Sep 11 2015, 8:40 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Matthew D. Anglemeyer Gregory F. Zoeller
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Deputy Public Defender
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
R.B., September 11, 2015
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1502-JV-96
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Marilyn A. Moores,
Appellee-Petitioner. Judge
The Honorable Gary Chavers,
Magistrate
Cause No. 49D09-1410-JD-2399
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] R.B. appeals his adjudication as a delinquent for dangerous possession of a
firearm, as a Class A misdemeanor when committed by an adult. R.B. raises
two issues for our review:
1. Whether his mother, T.B., had authority under the Fourth
Amendment to consent to a police search of R.B.’s bedroom in
T.B.’s house.
2. Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when it
admitted R.B.’s subsequent confession to law enforcement
officers, which, according to R.B., was fruit of the poisonous tree
following the purportedly illegal search of his bedroom.
As a matter of first impression in Indiana, we hold that it is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment for an officer to rely on the voluntary consent of a
minor’s parent to search the minor’s bedroom inside the parent’s home.
Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s adjudication of R.B. as a delinquent.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] At about 7:30 a.m. on September 30, 2014, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Department Officer Sonya Daggy received a dispatch report of an attempted
burglary. Officer Daggy spoke with the reporting homeowner, who gave a
detailed description of the suspects, who were juveniles. The juveniles had fled
south from the residence when the homeowner discovered them.
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[3] A few minutes later, Officer Daggy observed three juveniles about six blocks
south of the home. Those individuals matched the descriptions provided by the
homeowner. Officer Daggy observed that the juveniles were wearing school
uniforms but were not in school, even though “juveniles about that age are
generally . . . in school . . . about that time.” Tr. at 9. Officer Daggy stopped
the juveniles, determined that they were supposed to be at school, and obtained
their parents’ contact information. R.B., who was fifteen years old, was one of
the juveniles. Officer Daggy then contacted a parent for each juvenile and
asked the parents to pick up their children.
[4] When T.B. arrived to pick up R.B., Officer Daggy asked her “if she had seen
[R.B.] with a white laptop recently.” Id. at 19. Officer Daggy asked T.B. this
question because “there had been several burglaries in that particular
neighborhood” recently, and Officer Daggy had “taken a burglary report where
a white laptop had been stolen . . . approximately three weeks prior.” Id. T.B.
informed Officer Daggy that she had seen R.B. with a white laptop in the past
few days but she did not know how R.B. had acquired the laptop. Accordingly,
Officer Daggy asked T.B. if they could go to T.B.’s house to “locate the laptop
to see if it matched” the stolen laptop. Id. at 20. T.B. agreed.
[5] Officer Daggy then followed T.B. and R.B. to the house. There, Officer Daggy
placed R.B. in handcuffs and had him “detained . . . in the living room” with
another officer. Id. at 24. T.B. then escorted Officer Daggy “directly to [R.B.’s]
room,” which T.B. then searched. Id. at 21. T.B. “pulled out several
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watches . . . out of the dresser drawer and threw them on the floor and also
pulled out a small safe and tossed that on the floor,” stating that “she didn’t
know where . . . this stuff came from.” Id. at 22. T.B. then lifted R.B’s
mattress, and when she did so Officer Daggy “heard a loud click.” Id. at 32.
When Officer Daggy heard that noise, she asked T.B. “if it was ok [for Officer
Daggy to] look[] in the mattress and box spring to see what that was.” Id. at 33.
T.B. agreed. Officer Daggy then searched the area and discovered three
firearms inside the box spring.
[6] The officers escorted R.B. to the police station, where he and T.B. met with
Detective Jeremy Messer. Detective Messer advised R.B. and his mother of
R.B.’s rights and allowed them an opportunity to consult. Thereafter, pursuant
to T.B.’s advice, R.B. informed Detective Messer that he had purchased two of
the three firearms “[f]or protection” and that the third belonged to a friend. Id.
at 78.
[7] On October 1, the State alleged that R.B. was a delinquent for committing an
act of dangerous possession of a firearm, as a Class A misdemeanor when
committed by an adult. During the ensuing fact-finding hearing, R.B. objected
to the admission of the firearms seized from his bedroom and to the admission
of his confession to Detective Messer. The juvenile court overruled both
objections and adjudicated R.B. a delinquent. This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[8] R.B. appeals the juvenile court’s admission of evidence against him. We review
the court’s rulings on admissibility for an abuse of discretion and reverse only if
the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before the court and the error affects the juvenile’s substantial rights. Carpenter
v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014). However, “the ultimate
determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of law
that we consider de novo.” Id.
