Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________

No. 00-10197
____________________

AVIALL SERVICES, INC.,

Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant,

versus

COOPER INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellee.
_______________________________________
__________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
_________________________________________________________________
November 14, 2002
Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, JONES,
SMITH, WIENER, BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, BENAVIDES,
STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.1

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:

The question presented in this case is whether

§ 113(f)(1) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) allows a “potentially

responsible party” (PRP) to seek contribution from other PRPs for

environmental cleanup costs when no civil action has been brought

under CERCLA §§ 106 or 107(a). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607(a),

9613(f)(1) (2000) (hereinafter, citations are to sections of

1
Judge Clement is recused and did not participate in the
decision. Judge Parker retired before the case was decided.
CERCLA). We hold, contrary to the panel majority whose opinion

generated this en banc proceeding, that it does.

BACKGROUND

Appellant Aviall Services, Inc., purchased from appellee

Cooper Industries, Inc. property in Dallas, Texas, that was

contaminated with various hazardous substances. After prodding

from the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC),

Aviall began cleaning up the property.2 The federal Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) never contacted Aviall or designated the

property as contaminated. To recover some of the millions of

dollars it had incurred in cleanup expenses, Aviall sued Cooper in

the district court seeking contribution under CERCLA and damages

under state law theories. Cooper filed counterclaims. Both Cooper

and Aviall concede that they are PRPs under CERCLA because they

contributed to the contamination of the property. Aviall Servs.,

Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 263 F.3d 134, 137 (5th Cir. 2001).

Holding that Aviall could not yet assert a claim for

contribution under CERCLA because it had not been subjected to an

action under §§ 106 or 107(a), the district court granted summary

judgment for Cooper on Aviall’s CERCLA claim, dismissed it without

2
The TNRCC sent letters instructing Aviall to undertake various investigation and
remediation activities. The first such letter, styled a “Corrective Action Directive,” contained a
detailed list of required activities. Two later letters cited alleged violations of regulations and
statutory provisions and indicated that enforcement action would be sought “[i]f you fail to
adequately respond.” A fourth letter promised enforcement action if Aviall failed to pursue one of
two suggested remediation options.
2
prejudice, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

the parties’ state law claims. Aviall appealed.

A divided panel of this court affirmed, holding that “a

PRP seeking contribution from other PRPs under § 113(f)(1) must

have a pending or adjudged § 106 administrative order or § 107(a)

cost recovery action against it.” Aviall Servs., Inc., 263 F.3d at

145. For this conclusion, the panel majority relied primarily on

its textual interpretation of § 113(f)(1) of CERCLA, which

provides:

Any person may seek contribution from any
other person who is liable or potentially
liable under section 9607(a) of this title,
during or following any civil action under
section 9606 of this title or under section
9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be
brought in accordance with this section and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
shall be governed by Federal law. In
resolving contribution claims, the court may
allocate response costs among liable parties
using such equitable factors as the court
determines are appropriate. Nothing in this
subsection shall diminish the right of any
person to bring an action for contribution in
the absence of a civil action under section
9606 of this title or section 9607 of this
title.

42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000). The panel read the first sentence

of § 113(f)(1) to “require[] a PRP seeking contribution from other

PRPs to have filed a § 113(f)(1) claim ‘during or following’ a

federal CERCLA action against it.” Aviall Servs., Inc., 263 F.3d

at 138. The term “contribution” was understood to “require[] a

tortfeasor to first face judgment before it can seek contribution
3
from other parties,” id., and the term “may” in the first sentence

of § 113(f)(1) was viewed by the majority as creating “an exclusive

cause of action and mean[ing] ‘shall’ or ‘must.’” Id. at 138-39.

Compare Resolution Trust Corp. v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357 (5th Cir.

1994). As for the final sentence of § 113(f)(1) -– sometimes

referred to as the “savings clause” -- the panel read this “to mean

that the statute does not affect a party’s ability to bring

contribution actions based on state law.” Id. at 139. (emphasis

in original). The panel majority believed that interpreting the

savings clause “to allow contribution suits, regardless of whether

the parties are CERCLA defendants in a § 106 or § 107(a) action,”

would “render superfluous the first sentence of § 113(f)(1), the

enabling clause,” id., and thus, would violate the canon of

statutory construction that a specific provision governs over a

general provision. Id. at 140.

Judge Wiener dissented, furnishing the alternative

interpretation of § 113(f)(1) that we adopt here and pointing out

that the great majority of circuit courts implicitly reject the

panel majority’s conclusion.

Because of the importance of this question to the

allocation of financial responsibility for CERCLA cleanups, we

granted Aviall’s petition for en banc rehearing.

4
 DISCUSSION

Statutory construction begins with the plain language of

a statute, but “plain” does not always mean “indisputable” or

“pellucid.” Consequently, sound interpretation reconciles the text

of a disputed provision with the structure of the law of which it

is a part; may draw strength from the history of enactment of the

provision; and acknowledges the legislature’s general policies so

that the interpretation does not become absurd.3

Reasonable minds can differ over the interpretation of

section 113(f)(1), because its syntax is confused, its grammar

inexact and its relationship to other CERCLA provisions ambiguous.

Using the above tools, however, we adopt what we consider the most

reasonable interpretation of the provision. To facilitate the

discussion, we first state the preferred interpretation and compare

3
Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158, 110 S. Ct.
997, 1001, 108 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1990) ("In determining the meaning
of the statute, we look not only to the particular statutory
language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its
object and policy."); Perrone v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
232 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that use of
legislative history is appropriate where statutory text is
“opaque,” “translucent,” or “ambiguous”), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
971 (2001); United States v. A Female Juvenile, 103 F.3d 14,
16-17 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Axiomatic in statutory interpretation is
the principle that laws should be construed to avoid an absurd or
unreasonable result."); In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.,
Ltd., 793 F.2d 1380, 1384 (5th Cir. 1986) (“Each part or section
[of a statute] should be construed in connection with every other
part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. Thus it is
not proper to confine interpretation to the one section to be
construed.”).

5
it briefly with the interpretation advocated by the panel majority.

Prefatory to defending our interpretation, a review of the

statutory and decisional background leading to the passage of

§ 113(f) will be helpful.

The en banc majority concludes that section 113(f)(1)

does not constrain a PRP for covered pollutant discharges from

suing other PRPs for contribution only “during or following”

litigation commenced under sections 106 or 107(a) of CERCLA.

Instead, a PRP may sue at any time for contribution under federal

law to recover costs it has incurred in remediating a CERCLA site.

Section 113(f)(1) authorizes suits against PRPs in both its first

and last sentence which states without qualification that “nothing”

in the section shall “diminish” any person’s right to bring a

contribution action in the absence of a section 106 or section

107(a) action.

The dissent’s narrow textual interpretation is flawed for

several reasons.4 Regarding the first sentence, it focuses unduly

on the phrase “during or following”, and it implicitly interprets

“civil action” to include administrative remedial orders only when

the government files suit to enforce them in federal court. It

narrows the last sentence arbitrarily and without textual support

to the preservation of state law contribution claims. Finally, the

4
The dissent modifies the panel majority’s interpretation somewhat. This opinion responds
only to the dissent.
6
dissent’s interpretation distorts the interplay of the first and

last sentences and fails to make sense against the background of

caselaw and other interpretive guideposts.

I. Background - Why Section 113(f) Was Needed

CERCLA was enacted in 1980 to establish a means of

controlling and financing governmental and private cleanups of

hazardous releases at abandoned and inactive waste disposal sites.

