Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 14, 2007.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
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NO. 14-06-00837-CR
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MANUEL FUENTES MEJIA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 337th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1084702
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
A jury convicted appellant, Manuel Fuentes Mejia, of aggravated robbery and sentenced him to fifteen years= confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. On appeal, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Because the evidence is sufficient to support appellant=s conviction, we affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
At around 11:00 p.m. on February 28, 2006, the complainant, Rangel Mendoza, and his wife and their baby daughter were doing laundry at a laundromat in the North Houston area. While they were sitting in their minivan outside the building waiting for their clothes to dry, a truck pulled up behind them. Several men,[1] including appellant, approached their minivan; one man tapped on the driver=s side window with a black gun, and appellant stood at the passenger=s side window. The armed man on Mendoza=s side of the minivan took Mendoza=s wallet and ordered him out of the vehicle. As Mendoza exited the minivan, that individual climbed into the driver=s seat. Mendoza=s wife, who was holding their baby, then exited the vehicle. Appellant and another co-actor escorted Mendoza and his family into the laundromat; both of the assailants were armed with Apistols.@
Once inside, Mendoza and his family initially were ordered to the back of the building, while appellant and his co-actor remained at the front counter with a laundromat employee. However, appellant=s armed accomplice soon went to the back and forced Mendoza to the front counter area to try to open a coin machine. Mendoza was unable to open the machine. While Mendoza was at the counter, he saw appellant holding the laundromat employee at gunpoint. Appellant threatened to kill the employee if he did not open the coin machine. Appellant=s armed co-actor fired his gun into the floor when appellant made this threat. After they took the money from the cash register and were unable to access the money in the coin machine despite their threats, appellant and his accomplice left the scene in Mendoza=s minivan.
Several hours later, appellant ran a stop sign while driving the minivan. When a police officer attempted to initiate a traffic stop, appellant refused to stop. He instead sped up, veered across the street into the opposite lane of traffic, and drove over a curb into a nearby empty field. When the van came to a stop, appellant and his passenger fled from the vehicle, evading the officer on foot even though the officer ordered them to stop. The officer managed to capture the passenger, but appellant eluded him. After numerous other officers arrived as back-up, including a K-9 unit, a police dog discovered appellant hiding in the field underneath some grass. Appellant was arrested, and police verified the minivan belonged to Mendoza and recovered some of Mendoza=s property inside.
Appellant was charged by indictment with the offense of aggravated robbery. On September 18, 2006, a jury found him guilty as charged. The jury assessed punishment at fifteen years= confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. Appellant timely filed notice of appeal.
II. Issues and Analysis
Appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove that he committed the offense of aggravated robbery as alleged in the indictment because there is no evidence to support a finding that he intentionally and knowingly threatened and placed the complainant in fear of imminent bodily injury and death, as charged in the indictment.
A. Legal Sufficiency
In his first issue, appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Specifically, he contends that the State failed to prove that appellant, acting as a principal or party to the offense, intentionally and knowingly threatened or placed the complainant, Mendoza, in fear of imminent bodily injury and death.[2]
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Mason v. State, 905 S.W.2d 570, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). A person commits robbery if, in the course of committing theft and with the intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he intentionally and knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. Tex. Penal Code ' 29.02(a)(2). To prove the offense of robbery, there must have been actual or threatened violence to the person, or intimidation of such a nature that the threatened or injured party was put in fear. Green v. State, 567 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Jones v. State, 467 S.W.2d 453, 454 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). The fear must be of such nature as in reason and common experience is likely to induce a person to part with his property against his will. Green, 567 S.W.2d at 213 (quoting Jones, 467 S.W.2d at 454). Finally, threats that are sufficient to place one in fear of bodily injury or death can take the form of words or conduct. See McGowan v. State, 664 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); see also Donoho v. State, 39 S.W.3d 324, 329 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 2001, pet. ref=d).
In this case, the jury was authorized to convict appellant either as a principal or a party to the offense of aggravated robbery. A person may be found guilty as a party to an offense if he is criminally responsible for the conduct of the person who committed the offense. Tex. Penal Code ' 7.01(a). A person is criminally responsible for the offense committed by another=s conduct if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. Id. ' 7.02(a)(2). Circumstantial evidence may be used to show that a person is a party to an offense. Thomas v. State, 915 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref=d). The circumstantial evidence must show that at the time of the offense, the parties were acting together, each contributing some part toward the execution of their common purpose. Id. at 599B600. In determining whether a defendant was a party, the court may examine the events occurring before, during, and after the commission of the offense. Id. at 600.
