Vacated and Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 30, 2007.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
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NO. 14-06-01023-CV
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VIRGINIA PIERSON, Appellant
V.
THERESA REYNOLDS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 874973
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
In this forcible detainer action, Virginia Pierson appeals from a judgment awarding possession of an apartment to Theresa Reynolds on several grounds. Because Pierson (1) has relinquished possession of the apartment and (2) has not referenced any evidence on which to base a claim that she is entitled to current immediate possession of the apartment, we vacate the trial court=s judgment and dismiss this case as moot.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Appellant Virginia Pierson occupied an apartment rent-free in return for collecting rent payments from the other tenants in a building owned by Theresa Reynolds. On August 1, 2006, Reynolds advised Pierson in writing that Pierson should no longer collect any rent from Reynolds= tenants and Astart planning on moving elsewhere in the very near future.@ On August 2, 2006, Reynolds provided written notice to Pierson that their oral agreement Amade in 2002 in which it was agreed [Pierson] would act as manager for [Reynolds= four] apartment complex@ was terminated. Pierson was given thirty days to vacate the apartment on August 3, 2006. On September 6, 2006, Reynolds filed an eviction petition in the Harris County Precinct 2 Justice Court. After the justice court awarded possession to Reynolds, Pierson appealed to county court.[1]
Pierson filed an answer in county court, alleging Reynolds had violated an oral agreement to provide a permanent place for Pierson to live in return for Pierson=s assistance in managing and rehabilitating Reynolds= property. Pierson also contended that Reynolds violated her oral promise to repair damage to Pierson=s apartment, and that Reynolds= decision to evict Pierson was in response to Pierson=s demands that Reynolds honor her promise to rehabilitate Pierson=s apartment. Pierson further alleged that Reynolds sought to evict her because Pierson=s husband, Robert Pierson, had reported an incident involving alleged insurance fraud by Reynolds. Finally, Pierson asserted what she termed a counter claim, requesting that the court:
quash this suit and . . . make whole [Pierson] for [Reynolds=] breach of [their] legally binding verbal contract, which [Reynolds] terminated in writing, without explanation in a letter dated August 2, 2006, in order to fraudulently breech [sic] an agreement voluntarily entered into by both parties. The defendant cites the Texas Fair Trade Practices Act or any other statutes the court may deem just and fair in this matter.
After a trial de novo to the bench, the trial court awarded possession of the premises to Reynolds on November 8, 2006, noting in its judgment that a writ of possession could issue in thirty days.[2] This appeal timely followed.
II. Mootness
A forcible detainer action is intended to be a quick, simple, and inexpensive way to obtain immediate possession of property. Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006). Because the only issue in such an action is the right to actual possession of the premises, it is not intended to be a final determination of whether an eviction is wrongful. See id. at 785B87. The Texas Supreme Court has held that when a tenant no longer lives in an apartment and has no basis for claiming a current right to possession, a forcible detainer action may be rendered moot. See id. at 787. Although Reynolds does not contest our jurisdiction over this matter, we have a duty to consider if we have jurisdiction over a matter before us. See Kennedy v. Andover Place Apartments, 203 S.W.3d 496, 497 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Pierson has notified this court that she has moved out of the apartment upon which the forcible detainer action was based. Thus, based on the Texas Supreme Court authority cited above, we must first consider whether Pierson has asserted any basis for a current right to possession so that her appeal has not been rendered moot. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787.
Pierson presents the following issues for our review: (1) the trial court erred by acting as both judge and attorney for Reynolds; (2) the trial court intentionally destroyed evidence produced at trial; (3) the trial court refused to allow a party to the suit (Robert Pierson) to defend himself or cross-examine Reynolds; (4) the trial court allowed Reynolds to slander Robert Pierson; (5) the trial court=s decision was contrary to the law; and (6) the trial court failed to rule on Pierson=s motion for relief presented without objection.[3] None of these complaints have any bearing on Pierson=s right to actual possession of the premises, nor does appellant=s briefing to this court shed further light on this issue.
Moreover, Pierson=s claim that Reynolds violated their Alegally binding verbal contract@ is not supported by our record. Instead, the record reflects that Reynolds provided written notice to Pierson terminating their oral management agreement and provided Pierson thirty days in which to vacate the apartment prior to filing her eviction petition. Pierson has not claimed or offered any evidence that she occupied this apartment under any sort of lease, written or oral, requiring more than thirty days= notice to terminate. Under these circumstances, we discern no legal basis under which Pierson may successfully assert a current right to possession of the apartment, and she has raised none. Thus, because Pierson has vacated the premises and has no bases on which to assert a current right to possession, this appeal of the forcible detainer action has been rendered moot. See id. at 787B90. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court=s judgment and dismiss this appeal as moot. See id. at 787.
III. Conclusion
Pierson=s appeal is moot as to the issue of possession and no exception applies to warrant consideration of this appeal on its merits. We vacate the trial court=s judgment, and dismiss this appeal as moot.
/s/ Wanda McKee Fowler
Justice
Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed August 30, 2007.
Panel consists of Justices Anderson, Fowler, and Frost.
[1] An appeal bond was set at $720.00, but Pierson filed an uncontested Affidavit of Inability to Pay Costs for Appeal.
[2] Although Robert Pierson=s name appears on the notice of appeal, the judgment of the county civil court at law was against Virginia Pierson only.
[3] Contrary to the first, third, and fourth issues, which we construe as complaints regarding the overall fairness of the trial court proceedings, our review of the record indicates the trial judge attempted to craft an equitable solution in the face of the parties= open animosity and hostility towards each other and their seemingly limited understanding of the judicial process. Those items that Pierson asserts were intentionally destroyed or are missing from the recordCi.e., her answer, her pauper=s affidavit, and her motion for reliefCare all actually included in our record. Additionally, Pierson=s motion for relief was presented to the trial court at the conclusion of the bench trial. Nothing indicates that this motion was properly filed with the trial court, and it was instead entered into evidence as an exhibit without objection by either party. After carefully reviewing the record in this case, we are satisfied that these complaints are without merit. Moreover, Pierson cites no legal authority in support of any of these issues, nor has she provided any citations to the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f), (h). Under these circumstances, none of these issues suffice to breathe life into an appeal that has been otherwise rendered moot. Cf. Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at787B90.