COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Petty, Chafin and Retired Judge Coleman
UNPUBLISHED
SHIRLEY ROBINSON-MILES
MEMORANDUM OPINION
v. Record No. 1988-14-3 PER CURIAM
SEPTEMBER 15, 2015
DANVILLE DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE
James J. Reynolds, Judge
(Gregory T. Casker, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting
on brief.
(Alan B. Spencer; Sandra T. Chinn-Gilstrap; Guardian ad litem for
the minor children; Office of the City Attorney; Woods Rogers PLC,
on brief), for appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting
on brief.
Shirley Robinson-Miles, mother, appeals a decision of the trial court terminating her
parental rights to seven of her minor children, pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). On appeal,
mother contends the trial court erred in (1) finding she failed to remedy substantially the conditions
which led to or required the continued placement of the children in foster care; and (2) failing to
find she had remedied substantially the conditions which led to or required continuation of foster
care placement as it applied to any of the children individually as opposed to the children
collectively. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude this appeal is without
merit. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Retired Judge Coleman took part in the consideration of this case by designation
pursuant to Code § 17.1-400(D).
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the “‘light most favorable’ to the prevailing party in the
circuit court and grant to that party the benefit of ‘all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
therefrom.’” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 262, 616 S.E.2d 765, 767
(2005) (quoting Logan v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d
460, 463 (1991)).
Mother has eight children. This appeal involves the termination of her parental rights to
seven of the children- -L.T., S.T., D.T., T.T., T.R., T.B., and A.M. These children were all under
the age of thirteen at the time the trial court hearing. The children were removed from mother’s
custody on September 7, 2011, after a police officer visited the home on a follow-up visit and found
the family living in filthy and “deplorable” conditions.
At the trial court hearing, evidence was presented concerning incidents of domestic abuse
involving mother and her husband. Dr. A.J. Anderson, a psychologist, evaluated mother and
determined she is excessively self-focused and preoccupied with her own needs and feelings to the
extent that it likely prevents her from giving adequate attention to the needs and feelings of others.
Dr. Anderson also concluded that mother has narcissistic characteristics that limit her response to
interventions. He opined that mother is not likely to “self-correct or be open to constructive
criticism.” Dr. Anderson stated that individuals diagnosed with mother’s personality disorders often
do not change considerably over time, even with treatment.
Katie Hall, a Danville Division of Social Services (DSS) employee, participated in over one
hundred visits with mother “and various combinations of her seven children.” She described the
visits as “generally chaotic,” and she testified that three to four additional DSS workers always
participated in the visits. Hall gave several specific examples of incidents that took place during
some of the visits. The examples involved mother having difficulty supervising the children or
mother failing to intervene when a child was exhibiting inappropriate or potentially harmful
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behavior. In one instance, mother failed to intervene when one of the children repeatedly climbed a
pole despite being told by DSS workers to stop doing so. The child fell and struck his head on
concrete, requiring medical attention.
Sheila Walker, a case worker with DePaul’s Family Services (DFS), worked with mother
since 2011. She testified DFS provided mother with reunification services, parenting instruction,
budgeting assistance, nutrition services, transportation to the supervised visits with the children, and
assistance in administering the visits. Walker testified mother had consistent problems with a lack
of income and managing her frustrations. She also stated mother refused to participate in any
academic activities with the children. Walker described instances of visitation between mother and
the children that involved mother failing to properly supervise the children and failing to recognize
their needs.
Melisha Carwile, a DSS foster worker, testified mother completed twelve parenting classes
over an eighteen-month time period, a task that could have been completed in twelve weeks.
Mother attended approximately sixteen domestic violence classes. DSS provided counseling for
mother, but she attended only “sporadically.” DSS scheduled a second psychological evaluation for
mother in order to compare her progress since the evaluation in 2011, but mother failed to appear
for the appointment.
Carwile testified DSS assisted mother with funding for utilities, food, and rent and assisted
her with transportation. She stated mother has lived at six different residences since the children
were removed from her care. Carwile also testified mother reported instances of domestic violence
involving her husband. Mother struggles with positive parenting skills and maintaining a safe
environment for the children. Carwile testified mother often does not heed advice on parenting or
lifestyle changes that would assist mother, and she often requested a change in DSS employees
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assigned to her case when she did not agree with the recommendations or observations of her case
workers.
Evidence was presented that most of the children are receiving mental health therapy and
their behaviors are improving while in foster care. In addition, some of the children had very poor
dental hygiene and required dental intervention while in foster care.
Mother testified she has lived at five different residences since the removal of the children in
2011. At the time of the trial court hearing, she was residing with relatives and her eighth child.
She was not employed, and she intended to apply for disability. Mother stated she was in an
accident in 2012 and was unable to work at the time. Mother testified her relatives are “taking care
of her,” and she acknowledged she would “struggle” to financially support the seven children. The
written statement of facts states mother indicated it would be “too much for her to tackle” to take the
seven or eight children to a public location without assistance. Mother was not aware of the
children’s emotional and physical issues with the exception of one child’s need for medication. She
denied any incidents of abuse involving her husband, and she admitted she still associates with him.
