Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 1, 2006.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
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NO. 14-04-01050-CR
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ORANGE RASTINE BROWN, III, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 182nd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 982,507
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
A jury found appellant, Orange Rastine Brown, III, guilty of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years= confinement. In his sole issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by admitting hearsay testimony from investigating police officers regarding statements made by two witnesses. Because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion and affirm. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
I. Background
Appellant was accused of robbing a small grocery store at gun point. Tony Nguyen, the clerk, and Hieu Le, the owner, who were both present during the robbery, could not identify the robber because his face was partially covered. However, Brodrick Rax testified that he entered the store during the robbery and recognized appellant immediately because he had known him for several months. Rax followed appellant to his house after the robbery. Based on a tip from a witness who saw appellant running from the store, police officers subsequently found appellant and Rax leaving the house. The officers took them back to the store where Nguyen and Le both identified Rax as being present during the robbery.
II. Discussion
Appellant contends the trial court erred by admitting hearsay testimony from the officers that Nguyen and Le identified Rax as being present during the robbery. Appellant contends this testimony impermissibly bolstered Rax=s claim that he saw appellant commit the crime.
Appellant=s complaint is not exactly clear. In his stated issue, he complains only that the trial court overruled his objection to the testimony of Officer Marco Lopez. At trial, the State asked Officer Lopez whether Nguyen and Le could identify Rax as being present during the robbery. The trial court overruled appellant=s hearsay objection. Officer Lopez then replied, AI don=t recall.@ Thus, any error in overruling appellant=s objection was harmless because Officer Lopez did not provide any hearsay statements. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1).
Apparently, appellant=s actual complaint is that the trial court erred by later admitting Officer Christopher Aranda=s testimony when the State asked him similar questions:
Q. Brodrick Rax was identified by Mr. Nguyen and Mr. Le back at the store, do you remember that?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And they identified him as the man that was present during the robbery?
A. Correct.
Appellant did not preserve error on this complaint because he did not object to this testimony. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Appellant seems to argue that his earlier objection to Officer Lopez=s testimony was sufficient to preserve error as to Officer Aranda=s testimony. However, to preserve error, a party must object each time inadmissible evidence is offered unless he (1) obtains a running objection, or (2) makes an objection outside the presence of the jury to all the testimony he deems objectionable. Martinez v. State, 98 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Ross v. State, 154 S.W.3d 804, 811 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref=d); see Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1). Appellant did not obtain a running objection or object outside the jury=s presence to all testimony regarding the witnesses= identification of Rax to the police officers. Therefore, appellant waived his complaint that Officer Aranda=s testimony was hearsay.
We overrule appellant=s sole issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
/s/ Charles W. Seymore
Justice
Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed August 1, 2006.
Panel consists of Justices Hudson, Fowler, and Seymore.
Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).