Here, the State established that appellant and his co-actors trapped Mendoza and his family in his minivan and stole his wallet. Then, according to both Mendoza and his wife, he and his family were forced out of their minivan and into the laundromat. Once inside the laundromat, appellant, brandishing a gun, threatened to kill another individual. While appellant was making this threat, Mendoza was being held by one of appellant=s armed co-actors in close proximity to appellant. Furthermore, the co-actor holding Mendoza at gunpoint actually fired his gun into the laundromat floor in support of appellant=s threats. Many of these events were recorded on a surveillance camera, the videotape of which was played for the jury. In addition, Mendoza specifically testified that he was afraid either appellant or his co-actorCboth of whom were armedCwas going to kill him, a reasonable concern under these circumstances. Finally, appellant and his co-actor used Mendoza=s minivan as a getaway vehicle. Several hours after the robbery at the laundromat, appellant was found driving the stolen vehicle. When a police officer attempted to stop him for running a stop sign, appellant evaded the officer, even fleeing on foot after he drove the minivan into a field.
Appellant focuses his legal sufficiency argument on his contention that there is no evidence that appellant threatened Mendoza. However, contrary to appellant=s position, the State was not required to establish that appellant threatened Mendoza. Instead, the State was required to establish that appellant threatened or placed Mendoza in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. See Tex. Penal Code ' 29.02(a)(2). Moreover, because the jury was instructed on the law of parties, the jury could have convicted appellant as either a principal or a party to this offense; i.e., the jury could have determined that either appellant or his co-actor placed Mendoza in fear of bodily injury or death. See id. ' 7.01(a). In light of the evidence, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant, acting as either a principal or a party, intentionally and knowingly placed Mendoza in fear of imminent bodily injury or death while committing theft. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Mason, 905 S.W.2d at 574. We overrule appellant=s first issue.
B. Factual Sufficiency
In his second issue, appellant contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction. Again, appellant claims there is no evidence to support a finding that he intentionally and knowingly threatened and placed the complainant in fear of imminent bodily injury and death.
When conducting a factual-sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light. See Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). We may set the verdict aside if: (1) the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust; or (2) the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414B15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
The evidence that supports the verdict has already been set out in detail in response to appellant=s legal sufficiency challenge. Most importantly, appellant and his co-actors forced the complainant, Mendoza, and his wife and infant daughter, out of their minivan and into the laundromat after taking Mendoza=s wallet from him. Once inside, appellant and one of his co-actors brandished guns, threatened to kill a laundromat employee, and took money from the cash register. Appellant=s accomplice even fired his weapon into the floor to substantiate appellant=s threat to the employee. After taking money from the cash register and making several unsuccessful attempts to open a coin machine, appellant and his accomplice ran out of the laundromat and used Mendoza=s minivan as a getaway vehicle.
Although appellant does not identify any evidence negating these facts, our review of the record reveals the following evidence unfavorable to the verdict: (1) no guns were found in the minivan after appellant was apprehended; (2) no fingerprint evidence ties appellant to the offense; (3) appellant did not resist arrest; and (4) Mendoza=s wife was unable to identify appellant in a photo array.[3] However, appellant neither contests his presence during the offense nor that he and his co-actor were armed with guns, instead focusing his argument on the lack of proof of an Aovert@ threat made by appellant to Mendoza. But as discussed in our legal sufficiency analysis above, an Aovert@ threat is not an element of the offense of robbery. And although it is unclear from our record whether Mendoza was Aplaced in fear@ by appellant or his co-actor,[4] the jury was authorized to convict appellant as either a principal or a party to this offense. Finally, as noted above, the jury could have based its verdict on its determination that either appellant or his co-actor placed Mendoza in fear of his life. Viewing all the evidence in a neutral light, we cannot say the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust or that the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414B15. Accordingly, we overrule appellant=s second issue.
III. Conclusion
Having overruled both appellant=s legal and factual sufficiency issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
/s/ Wanda McKee Fowler
Justice
Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed August 14, 2007.
Panel consists of Justices Anderson, Fowler, and Frost.
Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
[1] According to Mendoza, four men were involved in this incident, but two of the men remained outside with the vehicles while appellant and another man went inside the laundromat.
[2] Appellant does not dispute that a firearm, the aggravating element here, was used or exhibited during the commission of this offense. A person commits aggravated robbery if, when committing robbery, he uses or exhibits a deadly weapon. Tex. Penal Code ' 29.03(a)(2). A firearm is a deadly weapon. Id. ' 1.07(a)(17)(A).
[3] Unlike his wife, Mendoza was able to identify appellant in a photo array. Moreover, his wife testified that she was so scared during the robbery that she did not look at any of the actors= faces.
[4] On direct examination, the following exchange occurred between Mendoza and the prosecutor:
[the State]: Did you think that the defendant was going to hurt you or your family that night?
[Mendoza]: When they saw that they couldn=t open the register, the one who came before me to break it, he fired a shot; and I did believe that he was going to kill me.
On cross-examination, appellant questioned Mendoza as follows:
[Appellant]: Is [appellant] the same person who pointed a gun at you and told you: I=m going to kill you?
[Mendoza]: No, sir. No, sir. They did point a gun at me, but at no time did they tell me they were going to kill me. I thought that he was going to kill me after the first shot.