Reversed and Remanded and Majority and Concurring Opinions filed January 16, 2003.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
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NO. 14-00-01201-CV
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JAMES WOJCIK, JANETTE MEDLIN, DIANE WOJCIK, AND
VERONICA WHITE, Appellants
V.
SOPHIE WESOLICK, INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF ADAM WOJCIK, DECEASED, Appellee
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On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Walker County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 6325
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M A J O R I T Y O P I N I O N
This appeal arises out of a will contest. Appellants/will contestants James Wojcik, Janette Medlin, Diane Wojcik, and Veronica White (collectively “Contestants”) challenge the trial court’s summary judgment against them. Appellee Sophie Wesolick, Independent Administratrix of the Estate of Adam Wojcik, Deceased (the “Wojcik Estate”) maintains the trial court properly granted summary judgment because the Contestants did not join two will beneficiaries as parties to their will contests. Under the unambiguous language of the Texas Probate Code, the Contestants were not required to join these will beneficiaries as parties. Therefore, we sustain the Contestants’ second issue and reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Sophie Wesolick, Gerald Slott, and Elizabeth Novark filed an application to probate the will of Adam Wojcik. Wesolick, Slott, and Novark alleged that they were the only distributees named in Adam Wojcik’s holographic will and asked the court to designate Wesolick as independent administratrix. They also “waive[d] the issuance and service of citation and enter[ed] their appearance in that cause for all purposes.” The trial court admitted the will to probate and appointed Wesolick independent administratrix. Veronica White later filed a will contest because the will had holes physically cut in it, suggesting that some of the distributees had been cut out of the will, literally. White also alleged that Wesolick’s name was in a different color ink and that someone other than Adam Wojcik may have added Wesolick’s name later, thereby invalidating the holographic will. Thereafter, Diane Wojcik and James Wojcik also filed will contests. Janette Medlin intervened but sought no affirmative relief.[1]
The Wojcik Estate filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that all necessary and indispensable parties were not joined in the will contest within the limitations period. Specifically, the Wojcik Estate argued the will contest was time-barred because (1) all of the beneficiaries named in the will were not joined as parties or served with citation during the two-year limitations period applicable to will contests; and (2) all persons who would inherit if the will fails were indispensable parties, and they were not joined as parties or served with citation during the limitations period. The trial court granted the Wojcik Estate’s motion.
II. Issues Presented
The Contestants assert the trial court erred because (1) heirs at law are not indispensable parties to a will contest; (2) the Texas Probate Code does not require the joining of all beneficiaries; (3) the named beneficiaries were properly before the court because they signed the application to probate the will and because Slott and Novark signed waivers of service; (4) the Wojcik Estate should be foreclosed from obtaining summary judgment on the ground that the deceased’s heirs at law were not made parties to the suit because the Wojcik Estate did not name all of them as potential parties in response to discovery requests; and (5) the Wojcik Estate should have challenged the failure to join allegedly indispensable parties by a motion to abate rather than by a motion for summary judgment.
III. Standard of Review
The standard for reviewing this summary judgment is whether the Wojcik Estate has shown that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Housing Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). In conducting our review, we take as true all evidence favorable to the Contestants, and we make all reasonable inferences in their favor. See id. The Wojcik Estate is entitled to summary judgment if it has pleaded and conclusively established each element of its affirmative defense of statute of limitations. See Science Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997).
Because the trial court did not specify the grounds for its ruling, we will affirm if any of the theories advanced in the motion has merit. See Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989). Although the Wojcik Estate asserted two grounds in its motion for summary judgment, it has abandoned one of those grounds on appeal, stating in its brief that it “does not contend at this time that heirs are necessary and indispensable parties to a will contest.” Because the Wojcik Estate has abandoned this ground on appeal, we do not address it in this opinion, and we do not address the Contestants’ first and fourth issues, which deal only with this ground. See Hall v. Tomball Nursing Ctr., Inc., 926 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ) (holding that court of appeals need not address ground in motion for summary judgment that appellee abandons on appeal).