CERCLA’s twin purposes are to promote prompt and effective cleanup

of hazardous waste sites and the sharing of financial

responsibility among the parties whose actions created the hazards.

See, e.g., OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d

1574, 1578 (5th Cir. 1997); Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal

Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 880 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied,

122 S. Ct. 1437 (2002). Under the statute, the EPA possesses broad

powers to remediate sites itself and require “covered persons”

(PRPs) to reimburse the government’s costs, and to compel PRPs to

perform the cleanups by administrative order or court action. 42

U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606(a) (2000). The definition of “covered

persons” encompasses nearly all those who have or had contact with

a particular site.5 Further, every PRP is jointly and severally

5
The four classes of “covered persons” include (1) current owners and operators of vessels
or facilities where hazardous substances were disposed of; (2) past owners or operators of any
such facilities; (3) persons who arranged for transport for disposal or treatment of hazardous
substances; and (4) persons who accepted any such substances for transport to disposal or
treatment facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000). While three
defenses are enumerated in the statute, they are not routinely available to PRPs. See Susan
7
liable unless it can prove the specific amount of harm it caused.

See generally Bell Petroleum Servs. v. Sequa Corp., 3 F.3d 889,

894-902 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying principles of apportionment found

in Restatement (Second) of Torts to CERCLA liability). These

circumstances, together with the enormous costs of remediating

hazardous waste sites, make the availability of contribution among

PRPs all the more important for achieving the purposes of the

statute – that those responsible for environmental damage to sites,

not other parties, properly bear the costs of their actions, and

that the sites are actually cleaned up.

As enacted, however, CERCLA contained no explicit

provision allowing recovery through contribution. Federal courts

soon began articulating a federal common law right of contribution

to resolve claims among PRPs. The seminal decision is City of

Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa.

1982), in which the City of Philadelphia sued another PRP for

cleanup costs. Neither the federal nor state governments had

brought suit against the city under CERCLA, id. at 1143, and there

is no indication in the opinion that the city had been sued or been

the object of a CERCLA administrative cleanup order. The district

court rejected the defendants’ argument that because the city was

subject to liability under the statute, it could not recover its

M. Cooke and Christopher P. Davis, The Law of Hazardous Waste:
Management, Cleanup, Liability, and Litigation § 13.01[5][c], at
13-70.17.
8
cleanup costs from other responsible parties. Id. at 1141-42. See

also NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1986)(what

amounted to a CERCLA action for contribution allowed to proceed in

absence of lawsuit or federal administrative action against the

contribution plaintiff under sections 106 or 107); Pinole Point

Prop., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal.

1984) (plaintiff, itself a PRP, could seek recovery under CERCLA §

107(a)(4)(B) for its response costs where no governmental action

had been taken).6

Several other published federal decisions allowed CERCLA

actions for recovery in the nature of contribution to proceed even

though the plaintiff had not been sued under § 106 or § 107.7 In

6
See Sand Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913, 916 (N.D. Okla. 1987)
(relying on Stepan Chem. Co. in concluding “that under 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(4)(B), a private party, even though a responsible party
under CERCLA, who voluntarily pays CERCLA response costs may
bring an action in its own behalf to collect cleanup costs
against the parties allegedly responsible for the production and
dumping of hazardous wastes”).
7
See, e.g., Wickland Oil Terminals v. ASARCO, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 889 (9th
Cir. 1986) (state agencies required site owner to test waste
substances; owner sued prior owner for costs incurred; action
allowed to proceed; appeal decided on same day as NL Indus.,
Inc.); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d
1074 (1st Cir. 1986); City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F.
Supp. 609, 612-13, 615-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (city, which owned and
operated landfills, sued corporations that generated and
transported wastes dumped at landfills; court denied motions to
dismiss city’s § 107 claims). Cf. Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow
Chem. Co., 299 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002) (owner sued other PRPs in 1983 for damages to
cover expenses of investigating soil pollution; no indication in opinion that owner was sued
beforehand; prior opinion in case, rejecting argument that prior governmental action was required
for owner’s suit to proceed, states that testing activities were undertaken at request of state
9
particular, this court held that prior government involvement was

not a prerequisite to recoupment of § 107 response costs by one

group of PRPs against other PRPs. Tanglewood E. Homeowners Ass’n

v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1575 (5th Cir. 1988).

Whether the cases actually used the label “contribution” is

irrelevant, as an action brought by a PRP for response costs

against another PRP is inherently one for contribution.8 And even

if the first PRP recovers 100% of its costs from the second PRP,

that does not makes its recovery any less a recovery in

contribution.9

officials, 840 F.2d 691, 692-93 (9th Cir. 1988)); Allied Towing Corp. v. Great E.
Petroleum Corp., 642 F. Supp. 1339, 1347-1350, 1352 (E.D. Va.
1986) (plaintiff transporter of hazardous substance sued
defendants for remedial costs arising from loading of substance
onto plaintiff’s barge; although concluding that complaint stated
claim for cost recovery under CERCLA § 107, court granted at
least two defendants’ motion to dismiss § 107 claim on other
grounds; unclear whether court dismissed claim as to other
defendants).
8
See, e.g., Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 423-24 (2nd Cir. 1998); United States
v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995) (“There is no disagreement that
both parties are PRPs by virtue of their past or present ownership of the site; therefore, any claim
that would reapportion costs between these parties is the quintessential claim for contribution.”);
Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994).
9
Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1026 (no abuse of discretion for trial court
to allocate 100% of contribution liability to defendant United States); Franklin County
Convention Facilities Auth. v. Am. Premier Underwriters, Inc.,
240 F.3d 534, 549 (6th Cir. 2001) (no abuse of discretion for
trial court to allocate total contribution liability to
defendant); PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 615-16 (7th Cir. 1998)
(100% contribution award to plaintiff not an abuse of discretion even though plaintiff
engaged in some dumping). But cf. Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 424 (“one
potentially responsible person can never recover 100 percent of
the response costs from others similarly situated since it is a
10
 The Supreme Court expressly acknowledged this development

of federal common law when it held that § 107 of CERCLA “impliedly

authorizes” a cause of action for contribution. Key Tronic Corp.

v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816, 114 S. Ct. 1960, 1965-66

(1994) (citing Stepan Chemical and others of the foregoing cases).

Ironically, the Court was in part responsible for Congress’s

enactment of an express statutory provision for contribution among

PRPs. Decisions it rendered in the early l980s, which were cited

in the legislative history concerning § 113(f), had cast doubt on

the ability of federal courts to fashion implied rights of

contribution under federal statutes. See Texas Indus., Inc. v.

Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639-40, 101 S. Ct. 2061,

2066-67 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union

of Amer., 451 U.S. 77, 91-95, 101 S. Ct. 1571, 1580-83, 67 L.Ed.2d

750 (1981).

Congress passed § 113(f) against this statutory and

decisional background. First, a way had to be found to encourage

cost-sharing among PRPs. Second, lower federal courts were

implementing, albeit unevenly, contribution rights that did not

depend on pre-existing EPA administrative orders and that did not

arise solely “during or following” CERCLA enforcement actions.

Third, the Supreme Court had cast doubt on the availability vel non

joint tortfeasor – and not an innocent party -- that ultimately
must bear its pro rata share of cleanup costs under § 107(a)”).
11
of federal common law contribution claims, arguably including those

under CERCLA. Section 113(f) was born as the “machinery” to govern

and regulate actions for contribution, “providing the details and

explicit recognition that were missing from the text of § 107.”

Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1302 (9th

Cir. 1997).10 Section 113(f) was enacted as part of the Superfund

Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-

499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).

