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NUMBER 13-06-164-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
GARY COPLEN, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 347th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Yañez, Rodriguez, and Garza
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Yañez
On January 17, 2005, the State filed a motion to revoke community supervision, alleging that appellant, Gary Coplen, had violated his conditions of community supervision.[1] On February 7, 2005, appellant pleaded Atrue@ to the State=s allegations and the trial court subsequently revoked appellant=s supervision and sentenced him to eight years= imprisonment. Appellant=s appellate attorney has filed a brief in which she concludes that, after a review of the record and the related law, the appeal is frivolous and without merit. We affirm.
Appellant=s counsel has filed an Anders brief with this Court stating that she has diligently reviewed the record and concludes that appellant has no non‑frivolous grounds for appeal.[2] The brief contains a professional evaluation of the record and advances one arguable ground for review: the trial court erred by failing to conduct, sua sponte, a competency hearing prior to conducting the hearing on the State=s motion to revoke. In compliance with High v. State,[3] counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, the trial court did not err in its judgment. Counsel certifies that she has served a copy of her brief on appellant and informed appellant of his right to file a pro se brief. We conclude counsel=s brief meets the requirements of Anders.[4] More than thirty days have passed and no pro se brief has been filed.
We have reviewed the arguable ground raised by counsel in her appellate brief, and we agree with her assessment that no reversible error exists.[5] Our independent review of the record has not revealed any reversible error.[6] We agree the appeal is frivolous and without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.[7] Additionally, in accordance with Anders, appellant=s counsel has asked permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant.[8] We grant counsel=s request to withdraw. We further order counsel to notify appellant of the disposition of this appeal and of the availability of discretionary review.[9]
LINDA REYNA YAÑEZ,
Justice
Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Memorandum opinion delivered and filed
this the 5th day of July, 2007.
[1] Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense of robbery on August 8, 2001. Appellant was sentenced to ten years= imprisonment; however, his sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on community supervision for a term of ten years. The State alleged that appellant violated the conditions of his community supervision by failing to participate in the Substance Abuse Felony Punishment Facility in a manner that complied with the facility=s rules, regulations, and treatment programs.
[2] See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744‑45 (1967).
[3] High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
[4] See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; High, 573 S.W.2d at 812.
[5] When asked if appellant was competent, appellant=s counsel responded:
I believe he is competent, Your [sic] Honor, insofar as he has been able to assist me in the defense of his case. He has an understanding of these proceedings and the allegations against him. But for the Court=s information, Mr. Coplen does have some mental health history and he is illiterate. But I did explain to him the admonishments in writing.
Nothing in the record indicates appellant did not have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Nothing in the record indicates appellant did not have sufficient ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.
Appellant testified at the hearing on the State=s motion to revoke. The record reflects that appellant coherently answered all questions posed to him on direct and cross-examination. Though appellant did discuss his history of mental illness, at no time did he assert that his illness rendered him presently incompetent, nor did his demeanor at trial indicate a lack of competency.
[6] See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
[7] See id.
[8] See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
[9] See Ex parte Wilson, 956 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam).