Sep 11 2015, 8:48 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
James E. Ayers W. Brent Threlkeld
Wernle, Ristine & Ayers Kelly A. Roth
Crawfordsville, Indiana Threlkeld & Associates
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Sheila Sasso and Mary Sasso, September 11, 2015
Appellants-Defendants, Court of Appeals Case No.
54A05-1411-PL-527
v. Appeal from the Montgomery
Superior Court
State Farm Mutual Automobile The Honorable David A. Ault, Judge
Insurance Company,
Case No. 54D01-1308-PL-637
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Sheila Sasso appeals the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) on State Farm’s
complaint for declaratory judgment. Sheila presents several issues for our
review, which we consolidate and restate as the following two issues:
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1. Whether Indiana’s Guest Statute, Indiana Code Section
34-30-11-1 (2014),1 prohibits Sheila’s negligence claim against her
mother, Mary Sasso, for Sheila’s injuries arising from an
automobile accident in Mary’s car while Mary was driving.
2. Whether the Guest Statute violates the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution2 or Article 1,
Sections 12 and 23 of the Indiana Constitution.3
[2] We affirm.4
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In October of 2010, Sheila, an Illinois resident, called her mother, Mary,5 to
determine whether she would be interested in visiting the Parke County,
Indiana, covered bridge festival. Sheila hoped to “meet vendors” for her online
business, which was “similar to e[B]ay” but “not [an] auction.” Appellant’s
App. at 126. Mary, a resident of Crawfordsville, Indiana, agreed.
1
In 1998, the Guest Statute was recodified and amended to no longer refer broadly to all “guests” of an
automobile’s operator. Nonetheless, the current version of the statute is still referred to as “the Indiana Guest
Statute.” See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 971 N.E.2d 58, 60 (Ind. 2012).
2
Specifically, Sheila asserts that the Guest Statute violates her right under the Fourteenth Amendment to not
be denied equal protection of the laws. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
3
Article 1, Section 12 provides: “All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his
person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely,
and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay.” And Article 1, Section
23 states: “The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities,
which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.”
4
Because we dispose of this appeal under Indiana’s Guest Statute, we need not address the parties’
alternative arguments regarding whether Sheila was excluded from coverage under the terms of Mary’s
policy with State Farm.
5
Mary is a named defendant in the trial court but she does not participate in this appeal.
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[4] Sheila met up with Mary on October 14, and, the next day, Mary drove Sheila
in Mary’s car to the festival. Sheila paid Mary $50 for gas and bought Mary
lunch. Later, while Mary was driving to another location at the festival, her
vehicle was involved in an accident, and Sheila was severely injured. Mary has
an automobile insurance policy with State Farm.
[5] On October 15, 2012, Sheila filed a negligence claim against Mary. Thereafter,
State Farm, under a different cause number, filed a complaint for declaratory
judgment against Sheila and Mary. On August 4, 2014, State Farm moved for
summary judgment on its complaint. Following a hearing, the trial court
entered judgment in favor of State Farm. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[6] Our standard of review for summary judgment appeals is well established. As
our supreme court has stated:
We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard as the trial court: “Drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of . . . the non-moving parties, summary judgment is
appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Williams v.
Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009) (quoting T.R. 56(C)). “A
fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the
case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to
resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the
undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable
inferences.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
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The initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to
“demonstrate [ ] the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a
determinative issue,” at which point the burden shifts to the non-
movant to “come forward with contrary evidence” showing an
issue for the trier of fact. Id. at 761-62 (internal quotation marks
and substitution omitted). And “[a]lthough the non-moving
party has the burden on appeal of persuading us that the grant of
summary judgment was erroneous, we carefully assess the trial
court’s decision to ensure that he was not improperly denied his
day in court.” McSwane v. Bloomington Hosp. & Healthcare Sys.,
916 N.E.2d 906, 909-10 (Ind. 2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (alterations original to
Hughley).
[7] Summary judgment is a “high bar” for the moving party to clear in Indiana. Id.
at 1004. “In particular, while federal practice permits the moving party to
merely show that the party carrying the burden of proof [at trial] lacks evidence
on a necessary element, we impose a more onerous burden: to affirmatively
‘negate an opponent's claim.’” Id. at 1003 (quoting Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty.
