Opinion issued September 10, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-14-00174-CR
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STEPHEN CLARK WEBB, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 337th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1389676
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REHEARING
Stephen Clark Webb filed a motion for reconsideration en banc. We
withdraw our opinion and judgment and substitute the following opinion and
judgment in their place. The motion for reconsideration en banc is rendered moot
by our substitution of the new opinion, and is therefore denied. Hudson v. City of
Houston, 392 S.W.3d 714, 717 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied);
see Hartrick v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 62 S.W.3d 270, 272 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
A jury convicted Webb of indecency with a child.1 In eight issues, Webb
contends that the trial court erred by admitting inadmissible evidence and denying
his motion for a mistrial. We affirm.
Background
In 1996, Webb dated (and later married) the mother of the complainant,
Jane, 2 and moved into Jane’s home. Jane was ten years old at the time. After
several years, Webb divorced Jane’s mother and moved out of the house. As an
adult, Jane disclosed to her boyfriend, her family, and police that Webb had
sexually assaulted her when she was a child. Webb was arrested for aggravated
sexual assault of a child. 3
Before trial, the trial court granted a motion in limine preventing the State
from soliciting evidence that Webb had given anyone other than Jane illegal drugs.
At trial, the State called Jane, who recounted that when she was a child Webb had
physically assaulted her, performed inappropriate massages on her, made her mow
the lawn topless, shown her pornography, given her drugs and alcohol, and
1
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11 (West 2011).
2
We refer to the complainant by this pseudonym to protect her identity.
3
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021 (West Supp. 2014).
2
performed various other indecent acts. The State also asked Jane if Webb ever
gave his younger son any illegal drugs—a question that violated the motion in
limine. Webb objected before Jane could answer; the court sustained the objection
and instructed the jury to disregard the question. Webb moved for a mistrial; the
court denied his motion.
The State also called Jane’s boyfriend, who recounted that Jane, now an
adult, would have terrible nightmares. During the nightmares, she would cry out
Webb’s name. He described how she eventually told him about the abuse. Webb
objected to this testimony as inadmissible hearsay; the court overruled the
objection.
The State’s other witnesses included the investigating police officer and a
child-abuse expert. The State then rested.
During his case-in-chief, Webb called Jane’s mother to testify about Webb’s
behavior during their marriage and to discredit portions of Jane’s story. On cross-
examination, the State asked Jane’s mother whether Webb was in another
relationship when he began a relationship with her. The State also asked about
Webb’s relationships with his two sons from an earlier marriage. Webb objected to
the relevance of this evidence; the court overruled his objections.
Webb called several other witnesses and then rested. The jury convicted him
of a lesser-included offense, indecency with a child. Punishment was assessed at
3
ten years’ incarceration, suspended for ten years’ community supervision. Webb
timely appealed.
Evidentiary Objections
In his first five issues, Webb contends that the trial court improperly
admitted hearsay testimony and irrelevant evidence.
A. Standard of review
We review a trial court’s ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence
for an abuse of discretion. Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011); Walker v. State, 321 S.W.3d 18, 22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009,
pet. dism’d). We will uphold the trial court’s ruling unless it falls outside the “zone
of reasonable disagreement.” Tillman, 354 S.W.3d at 435; Walker, 321 S.W.3d at
22.
To preserve the issue of erroneously admitted evidence, a party must make a
timely and specific objection and receive a ruling from the trial court. TEX. R. APP.
P. 33.1; Geuder v. State, 115 S.W.3d 11, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The party
must object every time the evidence is offered. Ethington v. State, 819 S.W.2d 854,
858 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
“The erroneous admission of a hearsay statement constitutes non-
constitutional error that is subject to a harm analysis.” Coleman v. State, 428
S.W.3d 151, 162 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). “We do not
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overturn a conviction if, after examining the record as a whole, we have fair
assurance that the error did not influence the verdict or had but a slight effect.” Id.
