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NUMBER 13-05-163-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
RONALD SNEED, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 130th District Court
of Matagorda County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION [1]
Before Justices Hinojosa, Yañez and Castillo
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Castillo
A jury convicted appellant Ronald Sneed of burglary of a habitation.[2] The trial court assessed punishment at forty years' confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice‑Institutional Division. By three issues, Sneed asserts that the evidence is insufficient to prove property was stolen and identity. We affirm.
I. Relevant Facts
At approximately 6:45 in the morning of February 26, 2004, the complainant heard her garage door open and "knew that two [men] had gone in there." Walking outside her residence, she ordered them to exit her garage. One man complied, paused momentarily, and fled through hedges on the property to the alley along the residence. The complainant assumed that the second man fled through a utility room by a gate left open outside that room. When police arrived, the complainant directed them to the alley. A few minutes later, an officer returned with a man who the complainant testified "we identified him as being the guy." Her leaf blower was returned to her at that time. The complainant testified that the leaf blower, among other things, had been inside her garage.[3] She later discovered that a weed-eater was also missing.
A police officer dispatched to the scene observed Sneed in the alley behind the complainant's residence with a leaf blower under his arm. Sneed fled. After a short pursuit on foot, the officer apprehended Sneed as Sneed "was dropping the leaf blower." The officer testified, without objection, that Sneed told him "he was out for a jog and going to a pawn shop." The pawn shops were not open at that time in the morning, according to the officer. The leaf blower belonged to the complainant.
On the same day, an employee of a nearby day care center identified Sneed to law enforcement as the man she saw standing on the complainant's driveway and then running through the hedges to the alley. In court, she identified Sneed again.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
By his first issue, Sneed asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish the essential theft element of property. He asserts that the evidence does not establish that a leaf blower was stolen. By his second and third issues, he asserts the evidence is factually insufficient to prove his identity, and that the leaf blower was stolen.
A. Legal Sufficiency Standard of Review
A legal sufficiency challenge requires us to review the relevant evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and then to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Sorto v. State, 173 S.W.3d 469, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); Escamilla v. State, 143 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). This standard is designed to give "full play to the [jury's] responsibility fairly" to "draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Sanders v. State, 119 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We consider all the evidence that sustains the conviction, whether properly or improperly admitted. Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (citing Garcia v. State, 919 S.W.2d 370, 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (per curiam)). Similarly, we consider all the evidence that sustains the conviction, whether submitted by the prosecution or the defense, in determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Cook v. State, 858 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). In this review, we are not to reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence; rather, we act only to ensure that the jury reached a rational decision. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
B. Factual Sufficiency Standard of Review
A factual sufficiency review begins with the presumption that the evidence supporting the jury's verdict is legally sufficient under Jackson. See Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). In a factual sufficiency review, we review all the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether evidence supporting the verdict is too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or if evidence contrary to the verdict is strong enough that the beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard could not have been met.[4] Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We review all the evidence. Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We must consider the most important evidence that the appellant claims undermines the jury's verdict. Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). However, we approach a factual sufficiency review with appropriate deference to avoid substituting our judgment for that of the fact finder.[5] Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 6-7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Every fact need not point directly and independently to the accused's guilt. Vanderbilt v. State, 629 S.W.2d 709, 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). A conclusion of guilt can rest on the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances. Id.
C. Hypothetically Correct Jury Charge
We measure the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence against the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Adi v. State, 94 S.W.3d 124, 131 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd); Cano v. State, 3 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1999, pet. ref'd). We then determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7.
