UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-6789
GREGORY C. KRUG,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
VICTOR LORANTH, in his individual capacity,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Aiken. David C. Norton, District Judge.
(1:14-cv-01829-DCN)
Submitted: September 9, 2015 Decided: September 14, 2015
Before SHEDD, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gregory C. Krug, Appellant Pro Se. Marshall Prince, II,
Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gregory C. Krug seeks to appeal the district court’s order
accepting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and denying
relief on Krug’s complaint filed pursuant to Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). We remand for consideration of whether reopening of the
appeal period is merited.
When the United States or its officer or agency is a party,
parties are accorded 60 days after the entry of the district
court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App.
P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the appeal
period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal
period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a
notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional
requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).
The district court’s order was entered on the docket on
January 6, 2015. Krug filed his notice of appeal on May 14,
2015. * Krug’s notice of appeal is clearly untimely. However,
under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), the district court may reopen the
* For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date
appearing on Krug’s notice of appeal is the earliest date it
could have been properly delivered to prison officials for
mailing to the court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c); Houston v. Lack,
487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988).
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time to file an appeal if: (1) the moving party did not receive
notice of entry of judgment within 21 days after entry; (2) the
motion is filed within 180 days of entry of judgment or within
14 days of receiving notice from the court, whichever is
earlier; and (3) no party would be prejudiced.
In his notice of appeal, Krug stated that he did not
receive notice of the district court’s order dismissing his
action until the court mailed him a copy on May 6, 2015, in
response to Krug’s April 30 letter of inquiry as to the status
of his case. Accordingly, we remand for the limited purpose of
permitting the district court to determine whether Krug’s
notice of appeal should be construed as a motion to reopen the
appeal period, and if so, whether reopening is merited. The
record, as supplemented, will then be returned to this court for
further consideration.
REMANDED
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