Newspapers of Ind., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind. 1994)). Further:
Summary judgment is a desirable tool to allow the trial court to
dispose of cases where only legal issues exist. But it is also a
“blunt . . . instrument” by which the non-prevailing party is
prevented from having his day in court. We have therefore
cautioned that summary judgment is not a summary trial and the
Court of Appeals has often rightly observed that it is not
appropriate merely because the non-movant appears unlikely to
prevail at trial. In essence, Indiana consciously errs on the side
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of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the merits, rather
than risk short-circuiting meritorious claims.
Id. at 1003-04 (citations and some quotations omitted; omission original to
Hughley). Thus, for the trial court to grant summary judgment, the movant
must have made a prima facie showing that its designated evidence negated an
element of the nonmovant’s claims, and, in response, the nonmovant must have
failed to designate evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. See
Dreaded, Inc. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 904 N.E.2d 1267, 1270 (Ind. 2009).
Issue One: Applicability of Indiana’s Guest Statute
[8] We first address whether Sheila’s negligence claim against Mary is prohibited
by Indiana’s Guest Statute, Indiana Code Section 34-30-11-1. That statute
provides as follows:
The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a
motor vehicle is not liable for loss or damage arising from injuries
to or the death of:
(1) the person’s parent;
(2) the person’s spouse;
(3) the person’s child or stepchild;
(4) the person’s brother;
(5) the person’s sister; or
(6) a hitchhiker;
resulting from the operation of the motor vehicle while the
parent, spouse, child or stepchild, brother, sister, or hitchhiker
was being transported without payment in or upon the motor
vehicle unless the injuries or death are caused by the wanton or
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willful misconduct of the operator, owner, or person responsible
for the operation of the motor vehicle.
(Emphasis added.)
[9] According to Sheila, the Guest Statute does not prohibit her claim against Mary
because “Sheila did pay for gas. That ‘payment’ is sufficient to remove her
from” the purview of the Guest Statute.6 Appellant’s Br. at 5. That is, Sheila
asserts that she is not within the scope of the Guest Statute because she was not
“transported without payment.” See I.C. § 34-30-11-1.
[10] Sheila is mistaken. This provision of the Guest Statute has long been
interpreted to require that the motor-vehicle operator be “directly
compensated . . . in a substantial and material or business sense[,] as
distinguished from [a] mere social benefit or nominal or incidental contribution
to expenses[] of the trip.” Allison v. Ely, 241 Ind. 248, 254, 170 N.E.2d 371, 374
(1960). As this court has added, “[t]o exclude from the Guest Statute cases of
this nature where groups of friends or relatives make arrangements or travel
together, consideration must be given by the guest in excess of expenses
incidental to the trip.” Knuckles v. Elliott, 141 Ind. App. 232, 239, 227 N.E.2d
179, 183 (1967). In Allison, our supreme court held that, as a matter of law,
“[t]he purchase of a few gallons of gasoline . . . d[oes] not constitute ‘payment’”
under the Guest Statute. 170 N.E.2d at 377. And, in Knuckles, we held—again,
6
Sheila has not alleged that her injuries were the result of wanton or willful misconduct on the part of Mary.
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as a matter of law—that paying “for some of the gasoline on the trip and . . . for
food” also does not constitute a payment under the Guest Statute. 227 N.E.2d
at 180.
[11] Sheila’s argument on appeal is contrary to our long-standing interpretation of
this statutory language. And while the Guest Statute has been amended since
Allison and Knuckles, the provision that there is no liability when the guest is
“transported without payment” has remained intact. See Allison, 170 N.E.2d at
373 (quoting the version of the Guest Statute then in effect). Accordingly, as a
matter of law Sheila’s contribution of gas and food is equivalent to being
“transported without payment,” and Mary is not liable to Sheila.
Issue Two: Constitutionality of Indiana’s Guest Statute
[12] Sheila also asserts that the Guest Statute violates the United States and Indiana
Constitutions. Specifically, Sheila asserts that the Guest Statute violates her
federal right to equal protection of the laws, U.S. Const. amend. XIV; her state
right to open courts, Ind. Const. art. 1, § 12; and her state right to equal
privileges and immunities, Ind. Const. art. 1, § 23. We address each argument
in turn. We then consider other, more general arguments Sheila raises on
appeal.