Mother testified she used “the proceeds of government assistance tuition programs” to pay rent for
some of her past residences over the last thirty-three months. Mother presented evidence that she
was seeking mental health counseling.
The trial court held it was in the best interests of the children to terminate mother’s parental
rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C). On July 21, 2014, the trial court entered an order reflecting
its ruling. This appeal followed.
Mother argues the trial court erred in finding she failed to remedy substantially the
conditions which led to or required continued placement of the children in foster care. Mother
asserts that, despite suffering from a mental condition, she cooperated with DSS and she
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participated in the services offered by DSS, specifically attending visitation with the children and
attending counseling, parenting, and domestic abuse classes.
When reviewing a decision to terminate parental rights, we presume the trial court
“‘thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its
determination based on the child’s best interests.’” Toms, 46 Va. App. at 265-66, 616 S.E.2d at 769
(quoting Fields v. Dinwiddie Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 7, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659
(2005)). “The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus, will not be
disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Id. at 266, 616 S.E.2d
at 769 (quoting Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (citation omitted)). “In its capacity as
factfinder, therefore, the circuit court retains ‘broad discretion in making the decisions necessary to
guard and to foster a child’s best interests.’” Id. (quoting Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387
S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990)).
In its final order entered on July 21, 2014, the trial court made specific findings in this case.
The trial court initially found mother “ignored” the best interests of the children. It also found
mother’s mental health condition and her inability to put the needs of the children before her own
needs compromised her ability to care for the children, both individually and collectively. The trial
court noted that DSS had offered mother services for years prior to the 2011 removal of the
children, and mother had given “no thought to her ability to care for the children.” The trial court
found that since the removal, and for more than twelve months, DSS offered mother mental health
services, liberal visitation with the “seven children together collectively and individually,” parental
guidance in learning how to safely and effectively parent the children, individually and collectively,
domestic violence counseling, and referrals to other resources aimed at family reunification. The
trial court found that, despite the efforts of DSS over a period of thirty-three months, mother without
good cause has been unwilling or unable to make substantial progress toward the elimination of the
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conditions which led to or required continuation of the foster care placements. The trial court also
noted the extensive history of domestic violence in the family and mother’s refusal to cooperate
with DSS in order for DSS to determine her progress.
“The twelve-month time limit established by Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) was designed to
prevent an indeterminate state of foster care ‘drift’ and to encourage timeliness by the courts and
social services in addressing the circumstances that resulted in the foster care placement.” L.G. v.
Amherst Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 41 Va. App. 51, 56, 581 S.E.2d 886, 889 (2003).
[S]ubsection C termination decisions hinge not so much on the
magnitude of the problem that created the original danger to the
child, but on the demonstrated failure of the parent to make
reasonable changes. Considerably more “retrospective in nature,”
subsection C requires the court to determine whether the parent has
been unwilling or unable to remedy the problems during the period
in which he has been offered rehabilitation services.
Toms, 46 Va. App. at 271, 616 S.E.2d at 772 (quoting City of Newport News Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
v. Winslow, 40 Va. App. 556, 562-63, 580 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2003)).
The evidence, as recited above, supports the findings of the trial court. Evidence was
presented that mother showed a continued lack of ability to supervise the children and maintain a
safe environment for the children. Mother attended counselling “sporadically,” and she failed to
appear for the second psychological follow-up evaluation. Carwile testified mother often did not
heed advice on parenting or lifestyle changes that would assist her. Importantly, mother’s own
testimony showed she lacked an ability to financially support a total of eight children, she continued
to lack stable housing, she did not understand the needs of the seven removed children, and she
questioned her own ability to supervise the children in a public location without assistance.
“‘[P]ast actions and relationships over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of what
the future may be expected to hold.’” Linkous v. Kingery, 10 Va. App. 45, 56, 390 S.E.2d 188, 194
(1990) (quoting Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530, 536, 359 S.E.2d 315, 319 (1987)). “It is clearly not
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in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if,
a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax Cnty. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990).
Based on the record, the trial court did not err in terminating mother’s parental rights to the
seven children pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2).
Mother also asserts the trial court erred by failing to find she remedied substantially the
conditions which led to or required continuation of the foster care placements as it applied to “any
of the children individually as opposed to the children collectively.” She asserts the evidence “only
involved situations where all seven children were present” and no evidence was presented
concerning mother’s visitation with fewer than seven children or in the absence of two specific
children. However, a DSS worker testified mother had visitation with “various combinations of her
seven children.” Furthermore, the trial court’s order specifically recognized mother had “liberal
visitation with the seven children together collectively and individually.” The trial court’s order
also stated mother received “guidance in learning how to safely and effectively parent the seven
children, together collectively and individually.” Finally, the trial court concluded “mother’s mental
health condition and inability to put the needs of the children before her needs compromises her
ability to care for one child, individually, and all seven children, collectively[.]” Moreover, mother
presented evidence in the case and the written statement of facts does not show she presented
evidence addressing how she remedied substantially the conditions which led to or required
continuation of the foster care placement as it applied to any of the children individually.
Accordingly, mother’s argument is without merit.
Based on the record, the trial court did not err in terminating mother’s parental rights to her
children pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2).
Affirmed.
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Shirley Robinson-Miles v. Danville Division of Social Services
Combined Opinion