IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
FROM THE ELEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS
TAYLOR COUNTY
O P I N I O N
Appellant was charged with possession of cocaine. The trial court denied his pretrial motion to suppress, which claimed that the arresting officer had no probable cause to detain him and conduct a warrantless search of his car a search that led to the discovery of cocaine inside a film cannister on the console of the car. Appellant then pled guilty, and the trial court, finding an enhancement paragraph true, sentenced him to twenty years in prison.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that, under "the totality of the circumstances" approach set out in Illinois v. Gates, (1) the arresting officer "had probable cause and properly searched appellant's vehicle." (2) Appellant petitioned this Court for discretionary review, claiming that the court of appeals erred because the evidence of probable cause was "so weak as to make its decision, and that of the trial court, clearly wrong." (3) We agree with the court of appeals that the arresting officer had probable cause to search appellant's car and therefore affirm.
I.
At the hearing on appellant's motion to suppress, Agent Gray, a twenty-year veteran of the Abilene Police Department, testified that he was assigned to the Special Operations Division which dealt primarily with narcotics and vice violations. A confidential informant phoned Agent Gray one morning and told him that he (4) had just seen appellant "in possession of an off-white, rock-like substance that was purported to him to be rocks, which is a street name for crack cocaine." The informant said that appellant was in a specific area of Abilene "known for drugs being dealt." The informant described appellant's appearance and identified him by name. Agent Gray also knew appellant by name from past drug dealing- incidents, and he knew that appellant was a felon. The informant told Agent Gray that appellant was in a specific car: he described that car, gave the license plate number, (5) and said that the rocks were in the car. The informant called Agent Gray less than an hour after he saw appellant with the rocks. Agent Gray then met personally with the informant, showed him appellant's photograph which the informant identified as the person who had the rocks in his car. Agent Gray immediately went out to find appellant.
Agent Gray had known the informant for over a year and said that he believed that this informant was reliable and trustworthy. Although the informant was being paid and had a prior history of misdemeanor offenses, he had provided information that was always shown to be true and that had led to the arrest of at least five drug offenders.
Agent Gray and a patrol officer searched the "drug trafficking" neighborhood where the informant had said appellant was located, looking for the car that the informant had described. They soon found it parked on the side of the road near a school. Appellant was sitting in the car.
Agent Gray approached appellant, told him who he and the patrol officer were, got him out of the car and handcuffed him, advised him of his rights, told him about the information they had received, and asked him if he had any controlled substances or other items that he wanted to surrender. Appellant said no. The patrol officer then searched appellant, but found no contraband. So Agent Gray searched the car and found rocks of cocaine in a film cannister inside a black toboggan (a type of sock hat) that was on the center console. Agent Gray then arrested appellant for possession of a controlled substance.
II.
Probable cause to search exists when the totality of the circumstances allows a conclusion that there is a fair probability of finding contraband or evidence at a particular location. (6) "[P]robable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts[.]" (7) To avoid "rigid" legal rules when dealing with information obtained from informants, the Supreme Court changed the "two-pronged test" of Aguilar v. Texas, (8) into a totality of the circumstances test in Illinois v. Gates. (9) Under the Gates test, the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" prongs of Aguilar for assessing the usefulness of an informant's tips, are not independent. "They are better understood as relevant considerations in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable-cause determinations: a deficiency in one may be compensated for . . . by a strong showing as to the other[.]" (10)
We review a trial court's implicit findings of historical fact with great deference as long as the record supports those findings. (11) However, the question of whether a specific search or seizure is "reasonable" or supported by probable cause under the Fourth Amendment is subject to de novo review. (12)
III.