B. Statements during and after Jane’s nightmares
In his first issue, Webb contends that the trial court erred by admitting
testimony from Jane’s boyfriend that during violent nightmares she would cry out,
“No, don’t, [Webb]. Don’t. [Webb], no, no.” Webb objected to these statements as
hearsay; the trial court overruled this objection, concluding that they fell within the
excited-utterance exception to the rule against hearsay.
In his second issue, Webb contends that the trial court erroneously admitted
hearsay statements that Jane made to her boyfriend about the nightmares shortly
after awakening from one. The trial court also admitted the statements as excited
utterances.
We will review the rule against hearsay, examine these issues in reverse
order, and, ultimately, overrule both.
1. The rule against hearsay and the excited-utterance exception
Hearsay is any out-of-court statement “offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.” TEX. R. EVID. 801(d). In Texas, the rule covers both
explicit assertions and “any matter implied by a statement, if the probative value of
the statement as offered flows from declarant’s belief as to the matter.” TEX. R.
5
EVID. 801(e). Hearsay is inadmissible, unless the statement qualifies for an
exception to the rule against hearsay. See TEX. R. EVID. 801–805.
In this case, the trial court concluded that Jane’s sleep statements (issue one)
and statements immediately after the nightmare (issue two) fell under the excited-
utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. An excited utterance is a “statement
relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” TEX. R. EVID. 803(2).
“[U]nder the excited-utterance exception, the startling event may trigger a
spontaneous statement that relates to a much earlier incident.” McCarty v. State,
257 S.W.3d 238, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
2. Explanation of nightmare
We begin with Webb’s second issue: whether the trial court erroneously
admitted hearsay statements that Jane made to her boyfriend about the nightmares
shortly after awakening from one. Before asking the witness to disclose what Jane
said, the State laid the following predicate for the excited-utterance exception:
Q: And when you woke [Jane] up, was she calm?
A: The exact opposite of calm.
Q: Describe how she was.
A: She was in full tears, still pushing me away . . . .
Q: Is this the first time you really pressed her?
6
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And did she finally tell you what she was dreaming, having a
nightmare about?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Over Webb’s objection, the prosecutor asked what Jane said “while she was still
upset and crying.” The witness responded:
A: She—she said that—I kept asking what had he done to you, and
she was crying at this point. I was—I was crying as well, but
she said that he had—that he had—he had done things to her
and he had touched her where he shouldn’t have, and we both
started crying and—
Q: Now, when you say “he,” who was she talking about?
A: [Webb].
Jane made statements about the abuse she had just relived in her nightmare.
Given that she had just woken up from her nightmare and was “upset,” “crying,”
“in full tears,” and “the exact opposite of calm,” the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by concluding that she was under the stress of this event when making
these statements. See McCarty, 257 S.W.3d at 240 (statements made when re-
startled may be excited utterances).
Webb argues that a nightmare cannot be a startling event for purposes of the
excited-utterance exception. He distinguishes this case from Apolinar v. State, 155
S.W.3d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). There, the declarant was beaten unconscious;
he spent four days either unconscious or heavily medicated, and thus did not have
7
the opportunity to reflect before discussing the assault. Apolinar, 155 S.W.3d at
189–90. The court held that, when he was finally able to speak about the assault,
he was still startled by it, and thus his statements were excited utterances. Id. Webb
distinguishes this case from Apolinar because the startling event here is the
nightmare, not the trauma.
We acknowledge this distinction, but it does not affect our analysis because
Apolinar does not abolish the general principle that the startling event “need not
necessarily be the crime itself.” Hunt v. State, 904 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 1995, pet ref’d); accord McCarty, 257 S.W.3d at 240. For example, in
Hunt a television program rekindled a child’s fear that she would become pregnant
from sexual abuse suffered three months prior. Hunt, 904 S.W.2d at 816. And in
McCarty, a benevolent tickle deeply upset a child because her abuser also tickled
her “but went much further.” McCarty, 257 S.W.3d at 240. In both cases, the trial
court did not err by admitting the ensuing statements as excited utterances. Id.;
Hunt, 904 S.W.2d at 816.
