Wilson, Otis Douglas Jr. v. State

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed December 23, 2004

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed December 23, 2004.

 

 

 

In The

 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

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NO. 14-03-01147-CR

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OTIS DOUGLAS WILSON, JR., Appellant

 

V.

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

 

 

On Appeal from the 339th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 911,203

 

 

M E M O R A N D U M  O P I N I O N

A jury found appellant Otis Douglas Wilson guilty of the murder of Melody Williams, a/k/a Janice Brown, and sentenced him to life in prison.  Appellant brings this appeal, claiming the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to convict him.  Since the facts of this case are known to the parties, we do not recite them here.  Furthermore, because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.  We affirm.


We utilize the normal standards of review in evaluating legal and factual sufficiency claims.  See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (legal sufficiency);  Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (factual sufficiency);King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (legal sufficiency).  In order to obtain a conviction for murder in this case, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant 1) intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Melody Williams or 2) intended to cause serious bodily injury and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of Melody Williams.  Appellant claims that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted intentionally and knowingly.  We disagree.

As the State correctly points out, a defendant’s intent may be inferred from his actions, words, and conduct.  Henderson v. State, 825 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref’d).  The jury is entitled to consider events that occurred before, during, or after the commission of the offense.  Id.  Appellant testified in his defense that Williams attacked him in a drug-induced rage and that the knife accidentally “cut” her in a “freak accident” when he fell on her during their struggle over the weapon. 

The evidence at trial showed, however, that Williams was cut and stabbed 23 times throughout several rooms of her apartment.  Furthermore, no evidence was admitted during trial that showed that appellant suffered any sort of injury as a result of his being attacked by Williams, as he alleged.  Evidence introduced at trial also showed that: appellant had a violent temper and had been using drugs at the time of the offense; the assailant used not one but four deadly weapons, including three different knives and a pair of scissors, to stab Williams; in addition to her multiple stab wounds, Williams also suffered severe blunt-force trauma to her head; appellant’s palm print was identified on the knife found lodged in Williams’s body and on Williams’s bathtub; and Williams’s blood was found on appellant’s boots. 


Taking into account the above evidence and the fact that the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  King, 29 S.W.3d at 562-63; Santos v. State, 116 S.W.3d 447, 460 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet ref’d).  That is, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that a rational jury could have determined that appellant intended to kill Williams and that her death was not a mistake or “freak accident,” as appellant claimed.  The evidence is therefore legally sufficient to support appellant’s conviction.

We also find that a neutral review of the evidence does not show that the proof of guilt is so weak that it demonstrates that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust; neither is the contrary proof so strong that the reasonable doubt standard could not have been met.  Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 484-85.  The evidence is therefore factually sufficient to support appellant’s conviction. 

Appellant’s points of error are overruled; we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 

 

 

 

 

/s/      Adele Hedges

Chief Justice

 

 

 

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed December 23, 2004.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Fowler and Seymore.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).