Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 2, 2006.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
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NO. 14-04-01166-CR
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CHRISTOPHER COOK, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 12
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1246505
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Appellant, Christopher Cook, pleaded guilty to the offense of driving while intoxicated. Pursuant to a plea bargain, the trial court assessed punishment at four days= imprisonment and an $800 fine. In one issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to suppress. Because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion and affirm. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
I. Standard of Review
We review a trial court=s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We defer to the trial court=s determination of facts supported by the record, especially when the fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id.; Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). If, as is the case here, the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court=s ruling and presume the trial court made the findings supported by the record that buttress its conclusion. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327B28. We review de novo the trial court=s application of law to those facts. Id. at 327.
II. Review of the Evidence
Two Houston police officers testified for the State at the suppression hearing. Officer Aguilar testified that he stopped appellant for driving fifty-one miles per hour in a thirty-five mile-per-hour zone after he observed appellant nearly strike another vehicle. When he approached appellant to inform him that he had been stopped for speeding, he detected a strong smell of alcohol. He also observed that appellant=s speech was slurred and his eyes appeared bloodshot. Officer Aguilar commenced field sobriety testing, but called another police officer, Officer Gonzalez, via radio to continue the investigation. After Officer Gonzalez arrived on the scene, Officer Aguilar left to aid other officers in the area. Officer Aguilar testified that the video equipment in his patrol car was not on and did not record the traffic stop.
Officer Gonzalez confirmed that he arrived at the scene after Officer Aguilar contacted him via radio. Officer Gonzalez testified that Officer Aguilar informed him of his initial observations, including appellant=s bloodshot eyes, the odor of alcohol, and the preliminary results of appellant=s field sobriety testing. Officer Gonzales testified that he completed the field sobriety testing based on the information he received from Officer Aguilar. Officer Gonzalez turned on his overhead camera equipment to record the tests.
Appellant testified on his own behalf. He claimed Officer Gonzalez was the officer who initially pulled him over for speeding and he did not see Officer Aguilar or any other police officer until after the field sobriety tests. Appellant testified that after he was pulled over, he told Officer Gonzalez he had not consumed any alcoholic beverages. However, he admitted at the suppression hearing that he had three glasses of wine the evening of the offense.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated that it found the officers= testimony credible and denied appellant=s motion.
III. Application of the Law to the Facts
When a police officer observes a traffic violation committed in his presence, he has probable cause to stop and detain the offender for the violation. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 2005); Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944B45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Josey v. State, 981 S.W.2d 831, 837 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref=d). Once a police officer makes a valid traffic stop, he may further detain the suspect for investigation if he develops a reasonable suspicion that another offense is being committed.[1] See Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer can articulate specific facts which, when taken along with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
Appellant argues that Officer Gonzalez could not have formed a reasonable suspicion that appellant was driving while intoxicated because the video tape shows that Officer Gonzalez commenced field sobriety testing within four or five seconds after having first approached appellant. However, Officer Gonzalez testified that he conducted the field sobriety tests based on the information provided to him by Officer Aguilar. It is well established that an officer need not rely on personal knowledge to establish probable cause or reasonable suspicion, but may act on information relayed to him by another officer. See Pyles v State, 755 S.W.2d 98, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). It is also well established that an officer=s observations of slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and a strong odor of alcohol can constitute reasonable suspicion that a driver stopped for a traffic violation has also committed the offense of driving while intoxicated. See Perales v. State, 117 S.W.3d 434, 439 (Tex. App.CCorpus Christi 2003, pet. ref=d); Rubeck v. State, 61 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 2001, no pet.). Therefore, the trial court did not err in concluding that Officer Gonzalez had reasonable suspicion to detain appellant for the purpose of conducting field sobriety tests based on the information provided to him by Officer Aguilar. Accordingly, we overrule appellant=s sole issue.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
/s/ Charles W. Seymore
Justice
Judgment Rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed May 2, 2006.
Panel consists of Justices Hudson, Frost, and Seymore.
Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
[1] The detention must be temporary and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the interference. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 302 U.S. 1, 25B26 (1968)). Here, appellant does not contend that the field sobriety tests were unreasonably related in scope to the officers= determination that appellant was intoxicated. Rather, appellant contends that Officer Gonzalez could not have developed reasonable suspicion to justify any further investigation beyond what was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the traffic stop for the speeding violation.