Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 30, 2008.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
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NO. 14-07-00772-CR
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DAVID EARL SWEED, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 21st District Court
Washington County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 14,907
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Appellant David Earl Sweed challenges his conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child, arguing that the trial court violated his due process and confrontation clause rights by denying him the opportunity to develop his defensive theory. We affirm.
I. Background[1]
A grand jury indicted appellant for the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child. Appellant pleaded Anot guilty,@ and he was tried for the offense in September 2007.
During cross-examination of outcry witness Jerline Griffin, appellant attempted to delve into a matter involving Griffin and appellant=s brother, Craig Sweed. The State objected to this line of questioning on relevance grounds, and the trial court considered the evidence outside of the jury=s presence. Appellant argued as follows:
We have information . . . that Jerline was involved in a situation with Craig Sweed. Craig Sweed is the defendant=s brother. That situation involved this lady stealing some credit cards from - - from Mr. Sweed - - Craig Sweed, using them without his permission and that that was a situation to lead her to want to get back at not only Craig Sweed but also Mr. Sweed by basically fabricating this - - telling that young girl to state what she said. That=s our relevance . . . .
While still out of the jury=s presence, appellant questioned Griffin. She admitted she had served probation or deferred adjudication for an incident some twenty years ago involving appellant=s brother, Craig Sweed, and the use of some credit cards. The State objected that the testimony was irrelevant and the incident was too remote. The trial court sustained the State=s relevancy objection to A[a]ny questioning of this witness as it relates to her relationship with Mr. Craig Sweed regarding the taking of a credit card or the using of a credit card . . . .@ Appellant concluded his cross-examination of Griffin before the jury without further questioning her concerning any potential bias against the Sweed family or attempts to influence the complainant to fabricate her testimony.
The jury convicted appellant of aggravated sexual assault of a child, fined him $10,000, and sentenced him to forty-five years= confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. The trial court entered judgment on the jury=s verdict, and this appeal timely ensued.
II. Issues Presented
In his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court denied him the opportunity to present a complete defense and violated his state and federal due process rights Aby ruling that his defensive theory was inadmissible on relevance grounds.@ He similarly argues in his second issue that the ruling violated his rights under the confrontation clauses of the state and federal constitutions.
III. Analysis
When reviewing a trial court=s decision to admit or exclude evidence, we apply the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard. Ramos v. State, 245 S.W.3d 410, 417B18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its ruling lies Aoutside the zone of reasonable disagreement.@ Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Even if erroneous, the trial court=s exclusion of evidence offered by the accused generally does not rise to the level of constitutional error unless the offered evidence Aforms the vital core of a defendant=s theory of defense and effectively prevents him from presenting that defense.@ Id. at 219 (citing Wiley v. State, 74 S.W.3d 399, 406B07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)); Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).[2]
Here, appellant=s arguments in support of each of the issues presented are based on the premise that the trial court ruled his entire defensive theory inadmissible. As he explained in his brief:
Since there was no empirical evidence corroborating the abuse allegations, the State=s entire case rested upon the veracity of the witnesses, more particularly Jerline Griffin and [the complainant]. The defense theory attempted to be proffered by [a]ppellant through the cross-examination of Jerline Griffin was that, due to her admitted bias against [a]ppellant, her testimony was thereby tainted, and furthermore that she influenced [the complainant] to fabricate the entire abuse scenario. The trial court ruled this defense inadmissible on the grounds of relevance, and arbitrarily refused to allow the jury to hear about the bias. This ruling violated [a]ppellant=s rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, and Article I ' 10 of the Texas Constitution.
But this argument mischaracterizes the trial court=s ruling. The trial court did not exclude the defensive theory that Griffin was biased and therefore encouraged the complainant to make baseless accusations of sexual abuse against appellant. Rather, the narrow ruling was directed only at Griffin=s arrest twenty years earlier.
As demonstrated in appellant=s offer of proof, Griffin would have testified that she knew appellant=s brother Craig because her cousin, the complainant=s mother, had dated Craig in 1987. During that time, the complainant=s mother was arrested in connection with her use of Craig=s credit cards. In addition, Griffin was arrested because she was driving the vehicle in which merchandise purchased with the cards was found. Griffin received Adeferred probation,@[3] which she successfully completed, and the charge was dismissed. According to Griffin, she has had no contact with Craig Sweed in the fifteen years since the charge was dismissed.
We cannot conclude that the exclusion of this evidence as irrelevant falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. When offered to attack a witness=s credibility, evidence of a conviction is inadmissible if probation has been satisfactorily completed and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent felony or a crime of moral turpitude. Tex. R. Evid. 609(c)(2). Here, appellant offered no evidence that Griffin had such a subsequent criminal history. Although appellant asserted at trial that he did not offer the evidence to attack Griffin=s credibility, he argued that the events of 1987 led Griffin Ato want to get back at not only Craig Sweed but also [appellant] by basically fabricating this - - telling that young girl to state what she said.@ Inasmuch as Griffin had already testified that she first learned of the alleged sexual abuse directly from the complainant, we are not persuaded that this testimony was not offered to impugn Griffin=s credibility as an outcry witness.
Moreover, courts generally analyze relevancy by considering the purpose for which evidence is offered and determining whether there is a direct or logical connection between the evidence and the proposition sought to be proven. See Reed v. State, 59 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 2001, pet. ref=d). ARelevant evidence@ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Tex. R. Evid. 401. Here, appellant sought to prove that the complainant fabricated her allegations of sexual abuse against him. Reasonable people could conclude that Griffin=s arrest twenty years earlier in connection with an offense concerning Craig Sweed had no effect on the veracity of the complainant=s accusations against appellant. As the trial court explicitly informed appellant, Griffin=s alleged predisposition or bias toward the Sweed family was a Adifferent issue.@
IV. Conclusion
Having ascertained no abuse of discretion in the trial court=s evidentiary ruling, we overrule appellant=s two issues and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
/s/ Eva M. Guzman
Justice
Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed October 30, 2008.
Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Guzman and Brown.
Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
[1] Because appellant complains only about a specific evidentiary ruling, we limit our discussion of the facts to those necessary to resolve his appeal.
[2] Although inapplicable here, a criminal defendant=s constitutional rights could also be violated by the exclusion of evidence pursuant to a state evidentiary rule that categorically and arbitrarily prohibits the defendant from offering otherwise relevant, reliable evidence that is vital to his defense. Wiley, 74 S.W.3d at 406‑07.
[3] It appears from the context that the phrase deferred adjudication was intended.