NUMBER 13-05-084-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
TEXASONE COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION
F/K/A CAMERON CREDIT UNION, Appellant,
v.
PATRICIA D. HARRIS, Appellee.
On appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2
of Harris County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza, and Benavides
Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam
This is a consumer debt collection case. Plaintiff below, Texasone Community Credit Union f/k/a Cameron Credit Union ("Texasone"), received a final summary judgment in its favor against Patricia D. Harris. The trial court subsequently granted Harris's motion for new trial. Harris then moved for and received a final summary judgment. Texasone now attempts to appeal the final summary judgment rendered in Harris's favor. In its sole issue, Texasone contends that the trial court abused its discretion by granting Harris's motion for new trial.
"[E]xcept in very limited circumstances, an order granting a motion for new trial rendered within the period of the trial court's plenary power is not reviewable on appeal." Wilkins v. Methodist Health Care Sys., 160 S.W.3d 559, 563 (Tex. 2005). In the instant case, the trial court's order granting Harris's motion for new trial was rendered within the period of the trial court's plenary power.
There are only two recognized instances in which a trial court has been directed to set aside an order granting a new trial: (1) when the order was wholly void because it was not entered in the term in which the trial was conducted; and (2) when the trial court specified in its written order that its sole ground for granting the motion was that the jury's answers to special issues were conflicting. See id.; Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1985). Neither of these situations exists here.
An order granting a new trial is an unappealable, interlocutory order. Fruehauf Corp. v. Carrillo, 848 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam). An order granting a new trial is not subject to review either by direct appeal from that order, or, as in the instant case, from a final judgment rendered after further proceedings in the trial court. Cummins v. Paisan Constr. Co., 682 S.W.2d 235, 235-36 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam); Bay, Inc. v. Ramos, 139 S.W.3d 322, 331 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. denied); Otis Spunkmeyer, Inc. v. Blakely, 30 S.W.3d 678, 683 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.); Vandehaar v. ALC Fin. Corp., 25 S.W.3d 406, 410 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, pet. denied); see also In re Bayerische Motoren Werke, AG, 8 S.W.3d 326, 328 (Tex. 2000) (Hecht, J. dissenting).
Accordingly, this appeal is ordered DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f); Cummins, 682 S.W.2d at 235-36.
PER CURIAM
Memorandum Opinion delivered and
filed this 26th day of April, 2007.