We conclude this section with a brief and cautious review

of the legislative history of § 113(f). Legislative history should

be consulted gingerly, if at all, in aid of statutory construction.

Boureslan v. ARAMCO, 857 F.2d 1014, 1018 (5th Cir. 1988), adopted

en banc 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990), aff’d. sub nom., E.E.O.C. v.

Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991). Caution is even more

necessary here, for CERCLA is notorious for vaguely drafted

provisions and an inconclusive, if not contradictory, legislative

history. Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d at 901 n.13 (quoting Amoco,

Inc. v. Borden, 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989)). Only a few

general observations can be drawn from the available legislative

history materials.

10
See also Sun Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 1997) (a
§ 113(f) contribution action “is an action for recovery of the costs referred to in § 107");
Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 234 F.3d 917, 924 (5th Cir. 2000) (same), cert. denied,
533 U.S. 950 (2001).
12
 First, the avowed purpose of § 113(f)(1) was to give PRPs

the “explicit right to sue” for contribution and to “confirm” the

decisions of federal courts that had so construed CERCLA. See,

e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, pt. I, at 59, 79 (1985), reprinted in

1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2841, 2861; S. Rep. No. 99-11, at 44

(1985).11 See also 131 Cong. Rec. 24,450 (1985) (statement of Sen.

Stafford (predicting that § 9613 would “remove[] any doubt as to

the right of contribution”)). Cf. William D. Araiza, Text, Purpose

and Facts: The Relationship Between CERCLA Sections 107 and 113, 72

Notre Dame L. Rev. 193, 224-26 (1996).

Second, Congress emphasized in SARA that it had

previously encouraged the federal courts to devise equitable

solutions for apportioning waste site cleanup costs among numerous

PRPs:

No change has been made in the standard of
liability that applies under CERCLA. . . .
[L]iability under CERCLA is strict, that is,
without regard to fault or willfulness. Where
appropriate, liability under CERCLA is also
joint and several, as a matter of federal
common law.

Explicit mention of joint and several
liability was deleted from CERCLA in 1980 to
allow courts to establish the scope of

11
Both of these reports refer to earlier versions of § 113(f)(1) that differ from the enacted
version in a number of respects, particularly in their keying of contribution to entry of a judgment,
S. Rep. No. 99-11, at 90, or a “defendant alleged or held to be liable.” H. R. Rep. No. 99-253, pt.
III, at 18 (1995), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 3041. Like the enacted version, both of
the earlier versions contained “savings clauses.”

13
 liability through a case-by-case application
of “traditional and evolving principles of
common law” and pre-existing statutory law.
The courts have made substantial progress in
doing so. The Committee fully subscribes to
the reasoning of the court in the seminal case
of United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.
Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983), which established
a uniform federal rule allowing for joint and
several liability in appropriate CERCLA cases.

H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, pt. I, at 74 (1985), reprinted in 1986

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2856 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).12

Another federal district court decision cited favorably in the

legislative history expressly extends this common law process of

development to contribution actions. United States v. South

Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 995 n.8

(D.S.C. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds sub

nom. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988),

cited in House Report No. 99-253, pt. I, at 79 (1985), reprinted in

1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861, and cited in S. Rep. No. 99-11, at 44

(1985).13

12
The Chem-Dyne decision, expressly referring to contribution in its discussion, concluded
that Congress intentionally omitted the term “joint and several liability” so as “to avoid a
mandatory legislative standard applicable in all situations which might produce inequitable results
in some cases.” 572 F. Supp. at 807 n.3 and 808. “The deletion was not intended as a rejection
of joint and several liability. Rather, the term was omitted in order to have the scope of liability
determined under common law principles . . . .” Id.
13
See H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, pt. I, at 80 (1985), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2862 (“As with joint and several
liability issues, contribution claims will be resolved pursuant
to Federal common law. Although the only defenses to liability
remain those set forth in section 107(b), courts are to resolve
such claims on a case-by-case basis, taking into account relevant
14
 Third, although snippets of the legislative history

suggest that Congress intended to remove any doubt that the right

of contribution was available after the person seeking contribution

had been sued under section 106 or 107,14 these statements are

contradicted by others and, as noted, pertain to much different

versions of § 113(f) that were not ultimately adopted. See Aviall

Servs., Inc., 263 F.3d at 151 (Wiener, J., dissenting).

The mixed and shifting signals from legislative history

yield no guide that should color the textual interpretation of

§ 113(f)(1). Yet, it would seem odd that a legislature concerned

with clarifying the right to contribution among PRPs and with

facilitating the courts’ development of federal common law

equitable considerations.”).
14
S. Rep. No. 99-11, at 44 (1985) (“This amendment clarifies and confirms the right of a
person held jointly and severally liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially
liable parties . . .”) (emphasis added); H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, pt. I, at 79 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861 (“The section also confirms a Federal right of contribution or
indemnification for persons alleged or held to be liable under section 106 or 107 of CERCLA . . .
. This section clarifies and confirms the right of a person held jointly and seve[]rally liable under
CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially liable parties . . . .”) (emphasis added); H.R.
Rep. No. 99-253, pt. III, at 18 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 3041, quoted in
n.10, supra; H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, pt. V, at 24 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,
3147 (“New subsection (g) expressly recognizes the right to contribution. Any defendant alleged
or held to be liable in an action under section 106 or 107 may bring an action for contribution or
indemnity against any other person liable or potentially liable.”). But cf. H.R. Rep. No. 99-253,
pt. I, at 59 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2841 (“The bill would give potentially
responsible parties the explicit right to sue other liable or potentially liable parties who also may
be responsible for the hazardous waste site.”); id. at 266, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2940
(separate and dissenting views of Members of Congress) (“The section would also establish a
federal right of contribution or indemnity for persons liable under section 106 or § 107 of current
law . . . .”) (emphasis added).
15
apportionment principles would have rather arbitrarily cut back the

then-prevailing standard of contribution. In no event does the

history “overwhelmingly support” the panel majority’s narrow view

of the statute. Id. at 140.

For sixteen years, Sections 113(f) and 107 have governed

the availability of contribution actions under CERCLA. As the

Supreme Court explained it, CERCLA, as amended by SARA, authorizes

two kinds of contribution actions among PRPs, one that is explicit

under § 113(f) and another that is an “implied,” “similar and

somewhat overlapping” action pursuant to § 107. Key Tronic Corp.,

511 U.S. at 816, 114 S. Ct. at 1965-66.15 To the statute we turn.

II. Statutory Text

This court’s expansive reading of § 113(f)(1) – which

enables a claim by a PRP “at whatever time in the cleanup process

15
The parties dispute whether Aviall’s pleadings seek contribution under the § 107 implied
action as well as under § 113(f)(1). It is unnecessary to reach this question or to opine more
concretely on the theoretical problems surrounding this “overlap” of remedies. See OHM
Remediation Servs., 116 F.3d at 1571 (SARA amendments “codified the federal common law
rights of contribution”), United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 100
(1st Cir. 1994) (“Congress, in enacting SARA, sought to codify the case law” holding that § 107
conferred implied right of action among PRPs for contribution); but see In re Reading Co., 115
F.3d 1111, 1117-21 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that § 113(f) is the exclusive statutory vehicle for
contribution claims and specifically rejecting “dictum” in Key Tronic about “overlapping”
contribution actions, 511 U.S. at 816, 114 S. Ct. at 1966).
16
the party, seeking contribution, decides to pursue it”16 – suits its

text better than the restrictive reading adopted by the dissent.