A. Fourteenth Amendment
[13] We first consider Sheila’s federal argument. Despite misgivings about the
validity of the prior version of Indiana’s Guest Statute under the Equal
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Protection Clause, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
has explained:
Nevertheless a recent [U.S.] Supreme Court decision requires us
to reach a contrary result. In Cannon v. Oviatt . . . the Supreme
Court of Utah rejected an equal protection challenge to a guest
statute virtually identical to Indiana’s. The appeal to the United
States Supreme Court presented the question whether the guest
statute violated the equal protection clause because it barred
recovery for ordinary negligence. See 43 L.W. 3103. The Court
dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question.[7]
Cannon v. Oviatt, 419 U.S. 810, 95 S. Ct. 24, 42 L. Ed. 2d 37.
Although that ruling is not a plenary consideration of this
significant current topic in tort law, it is an adjudication on the
merits. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-345, 95 S. Ct. 2281,
2289-90, 45 L. Ed. 2d 223, 236. Therefore, despite our
doubts . . . we are obligated to affirm. Hicks v. Miranda, supra,
422 U.S. at 345, 95 S. Ct. at 2290, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 236.
Sidle v. Majors, 536 F.2d 1156, 1159-60 (7th Cir. 1976).8 Accordingly, as
explained by the Seventh Circuit, we are obliged to follow the United States
Supreme Court and to reject Sheila’s argument under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
7
This is not to be confused with dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Jonathan L. Entin,
Insubstantial Questions and Federal Jurisdiction: A Footnote to the Term-Limits Debate, 2 Nev. L.J. 608,
629 (2002); see also Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975) (holding that dismissal for want of a
substantial federal question is a determination “on the merits” that lower courts “are not free to disregard”).
8
Sheila states that “the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Indiana guest statute . . . violated the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . .” Appellant’s Br. at 14. This is obviously incorrect.
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B. Article 1, Section 12
[14] Similarly, the Indiana Supreme Court has rejected a challenge to the previous
version of Indiana’s Guest Statute under Article 1, Section 12, the open courts
provision of the Indiana Constitution. In an opinion on a certified question in
the same Sidle case then before the Seventh Circuit, our supreme court stated:
We are drawn to Gallegher v. Davis et al., (1936), Del. Super., 7
W.W. Harr. 380, 183 A. 620, as a logical disposition of the [Art.
1, § 12] arguments. In that case, the court was concerned with a
constitutional provision almost identical to our own. And a
guest statute containing the saving provision, [“]unless such
accidents shall have been intentional on the part of such owner or
operator or caused by his wilful [sic] or wanton disregard of the
rights of others.[”] . . . The following quotations from the
Gallegher case are expressive of our viewpoint of the restraints
imposed by our constitutional Article 1, § 12.
Generally, we think, the provision is inserted in
Constitutions to secure the citizen against
unreasonable and arbitrary deprivation of rights
whether relating to life, liberty, property, or
fundamental rights of action relating to person or
property; and that it applies as well to the judicial
branch of government, as to the legislative and
executive branches. It embraces the principle of
natural justice that in a free government every man
should have an adequate legal remedy for injury
done him by another.
The inquiry, in every case, must be directed to the
nature of the right alleged to have been infringed
upon. Undoubtedly, arbitrary and unreasonable
abolishment of a right of action to redress injury to
the essential rights of person or property is
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prohibited. Certainly, the legislature may not
declare to be right that which is essentially wrong,
nor say that which is a definite, substantial injury to
fundamental rights to be no injury, nor abolish a
remedy given by the common law to essential rights
without affording another remedy substantially
adequate. But no one has a vested interest in any
rule of the common law. Rights of property which
have been created by the common law cannot be
taken away without due process; but the law itself,
as a rule of conduct, within constitutional limits,
may be changed at the will of the legislature. The
great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the
common law as they develop, and to adopt it to the
change of time and circumstance. Negligence is
merely the disregard of some duty imposed by law;
and the nature and extent of the duty may be
modified by legislation, with a corresponding
change in the test of negligence . . . .
