J-S30044-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
LERONE BRUNSON
Appellant No. 1911 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 18, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1007951-2005
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 11, 2015
Appellant Lerone Brunson appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas following his
bench trial convictions for robbery, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen
property, possessing an instrument of crime (“PIC”), and simple assault. 1
After careful review, we affirm Appellant’s convictions, but vacate his
judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.
The trial court accurately sets forth the relevant facts of this appeal as
follows:
On September 2, 2005, at 10:45 pm, Thomas Nealon was
inside a Chinese food store on the 2000 block of Hunting
Park Avenue in Philadelphia. After he placed his order,
Nealon put $4 on the counter to pay for his food order. At
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701, 3921, 3925, 907, and 2701, respectively.
J-S30044-15
that same time, [Appellant] entered the store, “grabbed
[Nealon’s] money off the counter, [and] dipped into [his]
right pocket and [his] left pocket and grabbed the rest of
[his] money.” Nealon felt what he believed to be a gun
jammed into his stomach by [Appellant]. During the
robbery, Nealon focused on [Appellant’s] gun, black shirt,
and black pants. He tried to look at [Appellant’s] face but
was too scared to do so; Nealon did observe that
[Appellant] was a black male. Nealon described the gun as
being about the “size of his hand.”
After stealing Nealon’s money, [Appellant] exited the store
and turned left down the street. After [Appellant] exited
the store, the employee behind the counter called the
police. Less than 5 minutes later, police officers arrived at
the Chinese food store. According to Nealon, “the police
got [there] fast.” The officers drove Nealon to the end of
the same block where the store was and asked Nealon if
he recognized a person they had stopped as the person
who robbed him. Nealon responded that he recognized his
clothing was the same as the person who robbed him; he
specifically responded, “I believe so.” Nealon identified
[Appellant] at trial as the person who robbed him. During
the preliminary hearing, Nealon testified that he was “not
sure” if [Appellant] was the person who robbed him and
that he “can’t tell [the preliminary hearing judge]
positively” whether [Appellant] robbed him. Police
returned to Nealon $74, which was recovered from
[Appellant] and was the same amount that Nealon testified
was stolen from him.
* * *
Philadelphia Police Officer Paul Siwek received a radio call
for a robbery in progress on the 2100 block of Hunting
Park Avenue on September 3, 2005, at 10:50 pm. Officer
Siwek was “right down the street” from the Chinese food
store when he received the call. Officer Siwek testified he
was “at the perfect location at the perfect time” to respond
to the call. As he approached the store, Officer Siwek
observed [Appellant], who was wearing a black shirt and
black pants, and was approximately one half of a block
from the Chinese food store. [Appellant] was walking on
the same side of the street as the store, and, if he had
-2-
J-S30044-15
exited the store, [Appellant] would have turned left from
the store given where he was stopped. No one else on the
street matched the description provided by Nealon. Officer
Siwek observed what he believed was a black gun sticking
out of [Appellant’s] right pocket. [Appellant] actually
possessed an air gun that looked like a Glock or “real gun.”
Officer Siwek also recovered $74 from [Appellant], which
was comprised of three $20 bills, one $10 bill, and four $1
bills.
* * *
At trial, [Appellant] admitted that he was at the Chinese
food store that night but denied that he robbed Nealon.
[Appellant] testified that two teenagers entered the store,
one of them pulled out a gun, and they robbed Nealon.
[Appellant] knocked the gun out of the teenager’s hand
and picked it up off of the floor. Both teenagers ran out of
the store.[2] [Appellant] decided to walk to the police
station to “turn the gun in and tell them the situation,
what happened.”
Trial Court Opinion, filed November 18, 2014, at 1-3 (citations to the record
omitted).
On March 18, 2014, the court sentenced Appellant to five to ten (5-10)
years’ incarceration for robbery followed by five (5) years’ probation for
PIC.3 The record does not reflect that Appellant filed a post-sentence
____________________________________________
2
Appellant also testified that one of the teenagers was pointing a gun at
Nealon and Appellant, and that Nealon fell down to the floor during the
robbery. N.T., 10/31/12, at 71-72. Appellant testified that he then called
the police two times from the Chinese Food store phone to report the
robbery. Id. at 75.
