Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 18, 2006.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
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NO. 14-05-00187-CR
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JAMES MARTIN LANE, JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 262nd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1002477
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the offense of robbery. He was convicted, and the jury assessed punishment at ten years= confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal JusticeBInstitutional Division. In two issues, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and the trial court=s ruling on his motion to suppress. We affirm.
Background
On September 28, 2004, appellant walked into a Jack-in-the-Box restaurant and ordered two tacos. When the cashier opened the cash register, appellant demanded that she give him all the money in the register. Appellant lifted the handle of a gun from his right pants pocket and placed his finger on the trigger. The cashier put the money in a sandwich bag and gave it to appellant. As appellant drove away from the restaurant, the cashier memorized the license plate number of his vehicle and called the police. Based on the license plate number and the cashier=s description of the suspect, appellant was subsequently arrested.
The cashier identified appellant after viewing a videotaped line-up and from still photographs taken by the restaurant=s security camera. Officer James Schultea of the Houston Police Department interviewed appellant after his arrest. Appellant admitted to robbing the restaurant but claimed he did not use a weapon. At trial, appellant denied he committed the offense and testified that he only admitted to the robbery because he did not understand the seriousness of the accusation and believed incarceration would give him temporary relief from his harassing girlfriend. The jury convicted appellant and sentenced him to ten years in prison.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first issue, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for robbery. Appellant does not specify whether he is challenging the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence. In his brief, appellant asks this court to examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found him guilty of all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. This is the standard of review for legal sufficiency. See King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Appellant cites only legal sufficiency cases and neither mentions the standard of review for factual sufficiency nor cites cases concerning it. Consequently, we interpret his issue as challenging only the legal sufficiency of the evidence. See Markey v. State, 996 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
Having reviewed the record, we find the evidence legally sufficient to support appellant=s conviction. Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient because he testified that he did not rob the cashier and, although the security video shows the cashier handing him a bag, he did not ask her for money. However, the cashier testified that appellant approached her, displayed a gun, told her to give him all the money, and said he would not harm her if she did not scream. She also identified appellant through a video line-up and at trial as the robber. Further, the jury viewed a security video from the restaurant and could have identified appellant from the videotape. Finally, appellant admitted to Officer Schultea that he robbed the restaurant. Appellant also argues that, although the security video shows him with his hand on his waist, he did not have a gun, emphasizing that the police never found one. However, the cashier testified that she saw a gun in appellant=s pocket and complied with his demands because she feared for her life. Moreover, it is immaterial for a robbery conviction whether appellant used or the police located a weapon because the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon is not required. Rather, the evidence is sufficient to show robbery if the defendant placed the complainant in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 29.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2003). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that a rational trier of fact could have convicted appellant of robbery beyond a reasonable double. We overrule appellant=s first issue.
Motion to Suppress
In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling the motion to suppress his confession for two reasons. First, appellant contends his confession was involuntary because he was detained fourteen hours before giving the statement and because he only confessed to get away from his girlfriend. Second, appellant argues the confession and line-up should have been excluded because his arrest was illegal.
We review a trial court=s decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the exclusive trier of fact and judge of witness credibility. Id. An appellate court affords almost total deference to a trial court=s determination of the historical facts supported by the record, especially when the trial court=s fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Involuntary confessions offend due process only when they flow from the improper conduct of law enforcement officials. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986). To determine whether the circumstances render an accused=s statement involuntary, we ultimately must determine whether his will was Aoverborne@ by police coercion. Creager v. State, 952 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We make this determination based on the totality of the circumstances. Gomes v. State, 9 S.W.3d 373, 377 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref=d). Relevant circumstances include the length of detention, denial of access to family members or an attorney, and physical brutality. Id.
We reject appellant=s argument that his confession was involuntary because of the length of his detention and his desire to avoid his girlfriend. Article 15.17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires that one making an arrest take the accused before a magistrate without Aunnecessary delay.@ Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 15.17(a) (Vernon Supp. 2005). Failure to take an accused before a magistrate in a timely manner will not invalidate a confession, however, unless there is proof of a causal connection between the delay and the confession. Boyd v. State, 811 S.W.2d 105, 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Appellant has failed to demonstrate any connection between the State=s failure to take him before a magistrate and the statements he gave to Officer Schultea. The record shows that appellant was held approximately fourteen hours before he was taken to Officer Schultea and read his Miranda[1] warnings. There is no evidence of physical brutality or that appellant was denied access to family members. In fact, appellant was permitted to telephone his mother to tell her where her truck was located. Moreover, even an unreasonable delay in presenting an accused before a magistrate will not vitiate an otherwise voluntary confession if the individual was properly advised of his Miranda rights. Boyd, 811 S.W.2d at 125; see also County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1665, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991) (noting that, as a general rule, a forty‑eight hour delay without presentment before a magistrate is not an unnecessary delay). Furthermore, appellant=s desire to avoid his girlfriend cannot render his confession involuntary because that desire is unconnected to any police coercion. See Creager, 952 S.W.2d at 856; Gomes, 9 S.W.3d at 377. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude appellant=s statement was voluntary. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant=s motion to suppress on this basis.
Appellant further contends the statement and line-up should have been excluded because they are products of an illegal arrest. Appellant contends the State failed to show a lawful arrest because Officer Outlaw, the officer who stopped appellant for a traffic offense, did not testify. Officer Michael Skillern testified that Officer Outlaw called him and said he was pursuing a robbery suspect. According to Office Skillern, Officer Outlaw stopped appellant for a traffic violation and because his license plate number appeared on the computer as having been used in a robbery. Officer Skillern drove to the location, and when he arrived, Officer Outlaw arrested appellant for the traffic violation and suspicion of robbery.
Following Officer Skillern=s trial testimony, appellant requested a hearing on his motion to suppress the confession. During the suppression hearing, Officer Schultea testified that appellant was arrested for a traffic offense and put on hold for the robbery offense. A police officer is authorized to arrest an individual for violation of traffic laws. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 2005); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001). Although Officer Schultea=s testimony was based on the offense report, which is hearsay, such evidence is admissible in a suppression hearing. See Granados v. State, 85 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (stating that, with the exception of rules governing privileges, the rules of evidence do not apply to suppression hearings). The State, therefore, presented sufficient evidence of a lawful arrest. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying appellant=s motion to suppress. We overrule appellant=s second issue.
We affirm the trial court=s judgment.
/s/ Leslie Brock Yates
Justice
Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed May 18, 2006.
Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Yates and Guzman.
Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
[1] See Miranda v. Arizona, 396 U.S. 868, 90 S. Ct. 140, 24 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1969).