***
We cannot say that existing conditions did not
present a manifest evil affecting the general welfare
and public morals necessitating the imposition of a
degree of restraint upon a certain class of suitors,
nor can we say that the means adopted by the
legislature do not bear a reasonable relation to the
end sought to be accomplished.
The provision of the Constitution does not, either
expressly or by necessary implication, forbid the
legislature to measure the degree of care to be
accorded by an owner or operator of an automobile
to a gratuitous passenger; for it does not constitute
the common law a straight jacket about the
legislature body rendering it powerless reasonably to
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regulate social relations in accordance with
changing conditions. 183 A. 624-26.
Sidle v. Majors, 264 Ind. 206, 221-24, 341 N.E.2d 763, 773-75 (1976) (citations,
footnote, and quotation marks omitted) (some omissions original). The court
then held that “[t]he Indiana guest statute . . . does not contravene . . . [Section]
12 . . . of Article 1 of the Constitution of Indiana.” Id. at 775. Accordingly, we
reject Sheila’s argument under Article 1, Section 12.
C. Article 1, Section 23
[15] We next turn to Sheila’s argument that Indiana’s Guest Statute, as currently
written, violates her right under the Indiana Constitution to equal privileges and
immunities. For background, we again turn to the Indiana Supreme Court’s
opinion in Sidle, which addressed an Article 1, Section 23 argument against the
previous version of the Guest Statute as follows:
Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have
upheld the right of states to abolish or modify the common
law. . . .
Within the context of these cases, at least, we see no differences in
the equal protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions.
Both are designed to prevent the distribution of extraordinary
benefits or burdens to any group. However, the power to
establish legislative classifications of persons has not been
categorically denied but only severely limited. Rather, our courts
have required only that such classifications meet certain tests. If
neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification is
involved, the standard of review is that the classification not be
arbitrary or unreasonable[,] Dandridge v. Williams, (1970) 397
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U.S. 471, 90 S. Ct. 1153, 25 L. Ed. 2d 491, and that a [“]fair and
substantial[”] relationship exist between the classification and the
purpose of the legislation creating it[,] Johnson v. Robison, (1974)
415 U.S. 361, 94 S. Ct. 1160, 39 L. Ed. 2d 389 . . . .
Our guest statute precludes a guest passenger from recovering
damages for personal injuries sustained merely by the negligence
of the owner or operator. Being inoperative as to passengers who
were not guests, the statute creates two classifications of
passengers—guests and non-guests, who are treated vastly
differently under circumstances that are otherwise identical. The
inequity is patent. The issues are whether or not the
classification is reasonable and bears a fair and substantial
relation to the legitimate purpose of the statute. The
presumptions are that it is and does, and the burden is upon the
plaintiff to show the contrary.
***
Purposes traditionally attributed to such statutes have been the fostering
of hospitality by insulating generous drivers from lawsuits instituted by
ungrateful guests and the elimination of [the] possibility of collusive
lawsuits. . . .
341 N.E.2d at 767-68 (emphases added; some citations omitted). The Indiana
Supreme Court agreed with those rationales for Indiana’s Guest Statute and, as
such, concluded that the statute did not violate Article 1, Section 23. Id. at 775.
[16] While Sheila does not address Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ind. 1994), in
that case our supreme court abrogated its Sidle opinion insofar as it had
conflated the analyses under Article 1, Section 23 and the Fourteenth
Amendment. As the court stated in Collins: “there is no settled body of Indiana
law that compels application of a federal equal protection analytical
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methodology to claims alleging special privileges or immunities under Indiana
Section 23.” Id. Rather, “Section 23 should be given independent
interpretation and application.” Id. The Collins court then concluded:
Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution imposes two
requirements upon statutes that grant unequal privileges or
immunities to differing classes of persons. First, the disparate
treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related
to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally
treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be
uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons
similarly situated. Finally, in determining whether a statute
complies with or violates Section 23, courts must exercise
substantial deference to legislative discretion.
Id. at 80.
[17] Applying the proper analytical framework under Collins does not yield a result
different from the one reached by the Indiana Supreme Court in Sidle. The
current Guest Statute, as applied here, distinguishes close family members of
the motor vehicle operator from all other guests in or upon the vehicle. See I.C.