Thus, the hypothetically correct jury charge authorized the jury to find Sneed guilty of the offense of burglary of a habitation if he (1) intentionally and knowingly (2) entered the complainant's habitation (3) with the intent to commit theft. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 30.02(a)(3) (Vernon 2003), ' 31.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 2005); Williams v. State, 505 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). "Owner" means a person who "has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor." Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 1.07(a)(35)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2005). The crucial element of theft is the deprivation of property from the rightful owner, without the owner's consent, regardless of whether the defendant at that moment has taken possession of the property. Stewart v. State, 44 S.W.3d 582, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
When there is independent evidence of a burglary, the unexplained personal possession of recently stolen property may support an inference that the possessor is guilty of the offense in which the property was stolen. Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Hardesty v. State, 656 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Once the permissible inference arises, sufficiency of the evidence must still be examined according to applicable evidentiary standards of appellate review, because the inference is not conclusive. Hardesty, 656 S.W.2d at 77. Flight is also a circumstance indicating guilt. Colella v. State, 915 S.W.2d 834, 839 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ("We have repeatedly held that flight is evidence of a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn."); Rumbaugh v. State, 629 S.W.2d 747, 752 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we should look at "events occurring before, during and after the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act." Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) and Thompson v. State, 697 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative effect of all the incriminating facts are sufficient to support the conviction. Id. (citing Alexander v. State, 740 S.W.2d 749, 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) and Russell v. State, 665 S.W.2d 771, 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)). The evidence is sufficient if the conclusion of guilt is warranted by the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances. See id.
D. Discussion
Sneed asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove the property component of theft, namely, the leaf blower. The jury heard the complainant identify the leaf blower as her property. In the complainant's statement, which was admitted in evidence, she stated that the leaf blower "had been right at the front of the garage." Sneed had the leaf blower in his possession while in the alley, after fleeing from the scene, and when apprehended.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, evidence of proximity in time and in place while Sneed was in possession of the leaf blower identified as the complainant's militates in favor of a conclusion that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential element of property beyond a reasonable doubt. Escamilla, 143 S.W.3d at 817. We conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient. We overrule Sneed's first issue.
There is no contrary evidence in the record to demonstrate that the leaf blower was other than in its usual place in the complainant's garage and subsequent to Sneed's forbidden entry into the garage, on Sneed's person. Viewing all the evidence in a neutral light, we cannot conclude that the evidence supporting the verdict is too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Threadgill, 146 S.W.3d at 664. We conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to prove the leaf blower was the property stolen. We overrule the second issue presented.
Viewed in the same light, eyewitness testimony places Sneed inside the complainant's garage, in flight, and then apprehended. There is no contrary evidence. We conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to sustain the essential element of identity. We overrule Sneed's third issue.
Further, Sneed fled from the scene and from law enforcement. His flight is evidence of a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. Rumbaugh, 629 S.W.2d at 752; see also Hernandez v. State, 939 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to sustain the verdict.
III. Conclusion
We overrule Sneed's three issues and affirm.
ERRLINDA CASTILLO
Justice
Do not publish.
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Memorandum opinion delivered and filed
this 23rd day of February, 2006.
[1] See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1, 47.4.
[2] See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 30.02(a)(3) (Vernon 2003). Enhanced, the indictment alleged that, on or about February 26, 2004, Sneed intentionally or knowingly entered a habitation without the effective consent of Jane Hicks, the owner, and attempted to commit or did commit theft of property, a leaf blower. "Habitation" means a structure that is adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 30.01(1) (Vernon 2003).
[3] The complainant's statement was offered by the defense and admitted in evidence. There, the complainant states, "We looked in the garage and my husband's yellow electric leaf blower was missing. It had been right at the front of the garage. My daughter, Rebecca looked at the leaf blower and identified it as ours."
[4] Our neutral review of all the evidence, both for and against the challenged elements, looks to determine whether proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination, or whether proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof. See Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484‑85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see also Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593‑94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We remain mindful of the jury's role to resolve conflicts in testimony. See Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that questions concerning the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are to be resolved by the trier of fact); see also Esquivel v. State, 506 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
[5] We always remain aware of the fact finder's role and unique position, a position we are unable to occupy. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc). Exercise of our authority to disagree with the fact finder's determination is appropriate only when the record clearly indicates our intervention is necessary to stop manifest injustice. Id. at 9. Otherwise, we accord due deference to the fact finder's determinations, particularly those concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence. Id. Absent exceptional circumstances, issues of witness credibility are for the jury, and we may not substitute our view of the credibility of a witness for the constitutionally guaranteed jury determination. Id.; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979).