3
Appellant’s convictions for theft and receiving stolen property merged for
sentencing purposes. The court imposed a determination of guilt with no
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-3-
J-S30044-15
motion. Nevertheless, on June 27, 2014, the court filed an order denying
Appellant’s post-sentence motion, and Appellant filed a notice of appeal that
same day. On July 15, 2014, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
within twenty-one (21) days. Appellant filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement
on March 6, 2015, almost seven months after the twenty-one days had
expired and after the court had already issued its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
DID THE COURT COMMIT ERROR BY CONVICTING
APPELLANT OF ROBBERY WHERE THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT APPELLANT
[THREATENED] SERIOUS BODILY INJURY WHILE
COMMITTING A THEFT?
DID THE COURT COMMIT ERROR BY CONVICTING
APPELLANT OF THEFT BY UNLAWFUL TAKING WHERE THE
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
THAT APPELLANT TOOK THE PROPERTY OF ANOTHER WITH
THE INTENT TO DEPRIVE HIM THEREOF?
DID THE COURT COMMIT ERROR BY CONVICTING
APPELLANT OF POSSESSING AN INSTRUMENT OF CRIME
WHERE THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH THAT APPELLANT POSSESSED AN
INSTRUMENT OF CRIME WITH INTENT TO EMPLOY IT
CRIMINALLY?
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
further penalty on Appellant’s simple assault conviction. Appellant received
credit for time served.
-4-
J-S30044-15
Before we address the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must address
the timeliness of this appeal. Although Appellant claims to have filed a post-
sentence motion on March 18, 2014,4 the same day as his judgment of
sentence, and the court denied a post-sentence motion on June 27, 2014,5
the record does not reflect that Appellant ever filed a post-sentence motion.6
____________________________________________
4
Appellant’s Brief at 7.
5
The order states:
AND NOW, this 27th day of June, 2014, after consideration
of the POST SENTENCE MOTION by the Attorney for the
Defendant it is ORDERED that the POST SENTENCE
MOTION IS DENIED.
Trial Court Order denying post-sentence motion, filed June 27, 2014.
6
The docket does not show an entry of a post-sentence motion. We
contacted the trial court to request a copy of any post-sentence motion, but
the court was unable to locate one. The appeals unit district attorney
suggested Appellant might have filed an oral post-sentence motion,
however, he did not. The sentencing transcript reveals that Appellant
expressed his intent to file a motion in the future, and the court specifically
directed him to file a written post-sentence motion:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: [Appellant], good afternoon. I just
need to inform you that you’ve been sentenced by the
Honorable Judge Anders in connection with this matter, I
need to inform you that you have ten days to file in writing
a motion for reconsideration of this sentence and 30 days
to file an appeal to the Superior Court of the state of
Pennsylvania, which includes, it must be in writing within
30 days from the disposition of this matter, which also
must be in writing. Do you understand?
[APPELLANT]: (Witness nodding head).
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-5-
J-S30044-15
Regarding the effect of a post-sentence motion on the timeliness of an
appeal, we observe:
A defendant has ten days after the imposition of sentence
to file a post-sentence motion. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1). An
untimely post-sentence motion does not preserve issues
for appeal. Commonwealth v. Hockenberry,. 689 A.2d
283, 288 ([Pa.Super.]1997).
If no post-sentence motion is filed within the ten-day time
period, the defendant has thirty days from sentencing to
file a direct appeal. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(3). This Court
does not have jurisdiction to hear an untimely appeal.
Commonwealth v. Green, 862 A.2d 613, 615
(Pa.Super.2004).
Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 719-20 (Pa.Super.2007).
Under Commonwealth v. Dreves, 839 A.2d 1122, 1128
(Pa.Super.2003) (en banc ), a post-sentence motion nunc
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
THE COURT: If you cannot do so – you may retain the
services of an attorney. Just make sure whatever you do
is in writing, okay. Do you wish at this point to exercise
any of your rights either to file a post-sentence motion
challenging the weight or sufficiency or appeal this verdict?
[APPELLANT]: I would like to appeal it.
[THE COURT]: All right. So [Defense Counsel], I think it
would be appropriate to file a post-sentence motion in the
same way that you’ve done. Just say it is the verdict, the
sufficiency and the weight. The sentence itself –
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I understand, Your Honor.
However, I just was retained for the trial and [my]
agreement states that. I will not be available.
N.T., March 18, 2014, pp. 16-17. Appellant did not thereafter file a written
motion.