IV. Analysis
A. Were the Contestants required to join Slott and Novark?
On appeal, the Wojcik Estate asserts that section 93 of the Texas Probate Code bars the will contests in this case because the Contestants did not join Slott and Novark within two years of the admission of the will to probate. See Tex. Prob. Code § 93. In this argument, the Wojcik Estate asserts that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39, entitled “Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication,” applies to will contests and requires a will contestant to join all beneficiaries under the will as necessary and indispensable parties. Of the three beneficiaries allegedly named in the will, the Wojcik Estate admits Wesolick was properly joined, but it complains the Contestants did not join the other two — Slott and Novark.
In their second issue, the Contestants assert that, under the unambiguous language of the Probate Code, will contestants are not required to join beneficiaries such as Slott and Novark. We agree. The Probate Code does not require joinder of all interested persons in a will contest. See Jones v. LaFargue, 758 S.W.2d 320, 323 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied). Nor does it generally require service of citation, or even notice. Section 33(a) of the Probate Code states that no person need be joined as a party or given notice of proceedings under the Probate Code unless the Probate Code expressly so provides:
(a) When Citation or Notice Necessary. No person need be cited or otherwise given notice except in situations in which this Code expressly provides for citation or the giving of notice; provided, however, that even though this Code does not expressly provide for citation, or the issuance or return of notice in any probate matter, the court may, in its discretion, require that notice be given, and prescribe the form and manner of service and return thereof.
Tex. Prob. Code § 33(a). The Probate Code does not expressly provide that a will contestant must join or give notice of the will contest to any party. See id. § 93; Jones, 758 S.W.2d at 323. Though a probate court has discretion to require notice, there is no evidence the court did so in this case. See Tex. Prob. Code § 33(a).
We review the trial court’s interpretation of applicable statutes de novo. See Johnson v. City of Fort Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653, 655–56 (Tex. 1989). In construing a statute, our objective is to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. See Nat’l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2000). If possible, we must ascertain that intent from the language the Legislature used in the statute and not look to extraneous matters for an intent the statute does not state. Id. If the meaning of the statutory language is unambiguous, we adopt the interpretation supported by the plain meaning of the provision’s words. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1997). We must not engage in forced or strained construction; instead, we must yield to the plain sense of the words the Legislature chose. See id.
An essential aspect of the Wojcik Estate’s argument is that Rule 39 applies to will contests and requires that will contestants join necessary and indispensable parties. This argument fails because it is contrary to the unambiguous language of the Probate Code. Significantly, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure apply to will contests only to the extent they do not differ from the procedure established by the Probate Code. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 2; Cunningham v. Parkdale Bank, 660 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. 1983); see also Johnstone v. State, 22 S.W.3d 408, 409 (Tex. 2000) (“[W]hen a rule of procedure conflicts with a statute, the statute prevails unless the rule has been passed subsequent to the statute and repeals the statute as provided by Texas Government Code section 22.004.”). Under the unambiguous language of section 33(a) of the Probate Code, it is not necessary to join any person as a party or give notice of probate proceedings unless the Probate Code expressly so provides. No provision of the Probate Code expressly provides that will contestants must join or give notice to will beneficiaries or to any other parties. Because Rule 39 conflicts with the unambiguous language of the Probate Code, it does not apply to these will contests. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 2; Cunningham, 660 S.W.2d at 812. Texas is one of a handful of states in this country with a will-contest statute that does not require notice to interested parties. See Petty v. Call, 599 S.W.2d 791, 793–94 (Tenn. 1980) (noting that Tennessee was one of seven states at that time whose will-contest statute did not require that will contestants join or notify interested parties).
