IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-21122
Summary Calendar
GREGORY WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
HARRIS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT,
Defendant - Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Souther District of Texas
USDC No. H:99-CV-4380
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November 7, 2002
Before BARKSDALE, DEMOSS and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plantiff-Appellant Gregory Williams initiated this
action against his former employer, Defendant-Appellee Harris
County Hospital District (the District), alleging that he was
terminated from his employment as a radiology technician because
of his age and because of his disability in violation of the Age
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et
seq.,(ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. § 12111 et seq.,(ADA). Williams also alleges he was
terminated in retaliation for conduct which is protected under
the ADEA and ADA. The district court granted summary judgment on
all counts in favor of Appellee. Williams appeals from this
ruling.
This Court reviews a granting of summary judgment de novo.
Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir.
1998). In the instant case, summary judgment is properly granted
if the District, as the movant, demonstrates the absence of a
dispute of material fact, and if, in rebuttal, Williams fails to
demonstrate that a dispute of material fact exists. Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). Moreover,
with respect to William’s discrimination claims, the District
must demonstrate either that Williams has failed to produce
evidence sufficient to support a prima facie case of
discrimination, or that Williams has failed to produce evidence
demonstrating that the District’s proffered reason for
terminating Williams is pretexual. McDonnell Douglass Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture,
235 F.3d 219, 223 (5th Cir. 2000). Here, the district court found
that Williams failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under either the ADA or the ADEA, and we agree.
2
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination,
Williams must provide evidence sufficient to create an inference
that he: (1) was discharged; (2) was qualified for his position;
(3) fell within the protected class; and (4) was terminated from
his employment because of age.1 Russell, 235 F.3d at 223;
O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312
(1996). However, while Williams is able to establish the first
three of these criteria, Williams does not provide even a
scintilla of evidence supporting an inference that he was
discharged because of his age. At most Williams suggests that
substantially younger individuals were hired and promoted by the
District prior to Williams’ dismissal, but this, alone, is
insufficient to establish an inference that Williams was
1
While, the district court particularly notes that Williams
does not point to evidence suggesting he was replaced by a
significantly younger employee, we would note that such a showing
is not the sole means by which Williams might have established
the fourth element of his prima facie case. Although a plaintiff
may construct a sufficient inference that he was discharged
because of age by showing that he was replaced in his position by
someone not insignificantly younger than himself, such a showing
may also be made by pointing to other indicia of discriminatory
motives. See, O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517
U.S. 308, 312 (1996)(finding that, “[b]ecause the ADEA prohibits
discrimination on the basis of age and not class membership, the
fact that a replacement is substantially younger than the
plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination
than is the fact that the plaintiff was replaced by someone
outside the protected class,” but that the key to the analysis
lies, “in recognizing that the prima facie case requires
‘evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment
decision was based on a[n] [illegal] discriminatory criterion.’”
Id. at 312 (quoting, Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
358 (1977)).
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discharged because of his age. Consequently, summary judgment was
properly entered against him with respect to this claim.
Similarly, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
in violation of the ADA, Williams must first demonstrate that he
falls within the protected class. Sherrod, 132 F.3d at 119; 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Thus, Williams must produce evidence
supporting an inference that he is substantially limited in a
major life activity. Sherrod, 132 F.3d at 1120. Williams asserts
that he is limited in the major life activity of working because
he suffers from an injury which restricts his ability to bend,
squat, work over forty hours in a week, or lift over forty
pounds. However, these restrictions alone do not create an
inference that he is limited in the major life activity of
working. See id. (finding that while the Appellant had produced
evidence supporting her assertion that she was unable to lift
more than forty-five pounds, that limitation, alone, did not
create the inference that she was limited in a major life
activity). In addition to supplying evidence of his injury-
induced physical restrictions, Williams must also point to
evidence indicating that as a result of his limitations he is
either restricted in his ability to preform a class of jobs, or a
range of jobs in various classes. Id. at 1120. Williams presents
no such evidence. Therefore, summary judgment was properly
entered against him with respect to this claim.
4
Finally, Williams’ retaliation claims are equally
unsupported by the record. To maintain his retaliation claims,
Williams must show: “(1)that[]he engaged in protected activity,
(2)that an adverse employment action occurred, and (3)that a
causal link existed between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action.” Sherrod, 132 F.3d at 1122 n.8.
Williams, however, fails to produce evidence such that a
reasonable juror could infer that a causal connection exists
between the filing of William’s EEOC claim and his dismissal. In
support of his contention that a causal connection does exist
between the filing of his complaint and his dismissal, Williams
points to the fact that he was dismissed after filing his first
EEOC complaint. However, the District offers a non-retaliatory
reason for Williams’ termination: specifically that Williams’
coworkers had asserted multiple complaints regarding Williams’
conduct at work. In producing this putatively nondiscriminatory
rationale for terminating Williams, the District shifts the
burden to Williams to demonstrate that the proffered reason is
pretextual. Williams, however, does not meet this burden. While
Williams contests the veracity of the complaints lodged against
him by his fellow employees, he does not offer evidence disputing
the assertion that these complaints formed, in the mind of the
decision maker, the basis for his termination. He may well have
been wrongly accused by his coworkers, but his obligation in
asserting his claim of retaliation is to demonstrate that the
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complaints functioned, at least in part, as a vehicle for masking
the decision maker’s discriminatory motives. In the instant case
this obligation remains unmet.
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we find that summary
judgment was properly entered in favor of the District on all
counts.
AFFIRM.
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