In the present case, the evidence showed that the informant: (1) had been reliable in the past; (2) gave detailed information about the appellant, his recent whereabouts and his recent possession of cocaine "rocks"; and (3) provided verifiable detail. Furthermore, as the court of appeals noted, Agent Gray was able to verify almost every piece of the informant's information, except the actual presence of the cocaine, before detaining appellant and searching his car. (13)
First, the evidence established that the confidential informant was credible and reliable. Agent Gray had known the informant for over a year. The information that he had provided in the past had always been shown to be true and had led to the arrest of at least five drug offenders. Thus, by Agent Gray's testimony, the informant was batting one thousand, at least with respect to five prior occasions. (14) This is an important factor in establishing the credibility of the informant as it may be inferred that the police would not repeatedly act on information from one who has not proven by experience to be reliable. (15)
Second, the evidence established that the confidential agent was relaying freshly obtained, personally observed information. He called Agent Gray right after he had seen appellant in possession of a "rock-like substance that was purported to him [the informant] to be rocks." An informant's first-hand observation of criminal activity provides a strong basis for the informant's knowledge of the facts he relays. (16) And it does not take a rocket scientist to deduce that, on the street, "rocks" means "rock cocaine."
Third, the evidence established that the confidential informant provided a wealth of verifiable details, details that Agent Gray did, in fact, verify. (17) He told Agent Gray appellant's name and accurately described his appearance; he identified appellant's photograph; he described the car appellant was driving and gave its license plate number; he described the specific "drug-dealing" neighborhood where appellant had been sitting in his car and gave the street boundaries.
Agent Gray immediately drove to the neighborhood where the informant had said he had just seen appellant. (18) Appellant was still in that "drug-dealing" neighborhood, parked down the street from a school. He was in the car that the informant had described. That car had the license plate number that the informant had said it had. Agent Gray verified the license plate number and discovered that the car did not belong to appellant; this fact tends to show that the informant really had seen appellant in this car, rather than simply knowing, from the rumor mill, that appellant owned a car with a certain license plate number. (19)
Appellant complains that Agent Gray did not corroborate the fact that appellant actually possessed rock cocaine in his car before he detained appellant and conducted the search. True enough, but that was the purpose of the search of appellant's car-to discover the contraband. Furthermore, requiring independent police corroboration-as a per se rule-is contrary to Gates and other precedent for two reasons. First, Gates criticizes per se rules for the determination of probable cause. (20) Second, independent police corroboration has never been treated as a per se requirement in each and every case. (21) In any event, Agent Gray did corroborate almost everything that the informant told him. Corroborating the existence of the cocaine before police may search for that cocaine is neither necessary nor, in many cases, possible. (22) Because the informant's veracity and basis of knowledge were sufficient, by themselves, to establish probable cause, Agent Gray's corroboration of details was, in the words of Professor LaFave, "only the frosting on the probable cause cake." (23)
Appellant also complains in his brief that Agent Gray illegally detained and handcuffed him before conducting the search of his car. He did not present that issue for this Court's consideration: his ground for review is limited to the existence of probable cause. (24) Appellant further asserts in his brief that Agent Gray did not have exigent circumstances to conduct a warrantless search of his car-he should have obtained a warrant. Once again, this question was not presented in his ground for review as it does not relate to the existence of probable cause. (25)
Because Agent Gray had ample probable cause to believe that appellant had rock cocaine in his possession or vehicle and that he would still have contraband in his possession when Agent Gray found him one hour after the informant had seen appellant with it, the court of appeals correctly held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to suppress on this basis.
We therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Delivered: May 24, 2006
Publish
1. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
2. 3. Appellant's sole ground for review reads as follows:
The court of appeals' decision upholding the trial court's determination that there
was probable cause to search Mr. Dixon's car was not based upon sufficient
evidence and was, therefore, so weak as to make its decision, and that of the trial
court, clearly wrong.
4. During cross-examination, appellant's attorney indicated that he knew who the
confidential informant was and that it was a specifically named female. Agent Gray neither
confirmed nor denied that his informant was that person.
5. Agent Gray checked the license plate number and discovered that the car did not belong
to appellant, but that it had not been reported stolen.
6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. Agent Gray knew appellant from prior drug dealing incidents and also knew the
neighborhood that the informant described as a high-crime, drug-dealing one.
19. 20. 21. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 577-85 (1971) (approving, without
discussing corroboration, an affidavit with no police corroboration); 22. 23. 24. We note, however, that it is well-established that when officers have probable cause to
search a person or location, they may temporarily detain those persons or others who arrive
during the search. 25. But once again, we note that the Supreme Court explicitly reiterated in