Webb argues that cases like McCarty are distinguishable because the
startling event “had nothing to do with who was tickling [the declarant].” But this
is a distinction without a difference. In both Hunt and McCarty, the declarant was
startled by an event that reminded her of prior trauma. This case presents the same
fact pattern.
8
Finally, Webb complains that the record does not specify whether Jane
described events from her real-world memories or from her dream. This may (or
may not) be a relevance issue, but Webb only objected to hearsay. Accordingly, we
do not address this argument. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.
We overrule Webb’s second issue.
3. Sleep talking
We next turn to Webb’s first issue: whether the trial court properly overruled
his hearsay objection and admitted Jane’s sleep talk—“No, don’t, [Webb]. Don’t.
[Webb], no, no”—during the nightmare. But we do not reach this issue because
any error from the admission of the sleep talk was harmless. The statements made
after she awoke provide much more detailed and direct evidence about what she
was dreaming and why. Thus, any tendency of the sleep talk to reveal the contents
of the dream is harmless because this other evidence provides stronger and more
detailed evidence of the same matter asserted.
And this was not the only evidence against Webb. In addition to Jane’s
boyfriend’s testimony, Jane herself gave detailed testimony regarding various
sexual assaults the she endured and a child-abuse expert explained to the jury how
Jane’s experiences corresponded to common patterns in long-term sexual assault
cases.
9
We conclude that any error in overruling Webb’s hearsay objection to the
sleep talk was harmless. Accordingly, we overrule Webb’s first issue.
C. Defendant’s relationships
In his third through fifth issues, Webb contends that the trial court
erroneously admitted evidence that Webb was living with another woman while
dating Jane’s mother and that Webb had poor relationships with his two sons.
Webb argues that this evidence was not relevant.
This evidence was solicited several times during the trial. At times, Webb
failed to object. Webb failed to object to the following testimony from Jane’s
mother concerning the start of her relationship with Webb:
Q: At the time you met [Webb], was he married?
A: No.
Q: Was he in a relationship?
A: Yes.
Q: And who was he in a relationship with?
A: Her name was . . . .
He also did not object to the following question and answer from the same witness:
Q: And [while you were dating Webb] he was living part of the
time out in California with [Webb’s significant other]?
A: Yes.
10
He also failed to timely object to the relevance of the following testimony from
Jane’s mother about Webb’s relationships with his sons:
Q: Now, at the time that you married [Webb], you indicated he had
two children . . . correct?
A: Yes.
Q: Did he have any type of . . . relationship[s] with his sons? How
would you describe his relationship[s] with his sons?
A: It seemed okay.
To successfully preserve the erroneous admittance of evidence for appellate
review, a party must timely object every time the evidence is offered. Ethington,
819 S.W.2d at 858. Assuming without deciding that the admission of this evidence
was in error, Webb did not preserve the error because he did not consistently object
when the State solicited this testimony. We overrule Webb’s third through fifth
issues.
Motion for Mistrial
In his sixth issue, Webb contends that the trial court erred by denying his
motion for a mistrial.
A. Standard of review
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of
discretion. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). “A mistrial is
an appropriate remedy in ‘extreme circumstances’ for a narrow class of highly
prejudicial and incurable errors.” Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim.
11
App. 2009) (quoting Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004)). A prompt instruction from the trial judge is usually enough to cure the
error and avoid the need for a mistrial. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 115–16
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Whether an error requires a mistrial must be determined
by the particular facts of the case. Ladd, 3 S.W.3d at 567.
When assessing action on a motion for mistrial, “[d]eterminations of
historical fact and assessment of witness credibility and believability are left
almost entirely to the discretion of the trial judge, and where there is conflicting
evidence there is no abuse of discretion if the motion is overruled.” Hughes v.
