Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 17, 2007.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
____________
NO. 14-05-01085-CR
____________
WILLIAM PATRICK JEFFERSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 208th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 985,653
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Appellant, William Patrick Jefferson, was found guilty by a jury of the capital murder of his five year-old stepson. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. '' 19.02(b)(1), 19.03(a)(8) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2006). The trial court assessed punishment at incarceration for life in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. In three issues, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence, and the trial court=s order denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
Appellant and Amanda Brewer (ABrewer@) lived together with their three-month-old infant, D.J., and Brewer=s five-year-old son, Anthony. Brewer is moderately mentally retarded.[1] At approximately 2:00 p.m. on April 24, 2004, appellant and Brewer brought Anthony to the emergency room at Memorial Hermann Northwest Hospital. Anthony was unresponsive. His pupils were fixed and dilated; his pulse and respirations were slow. Anthony had eighty-eight separate injuries, including a human bite mark on his face. Anthony had bruises on his head, face, shoulders, chest, back, legs, feet, and genitals. A CT scan of Anthony=s head revealed that he had recently suffered three separate traumatic head injuries, causing his brain to bleed and swell. Appellant told nurses he had been Awrestling@[2] with Anthony earlier in the day. Hospital personnel immediately suspected child abuse and contacted HPD.
HPD Officer Ronald Olivo detained appellant and Brewer at the hospital and called for additional officers to assist in the investigation. HPD homicide detective Clarence Douglas arrived at the hospital approximately thirty minutes later. Douglas interviewed medical personnel at the hospital and arrested appellant. At approximately 9:00 p.m., Douglas interviewed appellant at the offices of HPD Homicide Division. During the interview, Appellant told Douglas that Anthony had been in trouble for defecating in a trash can in the bathroom at his residence sometime during the prior night. Appellant stated that he disciplined Anthony by spanking his buttocks with a house shoe sometime before 10:00 a.m. Appellant stated that after disciplining Anthony, appellant prepared breakfast and Anthony ate. Appellant told Douglas that he and Anthony started Aplaying@ at approximately 10:00 a.m. Appellant stated:
Well we was wrestlin, I was throwin him down. Wasn=t no punches or nothing like that. That=s all I was just wrestlin and throwin him down on the mattress in his bedroom. I don=t know if y=all took pictures or not, but y=all see the mattress is on the floor. I did not throw him on the floor. I threw him on the mattress. But I did not think it would hurt him and apparently it did. I apologize for that.
In response to further questioning by Douglas, appellant stated that Anthony=s injuries must have occurred while he and Anthony were playing Arough,@ and no one else was in the room when Anthony was injured:
I did not spank him too hard. I guess when I slammed him and, and slammin him on that mattress that=s the only time it could have happened. . . . I=m not sayin I wasn=t playin with him, and I=m not sayin I wasn=t playin with him rough. . . . Amanda wasn=t in the room, it was just me and Anthony. . . . All I, all I did was body slam him on the mattress.
Appellant stated that after he and Anthony finished playing, he gave Anthony a bath and put him in bed for a nap. Anthony was not able to sit up in the bath tub and started Abreathing bad.@ After putting Anthony in bed, appellant left the house to give his friend a ride. When appellant returned, Anthony was bleeding from his mouth and nose. Appellant and Brewer took Anthony to Memorial Hermann Hospital. Anthony was transferred to Texas Children=s Hospital where he was pronounced dead at 7:52 a.m. on April 25, 2004. A Harris County grand jury indicted appellant for capital murder. The indictment alleged appellant intentionally and knowingly caused the death of Anthony, an individual under six years of age, Aby striking [Anthony] with an unknown object@ and by Astriking [Anthony] against an unknown object with his hands.@ The audiotape of appellant=s statement to Douglas, and a written transcript of the statement, were admitted into evidence at appellant=s trial and published to the jury.
Debra Tyler and Brenda Stewart, nurses at Memorial Hermann Hospital, testified they treated Anthony in the emergency room. Tyler and Stewart testified appellant told them he had been wrestling with Anthony earlier in the day. Tyler and Stewart further testified, based on their experience, that neither Brewer nor appellant reacted normally to the news that Anthony=s injuries could be fatal. Brewer did not seem to understand what was happening and displayed little emotion. Appellant began pacing back and forth in the hallway outside of the emergency room, but did not cry.
Dr. Samuel Smiley, the radiologist on call at Hermann Hospital, testified he reviewed CT scans of Anthony=s head and abdomen. Smiley testified Anthony suffered three separate blows to the outside of his head, each blow coming from a different direction. All of Anthony=s head injuries were recent and consistent with trauma occurring between 9:00 and 11:00 a.m. on April 24. Smiley testified the CT scan of Anthony=s head showed brain hemorrhaging and swelling consistent with Amultiple falls or multiple hits.@ The amount of force required to cause each of the subdural hematomas present on the CT scan was equal to the force generated by a fall onto a concrete floor from a height of five to six feet, at minimum. Smiley testified Anthony=s head injuries would likely have rendered him unconscious. Smiley further testified Anthony=s abdominal scan showed three contiguous rib fractures on the left side of his back, with an underlying injury to his lung. A Avery severe blow@ would have been required to cause the injuries to Anthony=s ribs and lung. Smiley testified the injuries shown in Anthony=s CT scans were more consistent with child abuse than anything else.
Dr. Jorge Bu, the pediatrician in charge of the intensive care unit at Texas Children=s Hospital, testified Anthony=s head injuries were consistent with severe trauma occurring within twelve hours of his arrival at Hermann Hospital. Bu testified Anthony=s head injuries were caused by impacts with a hard surface and would have rendered him incapacitated Apretty much immediately.@ Bu further testified Anthony=s injuries were not consistent with accidental trauma; rather, they were Aconsistent with an inflicted injury by an adult-sized individual.@
Dr. Michelle Lyn, a board certified doctor of pediatric emergency medicine and expert on the subject of child abuse, testified Anthony=s injuries were not consistent with play fighting or accidental trauma. Lyn testified that a Aforceful impact,@ such as a motor vehicle accident at a speed of sixty miles per hour, was required to cause the type of head injuries sustained by Anthony.
Dr. Dwayne Wolf, a board certified forensic pathologist and deputy chief medical examiner for Harris County, testified about the results of Anthony=s autopsy. Wolf testified Anthony=s death was caused by injuries to his head. The manner of death was homicide. Anthony had eighty-eight separate injuries, including a human bite mark on his face and bruises Aall over@ his body. Autopsy results showed multiple head impacts and subdural hematomas consistent with an adult person striking the child=s head against an object Aat or around the time of the child=s demise.@ None of the fatal head injuries showed evidence of healing.
Amanda Brewer testified she moved in with appellant and gave birth to D.J. during January of 2004. Anthony lived with his grandmother until March, then moved in with appellant and Brewer. Brewer testified Anthony was a Aslow learner@ and was unhappy about living with appellant. Approximately one week before his death, Anthony smeared feces around the bathroom in their apartment. Brewer testified appellant became angry, spanked Anthony with a house shoe, and made him clean the bathroom. Brewer testified appellant also spanked Anthony on prior occasions for wetting his bed and urinating on the couch. Brewer testified she saw appellant bite Anthony=s face a few days prior to Anthony=s death, and appellant stated he bit Anthony because he wanted to hear him cry.
Brewer testified that sometime after she fell asleep on the night of Friday, April 23, Anthony went into the bathroom and defecated in the trash can. Brewer testified appellant brought the trash can into the bedroom and woke her up to show her what Anthony had done. Brewer got out of bed at approximately 10:00 a.m. on Saturday. Appellant and Anthony were already awake. She watched Anthony eat a bowl of Spaghettios at the kitchen table, then told him to go brush his teeth. Brewer asked appellant to punish Anthony for defecating in the trash can and told appellant not to spank Anthony Atoo hard.@ Brewer testified she did not intend for appellant to beat Anthony. Brewer went into the kitchen while appellant and Anthony went into Anthony=s bedroom. Brewer testified she heard Anthony say, ANo more dukey in the trash, I dukey in the toilet.@ Next, she heard the sound of appellant Awhipping him,@ and heard Anthony crying Ano more, no more.@ Brewer testified she heard a Aloud bang . . . like if I hit something hard, like, you could hear it from the wall of the kitchen.@ Brewer went into Anthony=s bedroom and saw Anthony lying on the floor. Anthony=s head was on a mattress and the rest of his body was on the floor. Anthony was limp and unresponsive at all times thereafter. Appellant told Brewer that he and Anthony had been Aplay fighting.@ Brewer testified appellant was Alooking guilty@ and reacted as though he had dome something wrong.
Brewer testified Anthony was having difficulty breathing and appellant gave him CPR. Anthony urinated on his clothing, and appellant put Anthony in the bathtub to wash him off. Brewer testified Anthony=s eyes were open, but he could not sit up, move, or speak. Appellant dressed Anthony and laid him on the bed in the master bedroom. Thereafter, appellant left the house to give his friend a ride. Brewer testified that when appellant returned, they went into the bedroom and saw blood coming from Anthony=s nose. Brewer testified they drove Anthony to the hospital, and appellant told her to Amake a lie up@ if they asked her what happened.
Appellant testified that Anthony lived with appellant and Brewer for less than one month before his death, and appellant had disciplined Anthony on one or two prior occasions. Appellant testified Anthony usually spent the weekends with his grandmother and returned home with marks on his body. Appellant testified that on the weekend prior to his death, Anthony returned from his grandmother=s house with Aquite a few@ marks on his body. Appellant further testified he saw Brewer spank Anthony on several occasions.
Appellant testified Anthony defecated in the trash can in the bathroom sometime during Friday night. Appellant woke Brewer up to show her what Anthony had done, then cleaned the bathroom and went to bed. Appellant testified he was not angry. Appellant prepared breakfast for Anthony on Saturday morning. Appellant testified that after Anthony ate breakfast, appellant went into Anthony=s bedroom and spanked Anthony with a house shoe to punish him for defecating in the trash can. Appellant testified he went into the living room to watch television, then went back into Anthony=s bedroom and Aplayed with him.@ Appellant testified he was picking Anthony up and swinging him around. Appellant testified: AWe just was playing, I was throwing him on the mattress. . . . Then what happened, he lost his breath or whatever because he couldn=t - he wasn=t breathing too good. Then Amanda came in there and told me to stop playing with him so rough. I had forgotten he had asthma.@ Appellant testified that throwing Anthony onto the mattress was not part of his punishment.
Appellant testified that Brewer treated Anthony with an asthma inhaler and Anthony started breathing normally. Thereafter, appellant testified, Awe was in there talking, I was swinging [Anthony] around while Amanda was talking to me. She had [D.J.], I had Anthony and he peed on my shirt. Then I took him in the bathroom and gave him a bath.@ Contrary to his statement to detective Douglas, appellant testified Anthony was able to move his arms and legs and speak while appellant bathed him. Appellant testified that after bathing Anthony, he put Anthony in bed and laid down beside him. Next, appellant testified, he left the house for fifteen or twenty minutes to give his friend a ride to the barber shop. Appellant testified that when he returned, he went into the bedroom and saw Anthony bleeding from the mouth and nose. Appellant testified he gave Anthony CPR, then drove him to the hospital.
Appellant called sixteen witnesses to testify, twelve of whom were friends or relatives who testified they never saw appellant mistreat any child. One of appellant=s witnesses, Carlotta Gonzales, was appellant=s former girlfriend. Gonzales testified that when she and appellant ended their relationship, appellant grabbed her by the throat and choked her, lifting her feet up off of the ground.
The jury found appellant guilty of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced appellant to incarceration for life. This appeal followed.
Discussion
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Appellant=s Motion to Suppress
In his third issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his oral statement to detective Douglas. Appellant argues his statement should have been suppressed because it was the product of a warrantless arrest made without probable cause. The State argues testimony at the suppression hearing established that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe appellant had committed an assault resulting in bodily injury to a family member, thereby justifying the warrantless arrest of appellant pursuant to article 14.03(a)(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.03(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
A bifurcated standard of review is applied to a trial court=s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). An appellate court affords almost total deference to a trial court=s determination of historical facts supported by the record, especially when the trial court=s findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. The appellate court affords the same amount of deference to a trial court=s ruling on mixed questions of law and fact if the resolution of those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. The court reviews de novo those questions not turning on credibility and demeanor. Id. At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the exclusive trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Mason v. State, 116 S.W.3d 248, 256 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref=d).
When, as here, the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the court=s ruling and assume the court made implicit findings of fact that support its ruling as long as those facts are supported by the record. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). If the trial judge=s decision is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case, the decision will be sustained. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855B56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
A. Who Was the Arresting Officer?
Douglas was the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing. During direct examination, Douglas testified he was dispatched to Memorial Hermannn Hospital at approximately 4:15 p.m. on April 24. Upon arrival, Douglas spoke to the first HPD officer on scene, as well as the nurses and medical personnel who were treating Anthony. Douglas testified that he subsequently took appellant into custody, advised appellant of his Miranda rights, and instructed another HPD officer to transport appellant to a different location. On cross-examination, Douglas gave the following testimony:
[defense counsel]: Sergeant Douglas, where at the hospital did you come into contact with Mr. Jefferson?
