to Stanton that she was not under arrest and was free to leave at any time.