The first point of disagreement between the dissent and

the en banc majority is over the exclusivity of the claim for

contribution described in the first sentence of § 113(f)(1). Does

its allowance of contribution actions “during or following” a § 106

or § 107(a) civil action mean that contribution actions are “only”

allowed in such circumstances? We think not. The dissent’s

interpretation of the first sentence of § 113(f) departs from

“plain meaning” in several ways. “Only,” for instance, is the word

choice of the dissent, not of Congress, which characterized the

actions permissively (a PRP “may” bring an action for

contribution). Elsewhere in CERCLA, Congress used “only” many

times, signifying its intent to narrow, exclude or define

provisions.17 Had Congress similarly intended to make contribution

16
See In re Reading Co., 115 F.3d at 1120: “Indeed, the fact that § 113(f)(1) specifically
permits an action for contribution to be brought ‘in the absence of a civil action under . . . section
[107]’ reenforces our conclusion that Congress intended § 113 to be the sole means for seeking
contribution – at whatever time in the cleanup process the party, seeking contribution, decides to
pursue it.” We subscribe to the portion of the court’s statement quoted above in the text, but
have doubts about its exclusivity contention. See n. 13, supra.
17
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000) (“Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of
law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section . . .”); 42 U.S.C. §
9613(a) (2000) (“Review of any regulation promulgated under this chapter may be had upon
application by any interested person only in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States for
the District of Columbia.”); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(3) (2000) (“If the court finds that the selection of
the response action was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law, the
court shall award (A) only the response costs or damages that are not inconsistent with the
national Contingency Plan, . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 9624(b) (2000) (“In the case of any release or
17
actions available “only” after the referenced CERCLA lawsuits have

been brought, it could have done so.

After adding “only” to the first sentence of § 113(f)(1),

the panel revised “may” to mean “shall,” and thus rendered

contribution claims available exclusively during or following

certain CERCLA civil actions. The dissent then implicitly defines

“civil action” to include a federal administrative enforcement

proceeding but only when the administrative order is contested or

enforced in federal court. No one doubts the importance of

permitting contribution claims when administrative enforcement

actions are underway. Other courts have authorized such claims.18

But the dissent has effectively limited the availability of such

actions by requiring prior initiation of a lawsuit by the federal

government. This interpretation would be unnecessary if the

dissent had accorded the properly broad scope to the last sentence

of § 113(f)(1) and considered the first sentence, as we do, to be

threatened release referred to in paragraph (1), the owner or operator of the equipment described
in subsection (a) of this section shall be liable under this chapter only for costs or damages
primarily caused by the activities of such owner or operator.”). (emphasis added).
18
See, e.g., Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344 (6th Cir.
1998) (allowing CERCLA action for contribution to proceed after issuance of federal
administrative order but prior to initiation of suit by any party under section 106 or 107); Sun
Co., 124 F.3d at 1189 (same).
18
a statement of non-exclusive circumstances in which actions for

contribution may be brought.19

The final point of contention concerns the inter-

relationship of the first and last sentences of § 113(f)(1).

Despite the unusual syntax of this subsection, the en banc court

finds these sentences logically complementary, if somewhat unusual

in this regard. Thus, in addition to affording a particular right

of contribution in the first sentence, the provision emphasizes in

its last sentence that “nothing” shall “diminish” any other

contribution right available to the parties. This so-called

“savings provision” takes on added meaning in light of the pre-SARA

caselaw, which did not restrict common law contribution actions

until during or after proceedings or civil actions against the

party who had incurred disproportionate remediation and response

costs.

The dissent, however, is driven to a narrow view of the

“savings provision” for fear that any different reading would

vitiate the effect of the first sentence of § 113(f)(1).20 The

19
The dissent now concedes, contrary to the panel majority, that a § 113(f)(1) contribution
action may be brought before a judgment is entered, but given their restrictive reading of the
provision, that is not much of a concession.
20
See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, __, 122 S. Ct. 441,
449 (2001) (if it can be prevented, no part of a statute, not
even a word, should be rendered “superfluous, void, or
insignificant”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Dunn v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465, 472, 117 S. Ct.
913, 917 (1997) (“legislative enactments should not be construed
to render their provisions mere surplusage”).
19
dissent reads the “savings provision” to refer to actions for

contribution under state law, implicitly rejecting among other

things a construction that would preserve contribution actions

arising by federal common law under § 107. Taken together with its

exclusive view of the first sentence of § 113(f)(1), the panel’s

interpretation is at least in tension with the Supreme Court’s

description of CERCLA contribution:

Thus the statute now expressly authorizes a
cause of action for contribution in § 113 and
impliedly authorizes a similar and somewhat
overlapping remedy in § 107.

Key Tronic Corp., 511 U.S. at 816, 114 S. Ct. at 1965-66. It is

not clear that the dissent’s holding permits an implied § 107

contribution right to coexist.

This is not a situation in which the text of the savings

clause robs the first sentence of § 113(f)(1) of its meaning, as

the dissent contends. Instead, the provision was enacted as

confirmation that federal courts, in cases decided prior to SARA’s

enactment, had been right to enable PRPs to recover a proportionate

share of their costs in actions for contribution against other

PRPs. Confirmation of this sort was needed to eliminate the

uncertainty in the case law prior to SARA’s enactment as to whether

contribution was available under CERCLA at all. See OHM

Remediation Servs., 116 F.3d at 1581 (Garza, J.); New Castle County

v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1122 (3d Cir. 1997). The

first and last sentences of § 113(f)(1) combine to afford the
20
maximum latitude to parties involved in the complex and costly

business of hazardous waste site cleanups.

III. Decisions of This Court and Other Courts of Appeals
After Enactment of SARA

In numerous published cases decided after the enactment

of SARA in 1986, this and other courts of appeals have ruled on

CERCLA claims for contribution where no action had been brought

under § 106 or § 107 of CERCLA.21 Hardly any of the decisions have

21
In the following cases, no action under § 106 or § 107 --
and no federal administrative proceeding -- had been brought
before suit for contribution was initiated under § 113(f):
Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d 416 (2nd Cir. 1998) (after
negotiations with state agency, Bedford Affiliates agreed in
consent order to begin cleanup, in course of which Bedford
commenced action for contribution); Crofton Ventures Ltd. P’ship
v. G & H P’ship, 258 F.3d 292, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (Crofton
Ventures notified state agency of contamination, cleaned up
facility under agency’s “supervision,” then sued for contribution
under § 113(f)); Amoco, Inc., 889 F.3d at 672-73 (Amoco brought
action against Borden “for contribution” after being “informed”
by state agency of radioactivity); Kalamazoo River Study Group v.
Rockwell Int’l Corp., 274 F.3d 1043, 1046 (6th Cir. 2001)
(companies entered into consent order with state agency [see 107
F. Supp.2d 817, 819-20 (W.D. Mich. 2000)] to fund remedial
investigation and feasibility study, then sued other companies
for contribution under CERCLA); PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams
Co., 151 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1998) (after state agency
“required” PMC to clean up site, PMC brought suit for
contribution under § 113(f)); Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C.
Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 932-33, 935 (8th Cir. 1995) (Control Data
reported findings of contamination to state agency, entered into
consent decree with agency requiring it to investigate, monitor,
and clean up contamination, installed remediation system, and
then sued Schloff defendants for contribution); Cadillac
Fairview/California, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1024 (owner sued other PRPs for damages to cover
expenses of investigating soil pollution; no indication in opinion that owner was sued beforehand;
prior opinion in case states that testing activities were undertaken at request of state officials, 840
F.2d 691, 692-93 (9th Cir. 1988)); and Morrison Ents. v. McShares, Inc.,
2002 WL 1767540 at *1- *2 & *5 n.2 (10th Cir. Aug. 1, 2002)
21
explicitly parsed the language of § 113(f)(1),22 but that fact