Issue One: Bedroom Search
[9] We first consider R.B.’s argument that Officer Daggy violated his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when she
searched his bedroom without his consent and without a search warrant. 1
R.B.’s argument on appeal emphasizes that he had a “subjective and objective
expectation of privacy” to his bedroom; that he “had a high degree of actual
control and possession of his room”; that “[h]is bedroom was his own space”;
1
As our supreme court has noted, although the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution are textually identical, “they are analytically distinct. The
Fourth Amendment analysis turns on whether the subject has a reasonable expectation of privacy, while the
Section 11 analysis turns on whether the police conduct was reasonable under the totality of the
circumstances.” Carpenter, 18 N.E.2d at 1001-02. Although R.B. purports to raise an Article 1, Section 11
claim, see Appellant’s Br. at 8-9, he does not independently analyze whether Officer Daggy’s search was
unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Accordingly, no issue under Article 1, Section 11 is
properly before us.
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that he “had to live at his mother’s house, or commit a delinquent act”; that
T.B. “gave [him] a great deal of privacy”; and that “[his] expectation of
privacy . . . is one society should see as justifiable under the circumstances.”
Appellant’s Br. at 10-12. We think these arguments miss the point.
[10] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause . . . .” As the Supreme Court of the United
States has made clear, “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
‘reasonableness.’” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is subject to certain
exceptions. Id. As relevant here, “[t]he Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid
warrantless entry and search of premises when police obtain the voluntary
consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, authority
over the area in common with a co-occupant who later objects to the use of
evidence so obtained.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006) (citing
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164
(1974)).2
2
In Randolph, the Court held that, when a physically present co-occupant refuses consent to a search at the
same time another co-occupant gives consent, the “stated refusal . . . prevails, rendering the warrantless
search unreasonable and invalid as to him.” 547 U.S. at 106. R.B. does not argue that this holding should
apply to him.
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[11] That is what happened here. While R.B. did not consent to the search of the
bedroom, his mother, the owner or renter of the house, did. There is no serious
question that it is reasonable for an officer to rely on the voluntary consent of a
minor’s parent to search the minor’s bedroom inside the parent’s home.
[12] In Randolph, the Court held that when two adults disagree about police entering
their shared home a warrantless search cannot be justified on the grounds of
consent, notwithstanding the fact that one of the two adults gave consent to the
entry. 547 U.S. at 114-15. In reaching that conclusion, the Court explained
that, in determining the validity of consent, “great significance [is] given to
widely shared social expectations.” Id. at 111. And, on the facts before it, the
Court concluded that “no recognized authority in law or social practice”
entitles an officer to rely on one adult occupant’s consent over another adult
occupant’s objection. Id. at 114.
[13] But the Randolph Court recognized limitations to its analysis. As the Court
stated: “people living together [who] fall within some recognized hierarchy,
like a household of parent and child,” might have a “societal understanding of
superior and inferior” rights to use and enjoy the property. Id. That is of course
the case with respect to minors in their parents’ homes. The “widely shared
social expectations” in such circumstances are that the parents have unilateral
authority over and access to the home. See id. at 111, 114. Accordingly, like
numerous other jurisdictions, we reject R.B.’s argument that his mother’s
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consent does not supersede his.3 See, e.g., Wimberly v. State, 934 So. 2d 411, 429-
30 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005); In re D.C., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 837, 841 (Ct. App.
2010); State v. Jones, 475 A.2d 1087, 1094 (Conn. 1984); Tallman v. State, 120
So. 3d 593, 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); In re Salyer, 358 N.E.2d 1333, 1336-
37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Jacobs v. State, 681 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984). We affirm the juvenile court’s admission of the firearms seized by
Officer Daggy during her search of R.B.’s bedroom.
Issue Two: R.B.’s Confession
[14] R.B. next asserts that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it admitted
his confession to Detective Messer. The entirety of R.B.’s argument on this
issue is that his confession was “fruit of the poisonous tree”; that is, but for the
purportedly illegal search of his bedroom, R.B. would not have confessed. See
Appellant’s Br. at 14. Since we hold that the search of his bedroom was clearly
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we reject R.B.’s derivative argument
that his confession was improperly admitted.
Conclusion
[15] In sum, we hold that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in the
admission of either the firearms seized from R.B.’s bedroom or his confession.
Thus, we affirm R.B.’s adjudication as a delinquent.
3
R.B. cites no authority in support of his position.
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[16] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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R.B. v. State of Indiana
Combined Opinion