MEMORANDUM DECISION
Sep 15 2015, 9:01 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Marce Gonzalez, Jr. Gregory F. Zoeller
Dyer, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Jodi Kathryn Stein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Wyatt Clayton Squyres, September 15, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
45A05-1502-CR-56
v. Appeal from the Lake Superior
Court.
The Honorable Salvador Vasquez,
State of Indiana, Judge.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Cause No. 45G01-1312-FB-118
Darden, Senior Judge
Statement of the Case
[1] Wyatt Clayton Squyres appeals the sentence the trial court imposed after he
pleaded guilty to one count of sexual misconduct with a minor, a Class C
felony. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9 (2007). We affirm.
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Issue
[2] Squyres raises one issue, which we restate as: whether Squyres’ sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On the evening of November 23, 2013, fifteen-year-old J.H. and other family
members attended a party in Lowell, Indiana. Squyres, who was twenty-three
years old, was also present. He knew J.H. and her siblings because he was a
friend of J.H.’s older brother. Squyres was aware that J.H. was only fifteen
years old. At the time, Squyres was facing a pending felony charge of theft,
having been released on bail just five days earlier.
[4] As the party progressed, Squyres went inside a camper parked on the property
where the party was taking place and laid down on the bed. Later, around one
or two a.m., J.H., along with others, went to the camper. Squyres was lying in
the bed where J.H. was supposed to sleep. She asked him to leave, but he
refused, saying he had nowhere to sleep. J.H. lay down next to him and went
to sleep.
[5] J.H., who had never had sexual intercourse before, awoke to discover that her
pants had been pulled down and one of her legs was wrapped around Squyres’
legs. Squyres’ penis was inside her vagina. J.H. had not consented to the
sexual intercourse, and Squyres stopped after she woke up. J.H. immediately
left the camper and got a ride home.
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[6] J.H. became extremely depressed after the incident and had to seek counseling
and therapy. She was still attending weekly therapy sessions at the time of the
sentencing hearing, over a year later. Subsequently, J.H. became “terrified of
boys” due to the sexual assault and stayed at home whenever possible. Tr. p.
19. She was embarrassed and dropped out of school, and her mother had to
homeschool her. Prior to the sexual assault, J.H. had had her mind set on
going to college, but, according to her mother, decided that she did not want to
go because “she’s terrified of what’s out there.” Id. She mostly stopped
socializing with her friends and turned down baby-sitting jobs if there was a
man in the house. At home, J.H. stayed in her room all the time and did not
sleep at night because she was afraid of the dark. Her mother had to stop
hugging her because J.H. could not “stand to be touched.” Id. According to
J.H.’s mother, J.H. will continue with her therapy for the foreseeable future,
perhaps “for the rest of her life.” Id.
[7] The State had originally charged Squyres with rape, a Class B felony, and three
counts of sexual misconduct with a minor, one as a Class B felony and two as
Class C felonies. The parties later reached a plea agreement; wherein, Squyres
agreed to plead guilty to one count of sexual misconduct with a minor as a
Class C felony, and the State agreed to dismiss the companion charges, in
addition to a pending Class D felony theft unrelated charge. Sentencing was
left to the discretion of the trial court. The trial court accepted Squyres’ guilty
plea and, after presentation of evidence and argument by counsel, sentenced
him to six and one-half years. Squyres filed a motion to correct error,
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requesting an alternative sentence not to exceed four years and/or probation.
The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Although a trial court may have acted within its lawful discretion in imposing a
sentence, Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorize
independent appellate review and revision of sentences through Indiana
Appellate Rule 7(B). Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
Rule 7(B) allows an appellate court to revise a sentence that is otherwise
authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the
Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
and the character of the offender.”
[9] The principal role of appellate review under Rule 7(B) is to attempt to leaven
the outliers, not to achieve a perceived “correct” result in each case. Garner v.
State, 7 N.E.3d 1012, 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). When assessing the nature of
the offense and the character of the offender, we may look to any factors
appearing in the record. Thompson, 5 N.E.3d at 391. It is the defendant’s
burden to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is
inappropriate. Id.
[10] At the time Squyres committed this offense, the advisory sentence for a Class C
felony was four years, the minimum sentence was two years, and the maximum
sentence was eight years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (2005). The trial court
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imposed an enhanced sentence of six and one-half years. Squyres asks the
Court to reduce his sentence to the advisory sentence of four years.
[11] Regarding the nature of the offense, Squyres forced himself upon a sleeping girl
at a party. Squyres was a friend of J.H.’s family and was aware that she was
only fifteen years old at the time. J.H. had not ever had sexual intercourse
before the sexual assault. The sexual assault had a severe impact upon J.H., to
the extent that she became so embarrassed that she dropped out of school and
had to be homeschooled. She had to seek counseling and therapy. At the time
of sentencing, J.H. continued to attend therapy weekly and had abandoned her
dreams of attending college. She has become so terrified of males that she
rarely leaves her house and will not accept a baby-sitting job if she knows a man
will be present. The harm done to the victim was significant and much greater
than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense. See Ind.
Code § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(1) (2012).
[12] Now, we turn to the character of the offender. Although Squyres has no prior
criminal convictions, we cannot overlook the fact that he was out on bond for a
prior unrelated felony offense when he committed the crime at issue here. He
pleaded guilty, thereby conserving judicial resources and relieving the victim
from having to testify. However, Squyres also received a substantial benefit
from the plea, specifically, dismissal of a Class B felony rape charge that carried
a much longer prison sentence, as well as the earlier unrelated felony offense.
Furthermore, the unrelated felony charge could have warranted a sentence to be
served consecutively to the sentence for the instant offense. See Westlake v. State,
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987 N.E.2d 170, 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (a guilty plea does not rise to the level
of significant mitigation where the defendant substantially benefits from the
plea agreement). Squyres asserts that he suffers from depression, but he does
not argue that his depression influenced his decision to commit the crime at
issue.
[13] Considering the nature of the offense, particularly the severe degree of harm to
the victim, and the fact that Squyres was out on bond when he committed the
current crime, he has failed to convince us that his enhanced sentence is
inappropriate.
Conclusion
[14] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[15] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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