-6-
J-S30044-15
pro tunc may toll the appeal period, but only if two
conditions are met. First, within 30 days of imposition of
sentence, a defendant must request the trial court to
consider a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc. “The
request for nunc pro tunc relief is separate and distinct
from the merits of the underlying post-sentence motion.”
Id. at 1128–29. Second, the trial court must expressly
permit the filing of a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc,
also within 30 days of imposition of sentence. Id. at 1128
& n. 6. “If the trial court does not expressly grant nunc pro
tunc relief, the time for filing an appeal is neither tolled nor
extended.” Id. at 1128. Moreover, “[t]he trial court's
resolution of the merits of the late post-sentence motion is
no substitute for an order expressly granting nunc pro tunc
relief.” Id. at 1129.
Commonwealth v. Capaldi, 112 A.3d 1242, 1244 (Pa.Super.2015).
Instantly, the record does not reflect that Appellant filed either a
written or an oral post-sentence motion. Further, there is no indication that
he requested, or that the court granted him, nunc pro tunc relief. Moreover,
the trial court’s ruling on the merits of the late or missing post-sentence
motion is not a substitute for an order explicitly granting nunc pro tunc
relief. See Capaldi, supra. Because Appellant did not file a post-sentence
motion, he did not toll the appeal period, which expired on April 17, 2014.
Thus, his notice of appeal, filed June 27, 2014, is facially untimely.
Nevertheless, we decline to quash this appeal because we find there
has been a breakdown in the court’s operation. See Commonwealth v.
Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 79 (Pa.Super.2015) (“[An appellant] should not be
precluded from appellate review based on what was, in effect, an
administrative breakdown on the part of the trial court.”).
-7-
J-S30044-15
Although neither the record nor the docket reflects the filing of a post-
sentence motion, the transcript from June 27, 2014, the day the court
denied the post-sentence motion, suggests a breakdown in the court’s
operation. The transcript provides, in its entirety:
THE COURT: [Replacement Counsel], you’re appointed to
see if there’s any after discovered evidence that may be
the basis for some ineffectiveness by trial counsel.[7] You
have conducted your investigation and you have what to
offer to the [c]ourt?
[REPLACEMENT COUNSEL]: There’s nothing in addition to
offer to the [c]ourt, that was prior to. What I can say is
that, if the way the [c]ourt has worded it, it may not allow
[Appellant] to do a direct file appeal. I think we have to
word – I did a motion for a rest of judgment. This [c]ourt
continued it for possible new discovered evidence and that
it is denied because we continued it for then another
purpose, just for me to find after discovered evidence, he
would have had a direct file appeal rights. I did review my
appellate procedure, that there is after discovered
evidence within the motion for a rest of judgment, this
[c]ourt could have reviewed and still can review anything
on a motion for a rest of judgment.
THE COURT: Right. And we’re also within the 120-date
period to decide the post-sentence motions, so your post-
sentence motion, how it is styled, would be denied –
[REPLACEMENT COUNSEL]: Thank you.
THE COURT: -- without prejudice to you filing any appeal
and it’s my view, an appeal would be timely.
____________________________________________
7
The trial court appointed replacement counsel on March 21, 2014. The
docket reflects that the court granted replacement counsel’s motions for
continuance on March 21, 2014 and on May 30, 2014.
-8-
J-S30044-15
[REPLACEMENT COUNSEL]: So I will file a timely appeal
and attach a letter to this [c]ourt, requesting to be
withdrawn and have new counsel appointed.
THE COURT: That’s fine.
[REPLACEMENT COUNSEL]: Thank you, Your Honor.
N.T., 6/27/14, at 4-5.
Although Appellant failed to file a post-sentence motion or a timely
appeal,8 and the trial court does not have the power to fix jurisdictional
problems created by the ineffective assistance of counsel,9 the court
misadvised Appellant of his appellate rights, creating a breakdown in the
court process.10 See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 499
(2007) (“the trial court’s failure to comply with Rule 720 constitutes a
breakdown that excuses the untimely filing of Appellant’s notice of appeal.”);
____________________________________________
8
It is the appellant’s duty to ensure that the record is complete for purposes
of appellate review, however “where the failure to transmit the record was
caused by an extraordinary breakdown in the judicial process, an appellant
should not be denied merits review in the Superior Court.” Commonwealth
v. Almodorar, 20 A.3d 466, 467 (Pa.2011) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
9
Generally, counsel’s failure to file a timely post-sentence motion or direct
appeal would implicate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which
should be raised in a petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief
Act (“PCRA”) 42 Pa.C.S. 9541-9546. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79
A.3d 562, 576 (Pa.2013) (“claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to
be deferred to PCRA review”).