weighs more in favor of than against our non-restrictive view of

(after state agency ordered Morrison to investigate
contamination, Morrison hired consulting firm, then sued McShares
for contribution under CERCLA). See also Fina, Inc. v. ARCO, 200
F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2000) (action for contribution and cost
recovery under CERCLA). Cf. New Jersey Turnpike Auth. v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 197 F.3d 96, 99-101, 104 (3d Cir. 1999) (state
agency investigated site contamination in 1980s, issued
directives to contribution defendants beginning in 1988, and
entered into consent orders with them; in 1993, Turnpike
Authority filed suit against contribution defendants; summary
judgment affirmed for defendants on unrelated grounds, but
opinion says Turnpike’s “action against other PRPs is properly
characterized as a § 113 action”).
22
One case that seems to have come close, at the very least, to deciding this question is
Pinal Creek Group, 118 F.3d 1298, rev’g 926 F. Supp. 1400 (D.
Ariz. 1996). In that case, the Pinal Group voluntarily expended resources to clean up a
waste site, then sued other PRPs for the costs of doing so. Id. at 1300; Pinal Creek Group, 926
F. Supp. at 1402 (after member of Group provided state agency with proposed action plan,
agency “approved” plan; Group was formed, then began response activities “[w]ith the approval
and under the oversight” of state agency). The Ninth Circuit rejected Pinal Creek Group’s
argument that it was entitled to bring a joint and several cost recovery action under § 107. Id. at
1303. Instead, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Group’s claim was for contribution, and that
§ 113 applied to the claim. Id at 1306. The Ninth Circuit did not accept the Group’s argument
that allowing it a cost recovery action was appropriate because it “ha[d] not incurred any liability
which would trigger” a contribution claim under § 113(f). Id. at 1305. Pinal Creek Group had
contended “that the requisite liability only attaches if the government incurs response costs,
arguing that before then, no liability exists under § 107(a), and that the Pinal Group's status as a
PRP, by itself, does not give rise to a claim for contribution.” Id. The court rejected this
argument. Although “PRP status, by itself, does not generate liability,” a PRP that incurs
"necessary costs of response" for a hazardous waste site consistent with the National Contingency
Plan thereby “bec[o]me[s] partly responsible for those costs” along with all other PRPs associated
with the site, giving rise to a right of contribution under CERCLA. Id. Cf. id. at 1306 (“Under §
107, the Pinal Group's responsibility for its own equitable share of the cleanup costs is generated
independently of any liability that might arise from response costs incurred by the government.”).
In other words, the Group was entitled to bring a claim for contribution simply because it was a
PRP that had incurred necessary costs of response consistent with the National Contingency Plan.
See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 2002 WL 1792612 at *12 (CERCLA “explicitly authorizes any PRP
that has incurred response costs to seek contribution from any other PRP.”).
22
the provision. Given the enormous monetary exposure and the volume

of litigation surrounding CERCLA mandates, one must assume that

talented attorneys have had sufficient incentive and opportunity to

explore statutory lacunae such as those created by a cramped

reading of § 113(f)(1). Yet all that existed before this case

arose are isolated dicta.23 The absence of direct precedent is like

the dog that didn’t bark.24

Moreover, the reasoning employed by the court in Sun Co.,

124 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 1997), favors our reading. In Sun Co.,

the court held that § 113(f) governs actions for contribution

brought by a PRP who had not incurred costs pursuant to a civil

action under § 106 or § 107 but was itself subject to an

administrative order under § 106. 124 F.3d at 1191. While

deciding which CERCLA statute of limitations to apply to such

claims, the court said that “PRPs who, like Plaintiffs here, incur

cleanup costs pursuant to a unilateral administrative order (or by

23
See OHM Remediation Servs., 116 F.3d at 1580 (“A § 113(f)
contribution action is derivative of an action under § 107(a), if only a pending one.”); Rumpke
of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 107 F.3d 1235, 1241
(7th Cir. 1997) (stating that CERCLA “appears” to require that an action under § 106 or
§ 107(a) be “ongoing or already completed” before § 113(f)(1) is available,” but noting that such
a reading of the statute “seems to provide a disincentive for parties voluntarily to undertake
cleanup operations”). But cf. Geraghty & Miller, Inc., 234 F.3d at 924 (describing case involving
claim for contribution under § 9613(f) as “a case that is neither a recovery claim under section
107 nor derivative of or responsive to any other formalized dispute”).
24
Arthur Conan Doyle, The Silver Blaze, in Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes _____ ( ).

23
a consent decree, or in some cases, voluntarily) potentially have

an unlimited time in which to bring their contribution claims.”

Id. (emphasis added). See also id. at 1192 (“PRPs who have

incurred costs in some other way [than being sued under § 106 or §

107] are also covered by the language of § 113(f).”).25

By creating doubt as to the meaning of § 113(f)(1), the

dissent has thrown into uncertainty more than two decades of CERCLA

practice, if the pre-CERCLA common law of contribution is included.

Such a result may not be inconceivable, but it should place a heavy

burden on the dissent to explain how its interpretation is

justified under a “plain meaning” reading of the statute.

IV. Policy Considerations

The dissent’s reading of § 113(f)(1) would also create

substantial obstacles to achieving the purposes of CERCLA -- not

only by slowing the reallocation of cleanup costs from less

culpable PRPs to more culpable PRPs26 and by discouraging the

25
The court went on to explain how reading CERCLA in this way
does not, in its view, wreak havoc with the framework set up in §
113(g) governing the limitations periods within which various
CERCLA claims may be brought. Sun Co., 124 F.3d at 1191-93.
Compare Geraghty & Miller, Inc., 234 F.3d at 924 (adopting Sun
Co.’s reasoning as to “the appropriate statute of limitations to
apply in a [CERCLA] case that is neither a recovery claim under §
107 nor derivative of or responsive to any other formalized
dispute”).
26
This court has acknowledged that allowing parties who have
been sued under CERCLA to bring contribution claims “makes

24
voluntary expenditure of PRP funds on cleanup activities,27 but by

diminishing the incentives for PRPs voluntarily to report

contamination to state agencies. According to the dissent, even if

the TNRCC had unambiguously ordered Aviall to engage in cleanup

activities, this would not have triggered Aviall’s right to

contribution under CERCLA for the costs of such activities. We do

not think these effects are required by a faithful reading of the

statute.

The dissent hypothesizes that the negative effects of its

holding would be mitigated because its reading of the last sentence

of § 113(f)(1) allows a PRP to bring an action for contribution

under state law. This is surely an inferior and questionable

remedy for Congress to have embraced. Not all states allow

contribution before the party seeking contribution has been

possible the joinder of all potentially responsible parties in a
single case, an early identification of potentially responsible
parties for purposes of settlement, and . . . a single judicial
apportionment of cleanup costs among responsible parties.” OHM
Remediation Servs., 116 F.3d at 1583. The same purposes are
achieved by allowing a PRP who has incurred cleanup costs to
bring a contribution suit before he himself has been sued.
27
“Without the ability to require contribution from other
responsible parties, the current operator may prefer to wait and
let the government perform the work.” Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C.
Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).