State, 24 S.W.3d 833, 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). An appellate court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Webb v. State, 232
S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The ruling must be upheld if it was
within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.
B. Instruction to disregard
Before trial, the trial court granted a motion in limine prohibiting the State
from asking if Webb had distributed illegal drugs to any person other than Jane.
The court told the State that it should approach the bench before asking any
question precluded by the motion.
The State violated the motion in limine when it asked Jane: “Do you know if
[Webb] gave [his younger son] drugs?” The State did not approach the bench
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before asking the question. Immediately, Webb objected. At the ensuing bench
conference, the State apologized. The trial court then issued the following
instruction to the jury: “You are instructed to disregard that question and not
consider it for any reason whatsoever.” Webb then timely moved for mistrial,
which the trial court denied.
To determine if the trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion for
mistrial, we use the three-factor test announced in Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d
249, 259–60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). We look to three factors: (1) the severity of
the misconduct, (2) the measures adopted to cure the misconduct, and (3) the
certainty of conviction absent the misconduct. Carballo v. State, 303 S.W.3d 742,
748 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d); see Archie v. State, 340
S.W.3d 734, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (applying Mosley factors to denial of
motion for mistrial).
For the first Mosley factor, we examine “the severity of the misconduct, or in
other words, the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s
[misconduct].” Archie, 340 S.W.3d at 740. A prosecutor’s attempt to circumvent a
motion in limine is serious misconduct. See Scruggs v. State, 782 S.W.2d 499, 502
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, pet. ref’d). But the magnitude of the
prejudicial effect of this action was somewhat mitigated by the particular
circumstances of this case. First, the prosecutor promptly moved on and did not
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revisit the issue. Second, other evidence linked Webb to illegal drugs. Jane testified
that Webb had given her drugs and alcohol. And Webb asked Jane’s mother on
direct examination about various CPS and FBI investigations into “rampant drug
abuse and pornography in the house.”
For the second Mosley factor, “the reviewing court considers the character of
the measures adopted to cure the misconduct.” Archie, 340 S.W.3d at 741. In this
case, the trial court promptly instructed the jury to disregard the question. An
instruction to disregard is presumed effective unless the particular facts imply
otherwise. Waldo v. State, 746 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
For the third Mosley factor, “the reviewing court looks to the certainty of
conviction absent the misconduct.” Archie, 340 S.W.3d at 741. The State’s
evidence included Jane’s testimony recounting her abuse, her boyfriend’s
testimony about her nightmares and outcry, a police officer’s testimony about his
investigation of the case, and expert-witness testimony explaining how the facts of
this case match traditional patterns of abuse. The defense focused on Webb and
Jane’s family, who disagreed with various parts of Jane’s story. Thus, this case
came down to a credibility determination: did the jury believe Jane was telling the
truth? The State’s improper question did not significantly affect the believability of
Jane’s account because: (1) the question was posed to Jane, not to a corroborating
witness; (2) Jane had already testified that Webb gave her illegal drugs; (3) the
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state and federal investigations provided additional evidence of drugs in the home,
and (4) drug use formed only a small part of Jane’s story.
Given our analysis of the Mosley factors, we conclude that the State’s
misconduct did not warrant the extraordinary remedy of a mistrial. Accordingly,
we overrule Webb’s sixth point of error.
Cumulative Effect
In his seventh and eighth issues, Webb contends that the cumulative harm of
the alleged errors warrants reversal of his conviction. We have already concluded
that any error in admitting Jane’s sleep talk was harmless, and we have found no
other reversible error in the trial court’s evidentiary rulings or in its decision to
deny Webb’s motion for mistrial. Accordingly, we overrule Webb’s seventh and
eighth issues.4
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Harvey Brown
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Brown and Lloyd.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
4
The State argues that cumulative harm from multiple errors is not a proper issue
for appeal. Because there is no cumulative harm, we do not address this argument.
15