[Douglas]: Mr. Jefferson was seated in the rear seat of one of the patrol cars.
[defense counsel]: So it wasn=t actually in the hospital, it was on the outside somewhere?
[Douglas]: Yes, sir.
[defense counsel]: So someone had already arrested him?
[Douglas]: He was in the back seat of one of the patrol cars; yes, sir.
Based solely on Douglas=s response to the leading question asked by appellant=s trial counsel, appellant argues that he was under arrest prior to the time when Douglas arrived at the hospital.[3] Douglas=s testimony that appellant was Ain the back seat of one of the patrol cars@ is consistent with either an investigative detention or an arrest. Myers v. State, 203 S.W.3d 873, 884 (Tex. App.CEastland 2006, pet. ref=d); Francis v. State, 896 S.W.2d 406, 411B12 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 1995), pet. dism=d, 922 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Based on the evidence introduced at the suppression hearing, and the trial court=s order denying appellant=s motion to suppress, we find that the trial court implicitly ruled that Douglas was the arresting officer. See Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 328. Viewed in totality, Douglas=s testimony does not establish that appellant was already under arrest when Douglas first encountered appellant. Rather, Douglas=s testimony that he took appellant into custody, Mirandized appellant, and instructed another officer to transport appellant, supports the trial court=s finding that Douglas was the arresting officer.
B. Did Detective Douglas Have Probable Cause to Arrest Appellant?
In reviewing a warrantless arrest to determine the existence of probable cause, we look to the facts known to the officer at the time of the arrest. Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer=s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a particular person has committed or is committing an offense. Id. at 413. Whether probable cause exists is determined by applying a Atotality of the circumstances@ test. Id. Probable cause requires more than mere suspicion but far less evidence than that needed to support a conviction or even that needed to support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence. Hughes v. State, 24 S.W.3d 833, 838 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). An officer need not have personal knowledge of an offense, and may rely on reasonably trustworthy information provided by another person in making a probable cause assessment. Astran v. State, 799 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
Appellant contends Douglas=s testimony at the suppression hearing was conclusory and inadequate to establish probable cause because Douglas did not testify to any facts from which the trial court could independently determine the existence of probable cause to arrest.[4] We disagree. Douglas testified he was aware that hospital personnel had made an initial report of child abuse. Upon arrival at the hospital, Douglas spoke to the first HPD officer on scene, and the nurses and medical personnel who were treating Anthony.
Douglas testified he was informed by doctors and medical personnel that Anthony was a five-year-old child with injuries caused by non-accidental trauma. Douglas learned that Anthony had been transported to the hospital by appellant and Brewer. Douglas also learned from medical personnel that Anthony was appellant=s stepson, and Anthony and appellant resided in the same household. Douglas testified he was informed that appellant made statements to hospital personnel indicating appellant was with Anthony when the injuries occurred. Douglas testified he spoke to appellant and appellant did not seem to be emotional or upset about Anthony=s injuries. Douglas testified that the information he obtained from individuals at the hospital led him to believe that Anthony had been assaulted by appellant.
We hold that under the totality of the circumstances, Douglas had probable cause to arrest appellant based on reasonably trustworthy information indicating that appellant had assaulted Anthony. See Astran, 799 S.W.2d at 764 (holding police officers may rely on reasonably trustworthy information obtained form lay citizens in determining whether probable cause for an arrest exists). Accordingly, appellant=s statement to Douglas was not the product of an illegal arrest and the trial court did not err in denying appellant=s motion to suppress. Appellant=s third issue is overruled.
II. The Evidence is Legally and Factually Sufficient
In his first and second issues, appellant argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove that he was the person who caused the injuries to the child.
A. Standards of Review
In a legal sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The jury, as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of a witness=s testimony. Jones v. State, 984 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). We do not engage in a second evaluation of the weight and credibility of the evidence, but only ensure the jury reached a rational decision. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Harris v. State, 164 S.W.3d 775, 784 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref=d).