10
We note that the trial court properly advised Appellant of his post-
sentence rights at sentencing. The court, however, misadvised Appellant of
his post-sentence rights on June 27, 2014.
-9-
J-S30044-15
Commonwealth v. Parlante, 823 A.2d 927, 929 (Pa.Super.2003) (“the
trial court’s misstatement of appeal period…operated as a breakdown in the
court’s operation”). Further, the transcript suggests the presence of a
possible motion that was not docketed due to counsel or the court’s error.
See Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 78-79 (Pa.Super.2015)
(declining to quash untimely appeal where appellant was not at fault).
Thus, we decline to quash this appeal for Appellant’s failure to file a post-
sentence motion, or a timely post-sentence motion, or a timely appeal.
We must next address Appellant’s failure to timely comply with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
In Commonwealth v. Lord, our Supreme Court held that
“[a]ppellants must comply whenever the trial court orders them to file a
Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Rule 1925. Any
issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.” 719 A.2d
306, 309 (1998). In Commonwealth v. Castillo, the Supreme Court re-
affirmed the bright line rule set forth in Lord that mandates strict
compliance with Rule 1925(b). 888 A.2d 775, 780 (Pa.2005). In Castillo,
the Court specifically voiced its disproval of “prior decisions of the
intermediate courts to the extent that they…created exceptions to Lord and
have addressed issues that should have been deemed waived.” Id.
Here, on July 15, 2014, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement within twenty-one (21) days, and Appellant filed his
- 10 -
J-S30044-15
statement on March 6, 2015, after the twenty-one days had expired. The
record reflects that appellate counsel withdrew and new appellate counsel
was appointed on July 23, 2014. The record does not reflect, however, that
new appellate counsel requested, or that the court granted, an extension of
time to file the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
When the trial court has addressed the issues presented in an untimely
Rule 1925(b) statement, however, we need not remand and may address
the merits of the issues presented. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 39
A.3d 335, 340-41 (Pa.Super.2012). We observe:
While it is technically accurate that a complete failure to
file, or failure to timely file, a Rule 1925(b) statement
results in waiver of the issues, [Commonwealth v.
Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 432-33 (Pa.Super.2009)], under
the current version of the rule, a finding of waiver does not
necessarily end the trial court’s analysis or require it to
ignore the issues raised. Because the untimely or
complete failure to file a Rule 1925(b) statement waives
issues on appeal, counsel is per se ineffective. Id. Under
Rule 1925(c)(3), the remedy for per se ineffectiveness in
criminal cases is no longer collateral relief, but to remand
to the trial court, either for the filing of a Rule 1925(b)
statement nunc pro tunc or the filing of a Rule 1925(a)
opinion addressing the issues raised in an untimely
1925(b) statement. Id. Thus, to avoid unnecessary
delay, when a trial court orders the appellant in a criminal
case to file a Rule 1925(b) statement and the appellant
files it untimely, the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion
should note the per se ineffectiveness of counsel, appoint
new counsel if it deems it necessary, see West, supra at
658, and address the issues raised on appeal. See
Burton, supra at 434 (holding remand is not necessary
where trial court addressed issues in untimely Rule
1925(b) statement). Similarly, where, as here, counsel
fails to file a Rule 1925(b) statement before the trial court
files a Rule 1925(a) opinion, the opinion should note the
- 11 -
J-S30044-15
ineffectiveness of counsel, permit counsel to file a
statement nunc pro tunc and address the issues raised in a
subsequent Rule 1925(a) opinion. The trial court may
appoint new counsel if original counsel fails to comply with
the order because a failure to comply with the order would
prohibit appellate review. See id. at 432 (“Filing of Rule
1925 concise statement when ordered is a ‘prerequisite to
appellate merits review’ and is ‘elemental to an effective
perfection of the appeal.’ ”).
Thompson, 39 A.3d at 341.