25
subjected to judgment.28 And those that do follow quite different

substantive and procedural rules.29 Moreover, as the dissent

28
The states vary greatly as to whether and to what extent
they allow actions for contribution. As of 2000, six of the
states, including Texas, had “contribution statutes limited to
contribution between judgment debtors.” Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 23 cmt. a reporters’ note, at
292 (2000). Texas law does provide, however, that “[a] person
who conducts a removal or remedial action that is approved by the
commission [that is, by the TNRCC, see Tex. Health & Safety Code
Ann. § 361.003(5) (2001)] and is necessary to address a release
or threatened release may bring suit in a district court to
recover the reasonable and necessary costs of that action and
other costs as the court, in its discretion, considers
reasonable.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 361.344(a) (2001).
“This right is in addition to the right to file an action for contribution, indemnity,
or both in an appeal proceeding or in an action brought by the attorney general.” Id. Louisiana
law also provides for cost recovery for hazardous substance remedial actions, but its scheme is
quite different from Texas’s. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 30:2276(G)(1) (West 2000)
(providing, inter alia, that “those participating parties who, after an initial demand [for remedial
action] is made by the secretary under R.S. 30:2275, agree to clean up the pollution source or
facility may, without the institution of a suit by the secretary under R.S. 30:2275, sue and recover
from any other nonparticipating party who shall be liable for twice their portion of the remedial
costs”). The Mississippi statutes governing disposal of solid wastes, Miss. Code Ann. § 17-17-1
et seq., do not appear to contain a provision for private cost recovery. See 57 Am. Jur. Trials 1 §
40 (2002). Cf. Miss. Code Ann. § 17-17-29(4) (1995 & Supp. 2002) (“Any person creating, or
responsible for creating, through misadventure, happenstance, or otherwise, an immediate
necessity for remedial or clean-up action involving solid waste shall be liable for the cost of such
remedial or clean-up action and the commission may recover the cost of same by a civil action
brought in the circuit court of the county in which venue may lie.”).
29
See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of
Liability § 23 cmt. a reporters’ note, at 291-92 (2000) (describing six
categories of state contribution statutes and identifying two states that “recognize contribution
without a statute”). Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000) (providing that CERCLA contribution
“claims shall be brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law”).

26
acknowledges, some courts of appeals have held that CERCLA preempts

state-law claims for contribution for environmental cleanup costs.30

Policy considerations cannot change the interpretation of

Congress’s language, but they can contribute to an understanding of

the language. This court’s understanding, like that of most courts

preceding and following enactment of § 113(f)(1), better fulfills

the statutory purposes.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the

district court and remand the case for proceedings consistent with

this opinion. This leaves to the district court, for determination

in the first instance, two issues previously left unaddressed. 263

F.3d at 137 n.3. The first issue is whether Aviall failed to give

timely notice to the EPA and the Attorney General of its action

under CERCLA. The second is whether Aviall complied with the

National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan

(NCP), 40 C.F.R. Part 300, by failing to provide adequate

opportunity for public participation. See OHM Remediation Servs.,

116 F.3d at 1583 (remanding for similar determinations).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

30
See Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 425-27; PMC, Inc., 151 F.3d at 617-18; In re
Reading Co., 115 F.3d at 1117. We express no view on the preemption question.
27
28
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge, with whom SMITH and BARKSDALE,

Circuit Judges, join, dissenting:

The majority opinion holds that a party may bring an action

for contribution under § 113(f)(1) of the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),

42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1)31, without being subject to a prior or

pending § 106 or § 107 action. Because the majority’s holding

cannot be reconciled with the text or structure of the statute, I

dissent.

The majority acknowledges the tenuous nature of its textual

analysis by characterizing § 113(f)(1) as a provision whose “syntax

is confused, its grammar inexact and its relationship to other

31
Section 113(f)(1) provides:

Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is
liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during
or following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or
under section 9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be brought in
accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving
contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among
liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines
are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right
of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a
civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of this
title.

42 U.S.C. §9613(f)(1).
-29-
CERCLA provisions ambiguous.” The text is not so opaque as the

majority opinion asserts.

The first sentence of § 113(f)(1) provides: “[a]ny person may

seek contribution from any other person who is liable or

potentially liable under [§ 107(a)], during or following any civil

action under [§ 106] or under [§ 107(a)].” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1)

(emphasis added). The majority opinion reasons that the word “may”

implies that contribution suits are permitted during the pendency

of a § 106 or § 107 cost recovery action, but that a § 106 or § 107

action is not a prerequisite to a contribution suit. This analysis

is problematic. The inclusion of the word “may” in an enabling

provision generally establishes an exclusive cause of action. See

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357, 1361 (5th Cir.

1994) (holding that the word “may,” when included as part of an

enabling provision, implies an exclusive cause of action); see also

WEBSTER THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1396 (3d ed. 1993) (defining

“may” as “shall” or “must” “esp[ecially] in deeds, contracts, and

statutes”). Thus, the word “may” in the first sentence of §

113(f)(1), the enabling provision, establishes that contribution

suits must be brought “during or following” a civil action under §

106 or § 107.

The phrase “during or following” also indicates that §

113(f)(1) is available only after a primary cost recovery action

commences. This phrase serves two purposes. First, it reflects
-30-
the general legal proposition that contribution actions do not

require the execution of a final judgment before they can be

brought. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A(1) (1977) (“[W]hen

two or more persons become liable in tort to the same person for

the same harm, there is a right of contribution among them, even

though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of

them.”(emphasis added)). Second, the phrase “during or following”

imposes a limitation on the timing of CERCLA contribution suits.

Section 113(f)(1) requires, as its language suggests, that an

initial cost recovery action commence before a contribution claim

can proceed.32

Despite the limiting language in § 113(f)(1)’s enabling

clause, the majority opinion concludes that the provision

authorizes a party to sue for contribution in any circumstance. To

justify this conclusion, the majority opinion focuses on the last

sentence of § 113(f)(1)))the savings clause.33 However, this clause

does not authorize contribution actions under any and all

circumstances. Section 113(f)(1)’s savings clause, like CERCLA’s

general savings clause, is best interpreted as expressly preserving

32
As reflected in its amicus brief to this Court, the Department of Justice, the federal
government entity charged with the enforcement of CERCLA, adopts this interpretation.
33
The savings clause provides: “Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any
person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under [§106] or [§107].”
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
-31-
state law causes of action.34 When Congress meant to preserve both

federal and state law causes of action, it said so explicitly. See

42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (CERCLA’s general savings clause provides:

“Nothing in this chapter shall affect or modify in any way the

obligations or liabilities of any person under other Federal or

State law, including common law, with respect to releases of

hazardous substances or other pollutants or contaminants”); see

also PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 617 (7th Cir.