§ 34-30-11-1. The statute then prohibits the motor vehicle operator from being
held liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or the death of those close
family members as a result of ordinary negligence by the motor vehicle operator
in the operation of the vehicle. See id.
[18] Giving this legislative classification the substantial deference that we must,
Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 80, we conclude that the classification easily passes the
test of Article 1, Section 23. As noted by our supreme court in Sidle, one of the
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policies underlying the Guest Statue is to preempt potentially collusive lawsuits.
341 N.E.2d at 768. The disparate treatment the Guest Statute creates for close
family members of the motor vehicle operator is reasonably related to the
inherent differences between the distinguished classes; that is, it is reasonable
for our legislature to suppose that close family members of a motor vehicle
operator are more likely to engage in collusive lawsuits than persons more
attenuated in their relationships to the motor vehicle operator. And this
treatment is uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly
situated. As such, under Collins, Indiana’s Guest Statute does not violate
Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution.
D. Sheila’s Remaining Arguments
[19] Finally, we address Sheila’s two remaining arguments, in which she attempts to
avoid both Sidle opinions altogether by suggesting that subsequent events render
those opinions no longer good law (aside from Collins v. Day, which, again
Sheila does not argue on appeal). First, Sheila asserts that “[t]he Indiana
Legislature in 1998 repealed the ‘guest’ statute.” Appellant’s Br. at 14. But that
did not happen. In 1998 the General Assembly recodified the statute and
amended it. See P.L. 1-1998 § 26. As amended, the statute no longer applies
broadly to all “guests” of a driver but narrowly only to hitchhikers and the
driver’s close family members. See I.C. § 34-30-11-1. Sheila presents no cogent
reasoning to support her assertion that a more narrowly tailored classification is
less valid than the previous, broad classification. See Ind. Appellate Rule
46(A)(8)(a). As such, we reject this attempt to distinguish the Sidle opinions.
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[20] Second, Sheila contends that the Indiana Supreme Court disavowed its Sidle
opinion in Clark v. Clark, 971 N.E.2d 58, 61 n.1 (Ind. 2012). But, in Clark, our
supreme court discussed Sidle as follows:
The plaintiffs do not assert, and thus we do not address, any
claim that the [current version of the] statute violates Article 1,
Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution, which declares in part
that “every person, for injury done to him in his person, property,
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.” Such a
claim was previously presented and rejected with respect to a
former version of the Guest Statute in Sidle v. Majors, 264 Ind.
206, 341 N.E.2d 763 (1976). While not reanalyzing this
constitutional issue in the present case, we take this opportunity
to disapprove certain unfortunate language in Sidle which we find
to undermine and misstate well-established important values and
principles of Indiana and American jurisprudence. The Sidle
opinion speculated with approval that “a very likely legislative
policy” [for the statutory classification] may have been
“protection against the ‘benevolent thumb syndrome’” and “the
‘Robin Hood’ proclivity of juries.” Id. at 218-20, 341 N.E.2d at
771-72. Such language improperly mischaracterizes the
conscientious, insightful, and reliable efforts of those who serve
as jurors. It has no proper place in our jurisprudence.
Id.9 While Clark criticized part of the rationale in Sidle, it did not overrule
Sidle’s holding under Article 1, Section 12, and it is not this court’s place to
ignore those parts of Sidle that remain good law. See Horn v. Hendrickson, 824
9
While the Clark footnote is framed in the context of Article 1, Section 12, the language criticized is with
respect to the Sidle court’s analysis of Article 1, Section 23. See Sidle, 341 N.E.2d at 767-68, 771-72. As
explained above, that analysis was abrogated by Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 75.
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N.E.2d 690, 695 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Accordingly, we reject Sheila’s
remaining arguments.
Conclusion
[21] In sum, under the plain text of Indiana’s Guest Statute, Mary is not liable to
Sheila for the injuries Sheila incurred as a result of an automobile accident in
which she was a guest in Mary’s vehicle. Further, under controlling law the
Guest Statute does not violate either the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution or Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution. And
we hold that the Guest Statute does not violate Article 1, Section 23 of the
Indiana Constitution. As such, State Farm was entitled to summary judgment
on its declaratory judgment action, and we affirm the trial court.
[22] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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