NUMBER 13-05-263-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
of San Patricio County, Texas.
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Garza
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez
Appellant, Ruben Martinez Davila, Jr., was charged with aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.02 (Vernon 2003). A jury found appellant guilty of the lesser-included offense of assault, a class "A" misdemeanor. See id. § 22.01. The trial court assessed punishment at confinement for one year, suspended for two years' probation, a $500.00 fine, restitution to the victim for $1,448.00, and court costs. By one issue, appellant contends the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
I. Standard of Review
In a legal sufficiency review, we consider all of the properly or improperly admitted evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational jury could have found the accused guilty of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Rosillo v. State, 953 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, pet. ref'd). We measure the legal sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
"There is only one question to be answered in a factual sufficiency review: Considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, was the jury rationally justified in finding guild beyond a reasonable doubt?" Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). There are two ways in which a court may find the evidence to be factually insufficient: (1) the evidence supporting the finding, considered alone, is too weak to support the jury's finding beyond a reasonable doubt; or (2) the contravening evidence is so strong that the State could not have met its burden of proof. Drichas v. State, 75 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex Crim. App. 2005) (en banc). We also apply a hypothetically correct jury charge analytical construct in the context of a factual sufficiency review. Adi v. State, 94 S.W.3d 124, 131 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd) (citing Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).
Under both standards, the jury is the sole judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given the evidence. Beckham v. State, 29 S.W.3d 148, 152 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd). Therefore, the jury may believe all or part of any witness's testimony. Margraves v. State, 34 S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc). Reconciliation of any conflicts in the evidence falls within the exclusive province of the jury. Id. In conducting this review, the Court does not engage in a second evaluation of the weight and credibility of the evidence, but only ensures that the jury reached a rational decision. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc). If there is evidence that establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trier of fact believes that evidence, the appellate court does not sit as a thirteenth juror in reassessing the evidence. See Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc).
II. Analysis
Appellant contends there was legally and factually insufficient evidence to support his conviction for the lesser-included offense of class "A" misdemeanor assault. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.01 (Vernon 2003). Appellant claims that the State did not meet its burden of proving that appellant was actually the one who intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caused serious bodily injury to Quiroz on or about January 17, 2004.
Section 22.01 of the Texas Penal Code provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) A person commits [assault] if the person:
(1) intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another . . . .
. . . .
(b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor.
Id. § 22.01(a), (b).
Here, testimony indicated that on or about January 17, 2004, the victim, Ralph Quiroz, a resident of Ingleside, Texas, was invited to attend a party in Aransas Pass, Texas. Quiroz attended the party with three friends from Ingleside, including Hailey Hall, Daniel Cady, and Jonathan Martinez. Quiroz testified that appellant asked Quiroz, Cady, and Martinez to leave the party minutes after they arrived. Quiroz's testimony further shows that when Quiroz, Cady, and Martinez did not make an immediate departure from the party after being commanded to leave by appellant, appellant hit Quiroz with a closed fist in the jaw and broke it.
Quiroz's testimony was corroborated by the testimony of Cady and Martinez, as well as the testimony of appellant. Martinez testified that appellant was angry about their being at the party, and that appellant "got in Quiroz's face" in the backyard right before Quiroz was hit. Cady testified that after arriving at the party, he stayed in the house while Quiroz and Martinez went into the backyard; he heard someone yell "fight," and someone told him Quiroz was hurt in the backyard. Cady also testified he went outside, where he saw Quiroz grabbing his face and dazed with blood everywhere. In addition, Cady testified that appellant approached him with a raised fist, yelling and swearing loudly, but that someone held appellant back to prevent him from hitting Cady. Appellant, in a written statement, indicated that he had gone after Quiroz, but his girlfriend held him back. Furthermore, appellant indicated in his written statement that he also chased one of the other Ingleside males out of the house, but his girlfriend restrained him again.
Considering all of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant, himself, was actually the individual who caused Quiroz's injury. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Rosillo, 953 S.W.2d at 811. Thus, we conclude the evidence was legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction for the offense of class "A" misdemeanor assault.
Moreover, reviewing the evidence in a neutral light, Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 484, and not substituting our own judgment because the jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be given testimony, Beckham, 29 S.W.3d at 152, we conclude that the evidence supporting the jury's finding that appellant, himself, was actually the individual who caused Quiroz's injuries is not so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the verdict, nor greatly outweighed by contrary proof. See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 129. Thus, we conclude the evidence was factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction for the offense of class "A" misdemeanor assault.
Having concluded that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction for class "A" misdemeanor assault, we overrule appellant's sole issue on appeal.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ
Do not publish.
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Memorandum Opinion delivered and
filed this 3rd day of August, 2006.