1998) (“The purpose of CERCLA’s [general] savings clause is to

preserve to victims of toxic wastes the other remedies they may

have under federal or state law.”) (emphasis added).35

34
Congress’s inclusion of the phrase “civil action” provides support for this interpretation.
“Civil action,” as defined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has a specific meaning. FED. R.
CIV. P. 2 provides: “[t]here shall be one form of action to be known as a ‘civil action.’” When §
113(f)(1) uses the term “civil action,” it is referring to an action brought in federal court. (Thus ,
§ 113(f) permits contribution actions following an administrative remedial order only when the
government files suit in federal court under § 106 to enforce the order.) This connection is
further reinforced by § 113(f)(1)’s additional reference in the following sentence, which provides:
“Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and shall be governed by federal law.” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). The savings clause, in
contrast, references only an “action for contribution,” which, by the absence of the word “civil,”
contemplates a proceeding in a non-federal forum, such as state court.
35
Other circuit court decisions have held that the federal contribution right codified in §
113(f) preempts all state law contribution claims. See, e.g., PMC, Inc., 151 F.3d at 617-18
(holding § 113 preempts state law contribution actions); Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416,
425-27 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that § 113 preempts state law restitution and indemnification
actions); In re Reading Co., 115 F.3d 1111, 1117, 1119-20 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding CERCLA
preempts any state law contribution claims). These decisions do not conflict with the
interpretation advanced in this dissent. Following the reasoning of these courts, if a party does
not seek to utilize the federal contribution provisions, it is still free to proceed under state law.
-32-
 The practical effect of the majority opinion’s holding is that

§ 113(f)(1)’s savings clause overrides its enabling clause. In

other words, the enabling clause does nothing more than provide an

example of when a contribution action might be brought.36 This

conflicts with elementary canons of statutory construction. An

enacting sentence containing limiting language cannot be trumped by

a savings clause purporting to save all other possible causes of

action. Rather, any “repugnancy between the savings clause and the

purview does not make the enacting part void but operates to

invalidate the savings clause.” 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.12 (6th ed. 2000). The majority opinion’s

interpretation of the savings clause, however, renders the enabling

clause inoperative. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo

of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985) (citing the “elementary

canon of statutory construction that a statute should be

interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative”).

It is also important to note that § 113(f)(1) does not create

categories of liability, but rather relies on § 107(a)’s definition

of liability and simply apportions costs among the liable parties.

See, e.g., Sun Co., Inc. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187,

36
It is difficult to imagine that the drafters of § 113 deliberately included ambiguous
language in the enabling clause, and then sought to clarify its meaning though the savings clause.
Cf. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 420-21 (7th Cir. 1993) (declining to
interpret savings clause in FIRREA in a manner that would “swallow up the specific language” of
the provision).
-33-
1191 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that § 113 “is no more than a

mechanism for apportioning CERCLA-defined costs,” and also noting

that § 113 incorporates the liabilities set forth in § 107)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). Prior to the passage

of SARA, courts implied a contribution right from the language of

§ 107(a)(4)(B).37 The overall structure of CERCLA’s liability

provisions demonstrates that § 113 is merely a subset of § 107,

providing only for the allocation of CERCLA-defined liability. See

Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994) (“Section 107 sets forth the scope of

the liabilities that may be imposed on private parties and the defenses that they may assert”).38

Therefore, a § 113(f)(1) action should be contingent upon the commencement of a prior or pending

cost recovery action under § 106 or § 107.

37
CERCLA, as originally enacted, did not include an express contribution provision.
Instead, courts implied a contribution right from language in § 107(a)(4)(B). See, e.g. Walls v.
Waste Res. Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985) (“Allowing a private action to recover
response costs from responsible parties under [§ 107(a)(4)(B)] is thus consistent with both the
language of [§ 107(a)(4)(B)] and with the congressional purpose underlying CERCLA as a
whole.”). In 1986, Congress, in an effort to expedite the clean-up of hazardous waste sites,
passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (“SARA”). As part of SARA,
Congress codified the right to contribution under CERCLA in the provisions set forth in § 113.
See H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at *78-79, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861 (“It has
been held that, when joint and several liability is imposed under section 106 or 107 of the Act, a
concomitant right of contribution exists under CERCLA. . . . [§ 113(f)] clarifies and confirms the
right of a person held jointly and severally liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from other
potentially liable parties.”).
38
The majority opinion quotes language from Key Tronic, in which the Supreme Court
observed that CERLCA, as amended by SARA, “now expressly authorizes a cause of action for
contribution in § 113 and impliedly authorizes a similar and somewhat overlapping remedy in §
107.” Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 816. The Court did indeed acknowledge that both clauses provide
parties with a way to recover clean-up costs. The Court did not find, however, that both clauses
provide a way of allocating liability.
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 The structure of § 113 supports this interpretation. Section 113(g)(3), which sets out the

applicable statute of limitations for contribution actions proceeding under § 113, suggests that a

§ 113(f)(1) action cannot proceed in the absence of an initial cost recovery action. This provision sets

forth a three-year limitations period, which would begin to run following the date of judgment in a

§ 106 or § 107 action.39 Significantly, the statute is silent as to the limitations period to be applied

in the absence of a § 106 or § 107 civil action. Pursuant to the majority opinion’s interpretation of

§ 113(f)(1), courts would be required to derive from some other source the limitations period to

apply in this instance. Some courts have attempted to do just that, adopting the limitations period

for initial cost recovery actions under § 113(g)(2)40 and applying it to contribution actions proceeding

39
Section 113(g)(3) provides:

No action for contribution for any response costs or damages may be commenced
more than 3 years after--
(A) the date of judgment in any action under this chapter for recovery of
such costs or damages, or
(B) the date of an administrative order under section 9622(g) of this title
(relating to de minimis settlements) or 9622(h) of this title (relating to cost
recovery settlements) or entry of a judicially approved settlement with
respect to such costs or damages.

42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3).
40
Section 113(g)(2) provides:

An initial action for recovery of the costs referred to in section 9607 of this title
must be commenced--
(A) for a removal action, within 3 years after completion of the removal
action, except that such cost recovery action must be brought within 6
years after a determination to grant a waiver under section 9604(c)(1)(C)
of this title for continued response action; and
(B) for a remedial action, within 6 years after initiation of physical on-site
construction of the remedial action, except that, if the remedial action is
initiated within 3 years after the completion of the removal action, costs
incurred in the removal action may be recovered in the cost recovery action
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in the absence of a § 106 or § 107 action. See, e.g., Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 234

F.3d 917, 924-25 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that if there is no prior § 107 action, a § 113(f)(1)

contribution must be brought within six years); Sun Co., 124 F.3d at 1191-92 (same); United Techs.

Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 103 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that a contribution

action brought in the absence of an underlying § 106 or § 107 action must be brought within three

years of the accrual of the right to contribution because contribution and initial cost-recovery actions

are distinct remedies). Such herculean efforts are unnecessary. Section 113(g)(3)(A) provides that

no action for contribution may be commenced more than three years after “the date of judgment in

any action under this chapter for recovery of such costs or damages.” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3)(A).

There is no need to look outside of the contribution provisions in § 113(g)(3) to determine the

appropriate limitations period.41

brought under this subparagraph.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2).
41
In addition, § 113(f)(2) provides that “[a] person who has resolved its liability to the
United States or a State in an administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable
for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement.” 42 U.S.C. §
9613(f)(2). Section 113(f)(3)(B), in turn, states that “[a] person who has resolved its liability to
the United States or a State for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of
such action in an administrative or judicially approved settlement may seek contribution from any
person who is not a party to a settlement referred to in [§ 113(f)(2)].” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B).
Taken together, these two sections create a powerful mechanism to encourage settlements by
Potentially Responsible Parties (“PRPs”) by protecting parties who settle from being sued in later
contribution actions and granting a contribution right to those PRPs who enter into approved
settlements. Allowing a contribution action to proceed in the absence of a pending § 106 or §
107(a) action would undermine these incentives.
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 In sum, the plain language and statutory structure of CERCLA’s contribution provisions

demonstrate that the contribution remedy in § 113(f)(1) requires a prior or pending § 106 or § 107

action.42

The majority opinion asserts that its interpretation of § 113(f)(1) is supported by existing

precedent. However, the question presented here is one of first impression in the courts of appeals.43