Two rules of statutory construction arguably might apply here. First, if there are two reasonable interpretations of a statute and if one would lead to an absurd result and the other would not, then we must choose the reasonable interpretation that avoids an absurd result. See C&H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 903 S.W.2d 315, 322 & n.5 (Tex. 1994). Second, if there are two reasonable interpretations of a statute and if one would make the statute unconstitutional and the other would not, then we must choose the reasonable interpretation that avoids the constitutional infirmity. See State v. Hodges, 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1117, 1118–20, 2002 WL 1906111, at *3–*5 (Aug. 21, 2002); State v. Shoppers World, Inc., 380 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. 1964). Notably, however, both of these rules require that each of the competing statutory interpretations be reasonable. See Hodges, 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1118–20, 2002 WL 1906111, at *3–*5; C&H Nationwide, Inc., 903 S.W.2d at 322 & n.5; Shoppers World, Inc., 380 S.W.2d at 111. Because there is no reasonable interpretation under which the Probate Code would require that will contestants join or give notice to interested parties, these two rules of statutory interpretation do not apply.
We must take the Probate Code as we find it, truly and fairly interpreting and applying it as written. See St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 952 S.W.2d at 505. We are not responsible for any omissions in the statute. See id. The Texas Legislature did not include a requirement compelling the joinder of interested parties to a will contest. Though our lawmakers might in the future elect to re-examine section 33 of the Probate Code and require that will contestants join or give notice to will beneficiaries, unless and until they do, we must apply the statute as it is written. See id. Under the unambiguous language of the Probate Code, the Contestants were not required to join Slott and Novark. To the extent the Kotz and Jennings courts hold to the contrary, we respectfully disagree with those courts. See Kotz v. Kotz, 613 S.W.2d 760, 761 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1981, no writ) (admitting that Probate Code does not require citation and notice for will contests but requiring notice to avoid constitutional problems, even though it appears that no party asserted the Probate Code was unconstitutional); Jennings v. Srp, 521 S.W.2d 326, 328–29 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1975, no writ) (stating that sections 33 and 93 of the Probate Code do not expressly require joinder of any party to a will contest but applying Rule 39 to will contest without addressing section 33’s requirement that the Probate Code expressly provide for joinder).
B. Is the constitutionality of any statute before this court?
No party in this case has challenged the constitutionality of any statute, including section 33(a) of the Probate Code, either in the trial court or on appeal. We presume that all statutes applicable in this case are constitutional. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 725 (Tex. 1995). Any party alleging that a statute is unconstitutional has the burden of proving all facts necessary to show that the statute is unconstitutional. See id.; Tex-Air Helicopters, Inc. v. Galveston County Appraisal Review Bd., 76 S.W.3d 575, 584–85 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). The appellate record in this case lacks the evidence that would be relevant to a constitutional inquiry — for example, evidence as to Slott’s and Novark’s awareness of the will contests. See Dispensa v. Univ. State Bank, 987 S.W.2d 923, 928 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (finding no due-process violation because party received actual notice in time to allow an opportunity to be heard). Because no party challenged the constitutionality of any statute applicable in this case, the constitutionality of these statutes is not before this court. See Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex. 1993); Mallicoat v. Poynter, 722 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that constitutionality of Tennessee probate procedure that does not require notice to interested parties in will contests was not before appellate court when no constitutional challenge was made in the trial court). Consequently, in this case, we need not make a determination as to the constitutionality of the Probate Code regarding notice to interested parties in will contests. That is an issue for another case and another day.
V. Conclusion
The only summary-judgment ground asserted by the Wojcik Estate on appeal is that section 93 of the Probate Code bars the will contests in this case because the Contestants did not timely join Slott and Novark. Because the Wojcik Estate has abandoned its other summary-judgment ground, we need not address it or the Contestants’ first and fourth issues. Under the unambiguous language of the Probate Code, the Contestants were not required to join Slott and Novark. Because no party challenged the constitutionality of any statute applicable in this case, the constitutionality of these statutes is not before this court. Therefore, we sustain Contestants’ second issue, reverse the trial court’s judgment, and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because we have granted the Contestants the relief they seek, we need not address their third and fifth issues.
/s/ Kem Thompson Frost
Justice
Judgment rendered and Majority and Concurring Opinions filed January 16, 2003.
Panel consists of Chief Justice Brister and Justices Anderson and Frost. (Brister, C.J., concurring) (Anderson, J., concurring).
[1] For ease of reference, we refer to appellants collectively as “Contestants,” even though Medlin did not seek affirmative relief in the trial court.