Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed January 10, 2006.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
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NO. 14-05-00251-CV
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JOHN WORLDPEACE, Appellant
V.
JOHN LANG AND PHILIP APODACA, Appellees
On Appeal from the 269th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 02-42081-A
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
John WorldPeace appeals from the trial court=s dismissal of his lawsuit against John Lang and Philip Apodaca. In his lawsuit, WorldPeace alleged that he was owed fees under quantum meruit for legal services he provided. The trial court dismissed the claims for want of prosecution. On appeal, WorldPeace contends that (1) his claims against Lang and Apodaca were wrongfully severed from a disbarment proceeding against him, and (2) the trial judge who dismissed his lawsuit did not have jurisdiction over the severed claims. We affirm.
Background
WorldPeace originally filed his claims against Lang and Apodaca as third party claims in a disbarment proceeding brought by the Commission for Lawyer Discipline. We affirmed the resulting judgment of disbarment in a prior opinion. WorldPeace v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline, No. 14-03-01339-CV; 2005 WL 2874786 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] Nov. 3, 2005, no pet. h.). The grounds alleged in the disbarment petition included complaints made by Lang against WorldPeace. Id. at *1. The petition was assigned to the 269th District Court. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 3.02, the Texas Supreme Court appointed an active district judge residing in a different administrative district, James R. Fry, to preside over the proceedings. Tex. R. Disciplinary P. 3.02, reprinted in Tex. Gov=t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A-1 (Vernon 1998).[1] Judge Fry subsequently severed WorldPeace=s claims against Lang and Apodaca into a separate action from the disbarment proceedings. Judge John Wooldridge, the presiding judge of the 269th District Court, then set a status conference on the severed action. When no attorneys appeared for the conference, Judge Wooldridge dismissed WorldPeace=s claims for want of prosecution.[2]
Discussion
In his first issue, WorldPeace contends that the trial court wrongfully severed his claims against Lang and Apodaca from the disciplinary proceeding. In his brief, however, WorldPeace makes no arguments and cites no authority specifically in support of this contention. Further, in his reply brief, WorldPeace states that the severance issues were amply covered in his appeal from the judgment of disbarment. Indeed, in our opinion in that appeal, we held that the trial court did not err in severing WorldPeace=s claims against Lang and Apodaca. WorldPeace, 2005 WL 2874786, at *9. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in our prior opinion, we overrule WorldPeace=s first issue in the appeal now before us.
In his second issue, WorldPeace contends that Judge Wooldridge, the presiding judge of the 269th District Court who dismissed WorldPeace=s claims against Lang and Apodaca, did not have jurisdiction over those claims. WorldPeace does not dispute that Judge Wooldridge generally has authority to hear cases filed in his court; he asserts only that because the supreme court assigned Judge Fry to preside over the disciplinary action, only Judge Fry could have jurisdiction over the severed claims against Lang and Apodaca. We disagree.
We first note that although in his briefing, WorldPeace refers to his claims against Lang and Apodaca as counterclaims, they are in actuality third party claims because Lang and Apodaca were not parties to the disciplinary action until Worldpeace filed his claims against them. See Tex. R. Disciplinary P. 3.01 (providing that petition is filed in the name of the Commission); WorldPeace, 2005 WL 2874786, at *2 n.2, *9 (finding that Lang and Apodaca were not parties to the disciplinary action until WorldPeace filed his third party claims).
Second, the Rule of Disciplinary Procedure under which Judge Fry was appointed, Rule 3.02, expressly pertains to the assignment of a judge to preside over a disciplinary case, and it does not mention third party claims raised by the responding attorney. See Tex. R. Disciplinary P. 3.02. Likewise, the order appointing Judge Fry appointed him only Ato preside in the Disciplinary Action styled The Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. John Worldpeace [sic].@ Comm=n for Lawyer Discipline v. WorldPeace, No. 02-9152 (Tex. July 30, 2002, order). Once WorldPeace=s third party claims were severed, they were no longer part of the disciplinary proceeding; thus, neither the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure nor the supreme court=s order of appointment required Judge Fry to preside over the claims as opposed to Judge Wooldridge. Accordingly, WorldPeace=s arguments to the contrary are without merit.[3] We overrule WorldPeace=s second issue.
We affirm the trial court=s order.
/s/ Adele Hedges
Chief Justice
Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed January 10, 2006.
Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Yates and Anderson.
[1] The Rules of Disciplinary Procedure have been amended effective January 1, 2004. See Tex. R. Disciplinary P., reprinted in Tex. Gov=t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A-1 (Vernon 2005). However, under the amended rules, all actions commenced prior to the effective date of the amended rules are governed by the rules in effect at the time the action was commenced. See id. 1.04. Accordingly, except for the citations in this footnote, all citations to the rules in this opinion are to the rules in effect at the time this action was commenced.
[2] The severance order in the prior proceeding expressly severed only WorldPeace=s claims against Lang and Apodaca into the present action. For the disposition of other claims and parties involved in the prior proceeding, please see our prior opinion. WorldPeace, 2005 WL 2874786, at *5-8.
[3] Additionally, Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 3.08B provides that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to disciplinary actions, except as varied by the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. See Tex. R. Disciplinary P. 3.02B. Rule 330(g) of the Rules of Civil Procedure permits district judges in counties with more than one district court to hear and determine any part of any case or proceeding pending in any of the courts. Tex. R. Civ. P. 330(g). Therefore, it is without consequence that one district judge heard the disciplinary action and another district judge heard the severed claims.