In this case, the trial court filed its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on
November 18, 2014, before Appellant filed his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
In his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and in his brief, Appellant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions for robbery, unlawful taking
and PIC. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) statement, the trial court addresses
Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for all of his
convictions. Thus, there is no need for the trial court to file a supplemental
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) statement. We note that counsel is per se ineffective, but
continue to address the merits of Appellant’s claims.
In his combined issues on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence for his convictions. Appellant argues that the evidence only
shows that Appellant was present at the crime scene. He claims that the
only witness to the crime could not identify Appellant as the perpetrator
because he could only give a vague and contradictory description of his
clothing. He concludes that there was insufficient evidence to convict
- 12 -
J-S30044-15
Appellant of robbery, theft by unlawful taking, or possessing an instrument
of crime. We disagree.
When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless
the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain
its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact
while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa.Super.2011), appeal
denied, 32 A.3d 1275 (Pa.2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 874
A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super.2005)).
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the following
convictions, which are defined by statute.
§ 3701. Robbery
(a) Offense defined.--
- 13 -
J-S30044-15
(1) A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of
committing a theft, he:
(i) inflicts serious bodily injury upon another;
(ii) threatens another with or intentionally puts him
in fear of immediate serious bodily injury;
(iii) commits or threatens immediately to commit
any felony of the first or second degree;
(iv) inflicts bodily injury upon another or threatens
another with or intentionally puts him in fear of
immediate bodily injury;
(v) physically takes or removes property from the
person of another by force however slight; or
(vi) takes or removes the money of a financial
institution without the permission of the financial
institution by making a demand of an employee of
the financial institution orally or in writing with the
intent to deprive the financial institution thereof.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3701.
§ 3921. Theft by unlawful taking or disposition
(a) Movable property.--A person is guilty of theft if he
unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful control over,
movable property of another with intent to deprive him
thereof.
(b) Immovable property.--A person is guilty of theft if
he unlawfully transfers, or exercises unlawful control over,
immovable property of another or any interest therein with
intent to benefit himself or another not entitled thereto.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3921.
§ 907. Possessing instruments of crime
- 14 -
J-S30044-15
(a) Criminal instruments generally.--A person commits
a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses any
instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally.
(b) Possession of weapon.--A person commits a
misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses a firearm
or other weapon concealed upon his person with intent to
employ it criminally.
(c) Unlawful body armor.--A person commits a felony of
the third degree if in the course of the commission of a
felony or in the attempt to commit a felony he uses or
wears body armor or has in his control, custody or
possession any body armor.
(d) Definitions.--As used in this section, the following
words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them
in this subsection:
“Body armor.” Any protective covering for the body, or
parts thereof, made of any polyaramid fiber or any resin-
treated glass fiber cloth or any material or combination of
materials made or designed to prevent, resist, deflect or
deter the penetration thereof by ammunition, knife, cutting
or piercing instrument or any other weapon.
“Instrument of crime.” Any of the following:
(1) Anything specially made or specially adapted for
criminal use.
(2) Anything used for criminal purposes and possessed
by the actor under circumstances not manifestly
appropriate for lawful uses it may have.
“Weapon.” Anything readily capable of lethal use and
possessed under circumstances not manifestly appropriate
for lawful uses which it may have. The term includes a
firearm which is not loaded or lacks a clip or other
component to render it immediately operable, and
components which can readily be assembled into a
weapon.
18 Pa.C.S. § 907.
- 15 -
J-S30044-15
In this case, Nealon, Officer Siwek and Appellant testified at a bench
trial on October 31, 2013. Nealon testified that a black male wearing a black
shirt and pants, later identified as Appellant, took money from the counter in
front of him at a Chinese store, pressed a gun against him, and took money
out of his pocket. Officer Siwek testified that he responded to the scene and
found Appellant located a half a block from the Chinese store with a gun
sticking out of his back pocket. Appellant testified that he was in the store,
but that two Hispanic boys took the money from the counter and from
Nealon’s pocket and that Appellant just picked up the gun for safety. The
court, as the trier of fact, was free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence. See Hansley, supra. Viewing the testimony in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence to enable the
court to find every element of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant’s three issues on appeal merit no relief.