42
As the majority opinion concedes, the legislative history of § 113(f)(1) does not
contradict this statutory analysis. CERCLA did not include an explicit contribution provision
until the passage of SARA in 1986. SARA’s legislative history suggests that Congress intended
to create only a limited federal contribution right when it enacted § 113(f)(1). For example, when
explaining § 113(f) to the House of Representatives, the provision was described as “confirm[ing]
a Federal right of contribution or indemnification for persons alleged or held to be liable under
section 106 or 107 of CERCLA and prohibit[ing] the assertion of such rights against a party who
has entered into a judicially approved settlement with the EPA.” H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at
*79, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N 2835, 2861 (emphasis added). As evidenced by this
statement, Congress intended there to be a prior or pending § 106 or § 107 action before a party
could seek contribution from other PRPs. Further, when the Judiciary Committee amended a
previous version of § 113(f)(1) to provide for contribution actions “during or following” a § 106
or § 107 action, the change was explained as “clarif[ying] and emphasiz[ing] that persons who
settle with the EPA (and who are therefore not sued), as well as defendants in CERCLA actions,
have a right to seek contribution from other potentially responsible parties.” H.R. REP. No. 99-
253(III), at *18, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3041. The legislative history of
§ 113(f)(1) never states that a contribution action can be brought in the absence of a prior or
pending cost recovery action. Had Congress intended to create such a broad contribution right, it
would have done so explicitly.
43
While this and other appellate courts have addressed related questions concerning the
proper interpretation of § 113(f)(1), none of them have specifically addressed the issue with which
we are confronted: whether a § 106 or § 107 action is a statutory prerequisite to a § 113(f)(1)
contribution action. See OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc., 116 F.3d 1574,
1582 n.2 (5th Cir. 1997) (permitting contribution claim against third-party defendant, but
specifically stating that the court “express[es] no opinion as to whether a party may be considered
a PRP before being sued under CERCLA”); Geraghty & Miller, 234 F.3d at 925 (analyzing the
statute of limitations provisions set forth in § 113(g)(2), and holding that a contribution action
must be commenced within three years of the completion of removal action); Crofton Ventures
Ltd. P’ship v. G&H P’ship, 258 F.3d 292, 297 (4th Cir. 2001) (permitting § 113 action to
proceed after state-ordered cleanup, but failing to specifically address the language of §
113(f)(1)); Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 424 (permitting § 113 action after state-ordered
cleanup, but never addressing what requirements are imposed by § 113's specific language); PMC,
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The handful of district courts attempting a statutory analysis of § 113(f)(1) have reached differing

conclusions.44 Thus, the case law provides no clear guidance on the interpretation of § 113(f)(1).

Inc., 151 F.3d at 618 (holding § 113 preempts recovery under state contribution law); Pinal
Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding PRP is
limited to recovery from other PRPs under § 113, and cannot utilize § 107); Rumpke of Ind., Inc.
v. Cummins Engine Co., 107 F.3d 1235, 1241 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting in dicta that “a § 106 or §
107(a) action apparently must either be ongoing or already completed before § 113(f)(1) is
available”). Because none of these circuit court decisions specifically confront the issue before us,
we reject Aviall’s contention that our interpretation conflicts with existing precedent. See
Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925) (holding that “[q]uestions which merely lurk in the
record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as
having been so decided as to constitute precedents”).
44
Several district courts have held that contribution under § 113(f)(1) is conditioned on
the existence of a prior § 106 or § 107 cost recovery action. See Estes v. Scotsman Group Inc.,
16 F. Supp. 2d. 983 (C.D. Ill. 1998); Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. IU Int’l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384,
1389 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (stating that “[d]efendants are correct that contribution is a remedy
available to parties held liable, through judgment or settlement, in some damages actions. To
receive any actual compensation through an action for contribution, the party must have been
found liable as a defendant in an earlier or pending action.”) For instance, in Estes,
a case whose facts are strikingly similar to those here, a PRP
undertook a cleanup of its contaminated property after receiving
a letter from the state environmental agency. Estes, 16 F. Supp.
2d at 989-90. Following the clean-up, the PRP filed a CERCLA
claim against the prior owner under §107(a) and § 113(f)(1). The
district court dismissed the PRP’s §107(a) cost recovery action
and then relied on the plain meaning of the statute to hold that
the plaintiff could not seek contribution under § 113(f)(1)
because the action was not “during or following” a cost recovery
suit. Id. at 989 (stating that the “[s]ection 113(f) [claim]
should be dismissed because there is no §106 or § 107 claim
pending”).
In contrast, other district courts have adopted the majority opinion’s interpretation and
held that a contribution action can proceed in the absence of a prior or pending cost recovery
action. See, e.g., Coastline Terminals of Conn., Inc. v. USX Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 203, 208 (D.
Conn. 2001) (allowing the plaintiff to assert a contribution claim under § 113(f)(1) in the absence
of a pending or adjudged § 107 civil action); Ninth Ave. Remedial Corp. v. Allis Chalmers Corp.,
974 F. Supp. 684, 691 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (finding that a “PRP can bring a section 113 action even
when no prior or pending section 106 or 107 civil actions have occurred”).
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 The majority opinion supports its analysis by focusing on policy concerns. In particular, the

majority opinion asserts that requiring the commencement of a § 106 or § 107 civil action before a

§ 113 contribution action can be brought undermines CERCLA’s goal of promoting prompt and

effective clean-ups. The majority opinion’s policy justifications ultimately amount to an assertion that

there are more effective means of promoting private clean-ups than by conditioning the availability

of § 113(f)(1) on a prior federal action or judicially approved settlement. However, when a statute’s

language and structure are clear, as in this case, it is unnecessary to consider such policy arguments.

United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989) (“[A]s long as the statutory

scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain

language of the statute.”). It is not our role to substitute our judgment for that of Congress when

weighing the effectiveness of statutory provisions. Instead, we must adhere to the contribution

scheme created by Congress.45

45
The majority opinion suggests that the interpretation advanced in this dissent violates
the axiom that laws should be construed to avoid an absurd or unreasonable result. The plain
meaning of the statute, which requires that a § 106 or § 107 action precede a contribution action
under § 113(f)(1), does not lead to an absurd result. Contribution is readily available under the
statute. The statute sets out three ways in which a party can achieve the right to seek
contribution. First, an innocent party may bring a § 107 action against a PRP. Any party named
in the § 107 action may subsequently bring a § 113 claim following the commencement of the
initial § 107 action. Second, the government may bring an abatement action in federal court
pursuant to § 106(b). At any point following the filing of the § 106 action in federal court, a
named party can seek contribution from another PRP under § 113(f)(1). Finally, a PRP who has
resolved its liability to the United States or a state in an administratively or judicially approved
settlement can seek contribution pursuant to § 113(f)(3)(B). See H.R. REP. NO. 99-253(I), at
*80, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2385, 2862 (“Parties who settle for all or part of a cleanup or its
costs, or who pay judgments as a result of litigation, can attempt to recover some portion of their
expenses and obligations in contribution litigation from parties who were not sued in the
enforcement action or who were not parties to the settlement.”). Taken together, these three
methods by which to obtain access to § 113(f)(1) effectively preserve and encourage CERCLA’s
important goals.
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 The text of § 113(f)(1) allows a contribution action only for those parties who are subject to a

prior or pending § 106 or § 107 cost recovery action. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.

Nothing in § 113(f)(1) prevents a PRP from seeking contribution under state law. Section
113(f)(1)’s savings clause specifically preserves other contribution remedies. Aviall itself has
taken advantage of state contribution law in its attempt to seek recovery of clean-up costs from
Cooper. These alternate contribution remedies may ultimately expedite clean-up of contaminated
sites by reducing the burden on the federal government to investigate and oversee all remediation
efforts.
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