In a factual sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in a neutral light. Prible v. State, 175 S.W.3d 724, 730B31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The evidence may be factually insufficient in two ways. Id. at 731. First, when considered by itself, evidence supporting the verdict may be so weak the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Id. Second, where the evidence both supports and contradicts the verdict, the contrary evidence may be strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. Id. In conducting a factual sufficiency review, we must employ appropriate deference so that we do not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Our analysis must consider the evidence appellant claims is most important in allegedly undermining the jury=s verdict. Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
B. Analysis
A person commits capital murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual under six years of age. Tex. Penal Code Ann. '' 19.02(b)(1), 19.03(a)(8). The identity of the perpetrator of an offense can be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Earls v. State, 707 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.CAustin 2000, pet. ref=d).
Appellant argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove he was the person who caused Anthony=s injuries because no one saw him injure the child. Appellant further argues the evidence shows either appellant or Brewer could have committed the crime and, therefore, is insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant contends the evidence shows that Brewer was alone with Anthony for approximately twenty minutes during the time when the child was fatally injured. Appellant also directs us to the following evidence which he claims is contrary to the jury=s verdict: (1) appellant=s testimony that he did not hurt Anthony, (2) the testimony of twelve defense witnesses who testified they had seen appellant with children on prior occasions and never saw him mistreat any child, and (3) testimony that Brewer did not have an emotional response after being informed of the seriousness of Anthony=s injuries.
The jury=s verdict that appellant caused the fatal injuries to the child in this case is supported by appellant=s statement to Douglas, Brewer=s testimony, and the testimony of numerous medical experts, all of which are recounted in the Factual and Procedural Background section above. Appellant told Douglas that the only time Anthony=s injuries could have occurred was when appellant was Aslamming@ him. Appellant also stated that he was alone in the room with Anthony when his injuries occurred. Appellant further stated that Anthony was not able to sit up in the bathtub and began having difficulty breathingCall of which occurred before appellant left Anthony alone in the apartment with Brewer. Brewer testified she heard the sound of appellant Awhipping@ Anthony in the bedroom, then heard a loud banging noise. Brewer testified Anthony was limp and unresponsive at all times thereafter. Medical experts, including Dr. Bu and Dr. Smiley, testified that Anthony would have been incapacitated immediately after receiving the fatal head injuries.
In his appellate brief, appellant directs us to portions of his testimony at trial which are contradicted by the testimony of Brewer and appellant=s own statement to Douglas. The jury may believe or disbelieve all or part of any witness=s testimony. Jones, 984 S.W.2d at 257. Reconciliation of any conflicts in the evidence falls within the exclusive province of the jury. Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500, 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc). Thus, the jury was entitled to believe Brewer=s testimony and appellant=s statement to Douglas, or any portions thereof, regardless of conflicting testimony offered by appellant at trial.
We have reviewed the entire record in this case. When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find the evidence supports a determination beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Anthony. See Salinas, 163 S.W.3d at 737. When considering all the evidence in a neutral light, we find that the contrary evidence is not so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met, nor is the evidence supporting the verdict so weak it is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. See Prible, 175 S.W.3d at 730B31. The evidence is legally and factually sufficient. Accordingly, we overrule appellant=s first and second issues.
Conclusion
Having overruled each of appellant=s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
/s/ John S. Anderson
Justice
Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed May 17, 2007.
Panel consists of Justices Yates, Anderson, and Hudson.
Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
[1] Dr. Sharon Walker, a psychologist employed by Children=s Protective Services, testified Amanda Brewer has an IQ score of 52. Walker further testified that Brewer has a significant cognitive deficit which could cause her to exhibit inappropriate emotional responses.
[2] Appellant is six foot four inches tall and weights 240 pounds. Anthony was three foot ten inches tall and weighed approximately forty-nine pounds.
[3] Appellant=s brief contains conflicting arguments regarding his third issue. In his brief, appellant describes Douglas as Athe arresting officer@ and focuses the majority of his argument on the alleged lack of probable cause for Douglas to arrest appellant. However, appellant also argues, based on the testimony quoted above, that Douglas was not the arresting officer.
[4] In his appellate brief, appellant concedes that he failed to raise any arguments at trial regarding the State=s alleged failure to prove the existence of an exception to the warrant requirement, and has therefore waived that issue on appeal. Accordingly, the scope of our review is limited to the trial court=s finding that Douglas had probable cause to arrest appellant.