We now consider the legality of Appellant’s mandatory minimum
sentence under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712. Although Appellant did not raise any
issue related to the legality of his sentence, we note that questions
regarding the legality of a sentence “are not waivable and may be raised sua
sponte by this Court.” Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 118
(Pa.Super.2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 277 (Pa.2014). Further,
we note that issues regarding the Supreme Court of the United States’
decision in Alleyne v. United States, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct 2151, 186 L.Ed
- 16 -
J-S30044-15
2d 341 (2013), directly implicate the legality of the sentence.
Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800, 801 (Pa.Super.2014), appeal
granted, ___ A3d ___ 2015 WL 4755651.
Our standard of review of questions involving the legality of a sentence
is as follows:
A challenge to the legality of a sentence…may be
entertained as long as the reviewing court has jurisdiction.
It is also well-established that if no statutory authorization
exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and
subject to correction. An illegal sentence must be vacated.
Issues relating to the legality of a sentence are questions
of law. Our standard of review over such questions is de
novo and our scope of review is plenary.
Wolfe, 106 A.3d at 801-02 (citations omitted).
In this case, Appellant was sentenced under the following statute:
§ 9712. Sentences for offenses committed with
firearms
(a) Mandatory sentence.--Except as provided under
section 9716 (relating to two or more mandatory minimum
sentences applicable), any person who is convicted in any
court of this Commonwealth of a crime of violence as
defined in section 9714(g) (relating to sentences for
second and subsequent offenses), shall, if the person
visibly possessed a firearm or a replica of a firearm,
whether or not the firearm or replica was loaded or
functional, that placed the victim in reasonable fear of
death or serious bodily injury, during the commission of
the offense, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at
least five years of total confinement notwithstanding any
other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary.
Such persons shall not be eligible for parole, probation,
work release or furlough.
(b) Proof at sentencing.--Provisions of this section shall
not be an element of the crime and notice thereof to the
- 17 -
J-S30044-15
defendant shall not be required prior to conviction, but
reasonable notice of the Commonwealth's intention to
proceed under this section shall be provided after
conviction and before sentencing. The applicability of this
section shall be determined at sentencing. The court shall
consider any evidence presented at trial and shall afford
the Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to
present any necessary additional evidence and shall
determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, if this
section is applicable.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.
In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of
the Federal Constitution requires each factor that increases a mandatory
minimum sentence be submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable
doubt. Alleyne, 133 S.Ct at 2163. Based upon Alleyne, this Court stated
in dicta in Watley that 18 Pa.C.S. § 750811 and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.112 are
unconstitutional insofar as they permit a judge to automatically increase a
defendant’s sentence based on a preponderance of the evidence standard for
factors other than a prior conviction. Watley, 81 A.3d at 117 n. 4.
More recently, in Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86
(Pa.Super.2014) (en banc), following our dicta in Watley, we held that the
preponderance of the evidence standard in section 9712.1(c) is
____________________________________________
11
§ 7508. Drug trafficking sentencing and penalties.
12
§ 9712.1. Sentences for certain drug offenses committed with firearms.
- 18 -
J-S30044-15
unconstitutional under Alleyne. We then addressed whether it was possible
to continue enforcing the remaining subsections of section 9712.1 after
severing subsection (c). We held that section 9712.1, as a whole, was no
longer workable, because subsection (c) was “essentially and inseparably
connected” with the mandatory minimum sentencing provision in subsection
(a). Newman, supra at 101. Further, in Commonwealth v. Valentine,
101 A.3d 801 (Pa.Super.2014), this Court declared section 9712
unconstitutional and found that “it is manifestly the province of the General
Assembly to determine what new procedures must be created in order to
impose mandatory minimum sentences in Pennsylvania following Alleyne.
We cannot do so.” Valentine, 101 A.3d at 811. 13
Pursuant to Valentine, because the trial court sentenced Appellant
under the unconstitutional provision of section 9712, we must vacate
Appellant’s judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing without
application of the mandatory minimum.
Convictions affirmed. Judgment of sentence vacated; case remanded
for resentencing. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
____________________________________________
13
In Commonwealth v. Hopkins, our Supreme Court affirmed our holding
that the preponderance of the evidence standard in 18 Pa.C.S. § 6317(a) is
unconstitutional and that the “violative provisions [are] not severable.” 117
A.3d 247 (Pa.2015).
- 19 -
J-S30044-15
President Judge Emeritus Ford Elliott joins the memorandum.
President Judge Gantman concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/11/2015
- 20 -